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Is there a constitutive relationship between agency and causation? This
question seeks to determine whether or not causation needs to be analysed in
terms of agency; thus, the relationship between agency and causation should
be read in a particular direction—that is, agency is a constitutive element of
causation. Many readers might think the answer to this question is obviously
“no”. There are many cases where a causal relationship (i.e., a relationship
between a cause and an effect) is entirely unassociated with human agency.
Therefore, in order to refute the claim that causation is constituted by agency,
it appears that one must only provide a simple counterexample. For example,
we now know that the dinosaurs went extinct 65 million years ago because a
large asteroid struck the earth near the Mexican peninsula. The dinosaurs’
unfortunate extinction is a clear example of a relationship between cause
and effect, which appears to have nothing to do with human agency. Other
examples include the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake, the expansion of the
universe, or tidal movements on Earth, to name a few. In other words, the
claim that there is a constitutive relationship between agency and causation
seems to be easily refuted by a mere counterexample.
It could also be argued that the claim that agency is a constitutive ele-
ment of causation is outdated. The book of Genesis states that ‘God created
the heavens and the earth’. In other words, God (i.e., an agent) did some-
thing that resulted in the creation of the heavens and the earth. Historical
Christianity claims that God created by fiat—that is, God spoke and thereby
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created. However, a scientific perspective might suggest that this claim is
antiquated and instead cite the Big Bang as another example of an agent-
independent causal relationship.
Yet, there are cases where a connection between agency and causation
is rather clear. Tabloids are filled with stories about relationships that end
because one of the partners was unfaithful. In these cases, we can reasonably
claim that the cause was an action of the unfaithful partner. As another
example, when I was a young boy, I once broke my arm playing tennis. My
opponent hit a hard shot down the baseline, and I dove (rather carelessly) to
return the shot. To this day, I consider the cause of my injury to be a direct
result of my own action (i.e., diving).
While there are many other cases that could be used to support the
claim that causation is related to agency, there are just as many cases—
indeed many more—where a clear connection between agency and causation
appears to be absent. The best one might do, in light of these examples, is
claim that agency can be connected to causation but acknowledge that the
relationship is of little or no consequence to a plausible theory of causation.
Interestingly, a so-called agency theory of causation, which originated in
the middle of the twentieth century, was developed in the early 1990s. The
agency theory is generally associated with the work of Huw Price. In a
1993 paper with Peter Menzies, ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’, Price
argues that causation is contingent on human agency, much in the same way
that colour is contingent on the human visual system. Thus, Menzies and
Price conclude that there is a constitutive relationship between causation
and agency. Yet, with counterexamples so readily available, why do Menzies
and Price defend the idea that agency is essential to causation?
The answer, as you will soon discover in this thesis, is rather complicated.
However, there is something of a historical precedent for the idea that cau-
sation is related to agency—indeed, Menzies and Price did not conjure the
idea from nothing.
There is a line in the philosophy of causation, traced through such thinkers
as Hume, Mach, and Russell, which says that causation is not something that
really exists or something that exists in terms of a mind-independent reality.
For Hume, the causal relation was an idea (or habit) formed by the mind. A
cause as a natural relation is defined as
...an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united
with it that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the
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idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more
lively idea of the other. (Hume, 2015, p. 28).
For Mach, when we speak of cause and effect,
...then we arbitrarily emphasize those aspects, the connections
among which are the ones on which we have to focus, when we
represent a fact from a certain perspective that is important to
us. In nature there are no cause nor an effect. (Mach, 1901, p.
513)
A decade later, Russell would repeat Mach’s claim, saying, ‘there is no cause,
nor an effect’, because physicists had ceased to look for causes. According to
Russell, physicists no longer looked for causes because fundamental physical
laws were incompatible with the ordinary notion of cause. Russell concludes
that causation is merely a ‘relic’ and that the notion of cause should be
eliminated. In relation to the so-called law of causation, Russell famously
remarks that
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster
among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like
the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no
harm (Russell, 1913, p. 1).
While Mach’s view gives some minimal credence to causal notions in rela-
tion to us, his view that causal notions are in some sense perspectival would
become an idea that later philosophers would appraise, as we will soon see.
Moreover, the notion that causation is incompatible with physics is a hypoth-
esis that contemporary philosophers of science have taken seriously. Yet, in
light of the apparent incompatibility, philosophers have overwhelmingly re-
jected Russell’s conclusion that the notion of cause should be eliminated.
Why?
The answer can be traced to a new line in the philosophy of causation;
this line of thought states that, while causation may not be located in the
natural world (or reducible to fundamental laws), it can be located in human
practice or human agency.
In her influential essay, ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’ (1979),
Nancy Cartwright argues that while Russell is correct regarding the so-called
law of causation, Russell is incorrect to conclude that we can eliminate the
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notion of cause. According to Cartwright, we need the notion of cause be-
cause it enables us to think about and pursue effective strategies. Effective
strategies are methods that allow us to achieve certain ends. For example, one
could prevent further cases of malaria by gassing swamps. While Cartwright
does not explicitly defend the idea that causation is linked to human agency,
her idea that causation is useful for pursuing effective strategies certainly
makes the connection perceptible.
Indeed, Cartwright was not the first to notice the connection. In his book
An Essay on Metaphysics (1940), R.G. Collingwood describes three “senses”
of the word cause.1 In the third sense, the theoretical sense, causation is
taken to be an absolute relationship, which is made up of basic forces or
powers that exist in nature independent of human agents. Much like Russell
(though for different reasons), Collingwood rejects the theoretical sense of
cause for being nonsensical. Yet, following Collingwood, one could reject
the theoretical sense of cause but naturally maintain that causation was still
important because, for example, one still relies on the notion of cause in sense
one or sense two. Indeed, sense two, which Collingwood called the practical
sense of cause, is still important for sciences like medicine and engineering,
while sense one (i.e., the historical sense) is still important for historical
enquiry.2
Notably, Collingwood describes the practical sense of cause as agent-
relative. Although causes, as Mach pointed out, are perspectival, they are
non-arbitrary, according to Collingwood, because they provide us with con-
trol. For Collingwood, causation is explicitly defined as agent-relative be-
cause a cause is something that allows an agent to manipulate nature and
ultimately to achieve certain ends. For example, I could prevent scurvy by
consuming vitamin C or I could produce fire by manipulating two pieces of
wood.
Here, we find a plausible grounding for the agency theory of cause. Cau-
sation is (i) not something that exists at a fundamental level independent
of us as human beings, and (ii) causation is important for us (or from our
perspective) as human agents.3
1Prior to Collingwood, Ramsey (1929) articulated the idea that the distinction between
cause and effect could be grounded in deliberate action, i.e., human agency.
2In his influential book, What is History? (1961), the historian E.H. Carr actually
suggests that the practical sense of cause is the important sense for historical enquiry.
3(i) and (ii) are similar to what Price and Corry (2007) call causal republicanism. A
causal republican is someone who believes that, while causation is not a natural kind or
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Grounding the agency theory in (i) and (ii) may provide the theory with
some credibility. However, two obvious problems remain. First, there needs
to be a way to handle the numerous counterexamples which indicate that
causation is not connected to human agency. Second, relating causation to
human agents or to the perspective of human beings with distinct ends or
goals suggests that causation is subjective. I take it to be self evident and
incontrovertible that a viable theory of causation should be able to capture
both the scope of well-established scientific claims, such as the extinction of
the dinosaurs, as well as a clear sense of objectivity. Indeed, these are both
problems that threaten the agency theory of causation.
Lastly, even if one were to accept (i) and (ii) above, it is not evident
that this entails a constitutive relationship between agency and causation.
For example, in his book, Making Things Happen (2003), the philosopher
James Woodward argues (like Russell) that the notion of cause seems to be
incompatible with physics. Moreover, Woodward argues (like Collingwood)
that causes are handles that allow us to pursue certain ends. Yet, Wood-
ward explicitly disagrees with Price that causation is constituted by human
agency, precisely on the grounds that it makes causation unduly subjective
and limited in scope.
1.2 Philosophical Claims
The philosophical position defended in this thesis, Causal Interactionism,
is meant to provide a consistent position on causality, whereby the causal
relation is neither a physical, mind-independent feature of the world, nor is it
arbitrary, subjective, or something that varies from individual to individual.
I claim that there is a constitutive relationship between agency and causa-
tion. I develop a novel approach, Causal Interactionism, whereby we can say
that the causal relation involves an interaction between human agents and
the physical world and thus that causation is constituted by agency. This ap-
proach allows us to overcome numerous problems associated with standard
agency theories of causation (e.g., Collingwood [1940], Menzies and Price
something that is discoverable at the level of fundamental physics, it is, nonetheless, ine-
liminable. ‘Causal republicanism’, Price and Corry claim, ‘is thus the view that although
the notion of causation is useful, perhaps indispensable, in our dealings with the world, it
is a category provided neither by God nor by physics, but rather constructed by us’ (p.
2).
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[1993]) and to clarify the precise relationship between agency and causation.
This thesis is organised around a specific debate, and the debate can be
described in general terms—it is a disagreement between those who think
that causation is agent-independent (i.e., unrelated to human agents) and
those who believe that causation somehow depends on us as agents. The
thesis follows an ongoing debate between two manipulationists, James Wood-
ward and Huw Price. I also bring Collingwood into the debate because
Collingwood created the approach, and much of what he has to say is still
relevant (in the debate and my work).
While Woodward and Price agree that causes are handles that allow us to
pursue certain ends, they have been debating the precise relationship between
causation and agency for more than a decade. The debate between Wood-
ward and Price can be summarised quite easily. On one hand, Price argues
that causation is constituted by human agency.4 On the other, Woodward
(2003, 2013) has argued that Price is mistaken—he claims that causation
is not constituted by human agency. For Woodward, the causal relation is
objective and agent-independent.
I claim to have resolved the debate between Woodward and Price. The
details will emerge throughout this work. The resolution to the debate does
not show a clear winner: both Woodward and Price are slightly mistaken.
Although there are important differences between Woodward and Price’s ac-
counts, in most places, I have tried to show that there is, in fact, a consensus
between Woodward and Price and indeed a consensus between Woodward,
Price, and Collingwood.
In Part 1, I will introduce the agency approach under its various forms
and highlight the prospects and problems associated with it. I will situate
the agency approach by investigating Russell’s (1913) arguments against the
notion of cause, and argue that the agency approach should be viewed in
light of Russell’s concerns (Chapter 2). In Chapter 3, I will argue that the
agency approach is able to overcome two serious challenges associated with
standard notions of causation, viz., the problem of causal asymmetry and
the problem of spurious causes. However, I will also argue that the agency
approach is open to two serious concerns, notably, the problem of scope and
the problem of subjectivity.
Part 2 of the thesis offers a defence for the agency approach. In Chapter
4I’ll specifically focus on the work of Price, and not Menzies, because Price has contin-
ued to develop and defend the agency theory, whereas Menzies has not.
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4, I argue against Michael Strevens, who holds that the causal relation is
absolute and mind-independent. Against Strevens, I argue that the causal
relation cannot be absolute because the causal relation is relative to what I
call ‘frameworking’. The idea that the causal relation is non-absolute leads
to a valuable discussion for the agency approach. If causation is relative,
Collingwood’s claim that causation is relative to human agency will have
increased plausibility. To show that the agency approach can and should be
considered objective, I highlight the debate between Woodward and Price,
which I take to be centred around the question of objectivity. By making a
distinction between two kinds of objectivity—absolute objectivity and rela-
tive objectivity—I argue that the agency approach is objective in the relative
sense. Indeed, I reveal a consensus between Woodward, Price, and Colling-
wood regarding causation and objectivity. They all agree that causation is
objective in the relative sense and reject the idea that causation is objective
in the absolute sense.
Chapter 5 includes an argument against Alyssa Ney, who defends foun-
dationalism about causation. Foundationalism about causation is the the-
sis that the nature of causation is physical. Ney’s foundationalism allows
for frameworking, but she maintains that what is important for the causal
relation—that is, what is essential—is physical facts about the world. While
Ney provides a fascinating insight into the relationship between the physi-
cal world and practices like frameworking, I argue that her account does not
show what she intends. What Ney shows, contrary to her thesis, is that prac-
tices like frameworking are an essential element of the causal relation. Thus,
we cannot claim, following Ney, that the nature of causation is physical.
In Chapter 6, I argue that Woodward’s interventionist theory relies on
agency, and I investigate the relationship between agency and anthropocen-
trism. By creating a distinction between overt agency (e.g., deliberate bodily
movements) and mental agency, which includes deliberate reasoning, I reveal
that Woodward’s theory is distinct from Price’s agency theory in that it does
not rely on the concept of overt agency. However, I further bring to light
that interventionism does, indeed, rely on agency—notably, mental agency.
Furthermore, by distinguishing between different forms of anthropocentrism,
I exhibit a consensus regarding the manipulation approach and anthropocen-
trism while showing how the agency approach avoids an untoward anthro-
pocentrism.
Part 3 of the thesis introduces my own version of the agency approach
and explores its prospects. In Chapter 7, I bring together the work of Part
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2 and develop my theory, Causal Interactionism. I defend the thesis that
the causal relation involves an interaction between human agents and the
physical world (and thus that the causal relation is agent-dependent). I
further explore the metaphysical implications for Causal Interactionism and
conclude that agency is a constitutive element of causation.
I use the final chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8) to highlight the lead-
ing prospects for Causal Interactionism. I argue that Causal Interactionism
can overcome the problem of scope by taking into consideration facts about
mental agency. I further uncover how Causal Interactionism has the tools
to account for distinct concerns regarding the manipulation approach, e.g.,
how to explain causal variation (why the causal relation sometimes varies)








In this chapter, I will provide a historical overview of the agency approach.
In the next chapter, I will explain the main prospects for the approach while
also elucidating the most serious problems.
For now, the following questions are relevant:
1. What does an agent-dependent theory of causation look like?
2. Why does Price think that agency should be introduced into a theory
of causation?
3. What have other philosophers said about the relationship between
agency and causation?
My goal in this chapter is to answer these questions. In doing so, I will
elucidate the historical precedent of the agency approach, which begins nearly
fifty-five years before the work of Price. In §2, I will provide an overview of
Russell’s arguments for causal eliminativism. In §3, I will situate the agency
approach by looking at portions of the philosophy of causation that followed
Russell’s (1913) essay. In many ways, the agency approach can be viewed as a
rebuttal to Russell’s conclusion that the notion of cause should be eliminated.
In other words, I argue that the agency approach has a particular origin in
an idea made famous by Bertrand Russell over a hundred years ago.
History will show us that the idea of an important relationship between
agency and causation is better thought of as a general approach to causation
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rather than a single theory. I will show, quite generally, that the motto for the
agency approach can be paraphrased as follows: agency is a vital component
of causation.1 Many philosophers after Russell’s 1913 essay have explicitly
accepted the proposition that agency is a vital component of causation, while
many others have implicitly incorporated the idea into their work. In §4, I
will highlight some of the most notable contemporary work on causation,
which indicates that agency is related to causation. Of course, there are
significant issues related to the idea that agency is related to causation, which
I will explore in Chapter 3. Lastly, in §5, I will explain the interventionist
approach to causation, highlighting some of the important similarities and
differences with the agency approach.
But first things first—what does agency have to do with causation?
2.2 On The Notion of Cause
In 1913, Bertrand Russell published the essay ‘On the Notion of Cause’. In
the article, Russell makes two significant claims: (1) the (ancillary) claim
that the word “cause” had become so vague that philosophers should stop
using it, and (2) that the “law of causality” cannot be grounded in our
most advanced science, fundamental physics. Russell’s conclusion was that
we should stop using (i.e., eliminate) the term ‘cause’ because fundamental
science had shown it to be irrelevant, outdated, and non-existent.
The law of causality, which was Russell’s direct target in the essay, was
thought (at the time) to be a deterministic law which stated that when a finite
number of localised things happen at one time, some other localised thing
would happen a short time later. To illustrate, if I strike a match, given that
some limited number of conditions are satisfied, the law of causality states
that there will be a flame just after the strike. What Russell intended to
show by investigating the plausibility of a fundamental (physical) theory of
causation was that the law of causation was false. Russell’s conclusion can
be taken as the idea that a physical theory of causation cannot ground the
relation between cause and effect and that, granting the physicalist assump-
tion that our concepts should be reducible to physics, the notion of cause
should be eliminated.
1Going forward, I’ll use the term approach for the general theory. When I speak of the
agency theory, it will be in line with a specific approach, e.g., Price (1993).
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One of Russell’s secondary targets was causal realism. Russell wanted
to show that from the perspective of our most advanced sciences, causation
(by which Russell means the law of causality)—much like witches and the
ether—did not exist. Advanced sciences, Russell says, had ‘ceased to look
for causes’, because ‘in fact, there are no such things’ (p. 2). Thus, Russell’s
1913 position on causality was non-realist and eliminativist. Because the
relation between cause and effect could not be grounded in physics, Russell
thought we should eliminate the idea of causation much like we eliminated
the concepts of witches and ether.
The Directionality Argument
One of Russell’s arguments concerns causal asymmetry, the so-called direc-
tionality of causation. The relationship between cause and effect is said to
be temporally asymmetric—cause events (e.g., striking the match) always
precede effect events (e.g., the flame) in time. In everyday life, we experience
many temporal asymmetries that rely on the notion of cause; how we act and
how we explain individual events lead us to say that causes and effects can
be contiguous through time. We say that one event, the cause event, leads
directly to another event, the effect event. Causation is asymmetric because
causes precede effects, and effects do not precede causes.
Fundamental physical laws are symmetric. From the perspective of physics,
the future explains the past just as well as the past explains the future. In
other words, fundamental physical laws have the same character in both for-
ward and backward temporal directions. The obvious problem for the “law
of causation” is that causal asymmetry cannot be grounded by fundamental
physical laws, which are temporally symmetric. So, given the symmetrical
character of physical laws, Russell concludes that our notion of cause has no
grounding in fundamental physics.
Russell’s argument works as follows. First, Russell makes a conceptual
claim, that is, he assumes that the notion of cause must have a certain fea-
ture. In terms of the directionality argument, the feature in question is
temporal asymmetry. Second, Russell attempts to show that fundamental
physics cannot ground the feature in question. Russell concludes that fun-
damental physics cannot ground temporal asymmetry, and therefore funda-
mental physics cannot ground causal relations. Alyssa Ney (2009) correctly
summarises Russell’s directionality argument as follows:
1. Causal relations are temporally asymmetric.
15
2. However, fundamental laws have the same character in both forward
and backward temporal directions.2
3. Therefore, there is nothing in fundamental physics to ground temporal
asymmetry.
4. Therefore, there is nothing in fundamental physics to ground causal
relations.
Russell also points out that fundamental physics cannot capture the or-
dinary distinction between cause and effect, i.e., what counts as the cause
of an event and what counts as the effect. For Russell, this is because our
ordinary notion that two events are distinguishable within a time sequence
makes no sense—or, at the very least, it becomes incredibly vague—from the
perspective of fundamental physics. From the perspective of fundamental
physics, our intuition that one event, the cause (e.g., striking the match), is
clearly distinguishable from another event (e.g., the flame) is simply false.
Fundamental physics can show that, in some sense, the two events are actu-
ally simultaneous (that is, they are indistinguishable within a certain time
sequence).
The Localisation Argument
The principle of the same cause/same effect, which is articulated by philoso-
phers such as Bergson and Mill, says that when a finite number of localised
things happen at one time, some other localised thing will happen a short
time later. The principle leads to a general law of causation: there are ob-
servable laws that tell us that given a cause A (e.g., striking a match), an
effect B (e.g., a flame) will occur. Regarding the law of causation, here is a
line from Mill:
The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the main pillar
of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability of
succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact
in nature and some other fact which has preceded it (quoted from
Russell, 1913, p. 6).
2Hartry Field (2003) points out that there is no need to assume determinism for the
argument to be sound. It could be the case that the laws of physics are indeterministic
but have the same indeterministic character in both temporal directions.
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And Bergson states:
Now it is argued that this [the law of causality] means that every
phenomenon is determined by its conditions, or, in other words,
that the same causes produce the same effects (quoted from Rus-
sell, 1913, p. 6).
Russell’s objection to the principle of the same cause/same effect concerns
our definition of ‘events’. If we assume that the law of causation is true, if A
nomologically produces B, Russell points out that we cannot define an event
as localised to a limited number of conditions (as we ordinarily do). Rather,
we must describe the event in such a way, as Russell says, to ‘include the
environment’. By ‘the environment’, Russell means any physical facts that
influence a particular phenomenon, e.g., whatever physical facts affect the
match prior to the strike. The problem with ‘including the environment’ is
that the physical facts that affect the match prior to the strike amounts to
a ridiculously large range of influence. Essentially, physics can describe how
anything impacts an event, assuming that event is within a distance that can
be reached by light in a finite period of time; this is often referred to as the
past light cone of an event. What Russell notes is that when we include the
environment into A, event A will become so large that it will never reoccur.
If event A is unique, the law of causation is false. It cannot be true that
(in ordinary language) “all As cause Bs” when A will never reoccur (A will
never reoccur because the exact physical specifications of A are so vast that
they are essentially unrepeatable).
For the law of causation to be true, Russell points out, we must define the
event A by noting invariable uniformities, i.e., we must localise the event by
abstracting away most of the physical influences on A. Russell calls this type
of localisation ‘an essential vagueness’ (ibid, 8). Russell’s contention with
vagueness was based on a serious problem. When we abstract away from
the multitude of physical influences on an event, we can never be sure that
we have not abstracted away something causal, i.e., something that makes
a difference to A. If we were to abstract a causal influence on A, the law of
causation would fail (we cannot say that ‘A causes B’ in terms of the law
of causation when some causal influence on A has been abstracted away).
So, the only way to guarantee that we are not leaving out a genuine causal
influence is to include the environment back into A, but we have already seen
that this solution fails.
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Thus, Russell presents a dilemma for the law of causation: either we
include the environment into A, thereby making the event so large that it
will never reoccur, or we abstract the seemingly irrelevant influences on A,
making it uncertain whether B will occur. Either way, the law of causation
is shown to be false. Russell concludes that the existence of causes of the
kind that our ordinary concept requires cannot be grounded in fundamental
physics and subsequently that we should eliminate the notion of cause.
Russell’s conclusion gives rise to an important question. If causation is
not a physical phenomenon, something that exists in nature or something
grounded by our most advanced physics, then what is it? Russell’s answer
in 1913 was that causation is ‘a relic of a bygone age,’ which is ultimately
outdated and obsolete.
Whether or not fundamental physics has made causation outdated and
obsolete is a question that will be addressed throughout this thesis. To
begin, let us consider some of the philosophy of causation that was done
after Russell’s critical essay, focusing on what I believe to be the inception
of the agency approach to causation.
2.3 Collingwood, Gasking, and von Wright
The agency theory originated in 1940, with the work of R.G. Collingwood.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, prior to Collingwood, Ramsey had
argued that the distinction between cause and effect was agency based. Ram-
sey’s idea is one that agency theorists have embraced, as we will soon see.
Generally speaking, Ramsey was a pragmatist about causation, or as Price
(2017b) now argues, an expressivist with links to Hume (and in the contem-
porary landscape of expressivism, Simon Blackburn). The basic idea behind
this brand of pragmatism is that concepts such as ‘cause’ must start with,
and remain linked to human experience and inquiry. Nevertheless, Colling-
wood was the first philosopher to offer a systematic theory of causation that
was based on human agency.
In 1940, Collingwood wrote what has become a classic text in the philo-
sophical literature on causation, his controversial An Essay on Metaphysics.
The book primarily addresses Collingwood’s views on metaphysics—an as-
pect of philosophy that Collingwood believed was in need of serious reform.
Philosophy, for Collingwood, is a reflective activity. The task of philos-
ophy, Collingwood thought, was to reflect on the fundamental principles or
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absolute presuppositions on which knowledge rests. For example, an abso-
lute presupposition of medicine is that understanding causes allows us to
produce or prevent certain conditions. In fact, the subject matter of philos-
ophy for Collingwood was the fundamental principles that underlie certain
areas of knowledge and experience, such as medicine, natural science, and
history—principles implicitly followed by individual practitioners, such as
medical doctors.
At the time that Collingwood was writing An Essay on Metaphysics,
A.J. Ayers’ Language, Truth and Logic (1936) had been published, and neo-
empiricism had become popular in the anti-metaphysical school of logical
positivism. Logical positivists believed that statements were meaningful only
if they could be verified empirically. Since the absolute presuppositions on
which knowledge rests could not be tested empirically, Collingwood uses
An Essay on Metaphysics to defend his conception of philosophy. To do
so successfully, Collingwood would need to show that there are important
propositions that are empirically unverifiable.
Collingwood thought that we could reform metaphysics by eliminating on-
tology and by making metaphysics the search for the fundamental principles,
or presuppositions, on which knowledge rests. Collingwood calls fundamental
presuppositions ‘absolute’ presuppositions. He defines absolute presupposi-
tions as, ‘[a presupposition] which stands, relatively to all questions to which
it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer’ (1940, p. 31). He goes
on to explain what he means with the following example
Thus if you were talking to a pathologist about a certain disease
and asked him ‘What is the cause of the event E which you say
sometimes happens in this disease?’ he will reply ‘The cause of
E is C’...You might go on to ask: ‘I suppose before so-and-so
found out what the cause of E was, he was quite sure it had a
cause?’ The answer would be ‘Quite sure, of course.’ If you now
say ‘Why?’ he will probably answer ‘Because everything that
happens has a cause.’ If you are importunate enough to ask ‘But
how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?’ he
will probably blow up right in your face, because you have put
your finger on his absolute presupposition, and people are apt
to be ticklish in their absolute presuppositions. But if he keeps
his temper and gives you a civil and candid answer, it will be to
the following effect. ‘That is a thing we take for granted in my
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job. We don’t question it. We don’t try to verify it. It isn’t a
thing anybody has discovered like microbes or the circulation of
the blood. It is a thing we just take for granted.’
According to Collingwood, we get ‘ticklish’ about our absolute presupposi-
tions because they do not stand as answers to questions. As the above quote
suggests, if you were to ask a pathologist why she believes that everything
that happens has a cause, there is no sensible answer which she could give.
As Collingwood says, it’s simply something taken for granted. Collingwood
argues that metaphysics should be the search for just these kinds of ticklish
things—unverifiable assumptions held by certain individuals working within
the context of a particular field of knowledge, e.g., pathology, history, or
natural science.
Collingwood’s idea is that to be a legitimate science, a scientia or body
of knowledge requires a unique subject matter. Collingwood argues that
metaphysics, understood as the science of ontology or pure being, lacked
a unique subject matter and thus that metaphysics failed to be a science
at all. Understood as the science of pure being, metaphysics possesses no
subject matter of its own because, according to Collingwood, it attempts to
study what exists without asking specific questions and without making any
presuppositions. Legitimate sciences, such as the science of mind (or history;
see Collingwood [1946]), and the science of matter (or natural science; see
Collingwood [1945]), had their own unique subject matter. Because each
science had its own unique subject matter, each science would bring different
questions, presuppositions, and interests to bear on their individual fields.
The historian is interested in the motives that guide our actions because the
goal of the historian is to understand. The natural scientist is interested in
constant conjunctions because the goal of the natural scientist is to predict.
In order for either science to be possible, historians and natural scientists
have to make different presuppositions about the nature of reality. Historians
assume that man is rational; otherwise, they could not explain the past in
terms of rational processes. The natural scientist assumes that nature is
uniform; otherwise, they would not be able to make sense of the inductive
generalisations on which their predictions rely.
After Collingwood describes his theory of reform, he uses the idea of
causation as an example to demonstrate the concept of metaphysics as the
investigation of absolute presuppositions.
Like Russell, Collingwood notes an inherent ambiguity in our notion of
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cause. To resolve the ambiguity, Collingwood offers a description of causation
based on three different ideas or ‘senses’ of the word ‘cause’; the historical
sense, the practical sense, and the theoretical sense. Each sense of the word
‘cause’ corresponds to a different idea, where ‘idea’ refers to specific presup-
positions that determined how certain practitioners think about cause and
effect.
The Historical Sense of Cause
Collingwood attempts to show that the practical and theoretical senses
of cause are derived from the historical sense, which is itself derived from
the Latin causa, which meant ‘guilt’ or ‘blame’ (1940, 291). In the historical
sense, ‘cause’ means ‘a free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible
agent’ (ibid, 290) and is typically intended to imply that A affords someone
a motive for doing B. A clear example of this is found in the text of Genesis.
When Adam discovers his nakedness, God asks Adam, ‘Who told you that
you were naked’? Adam replies, ‘The women whom you gave to be with
me, she gave me from the tree, and I ate’ (Genesis 3: 11-12, New Standard
American Bible). We discover the cause of Adam’s nakedness (according to
Adam) to be the persuasion of Eve—Eve is the cause in the sense that she
“made” Adam do it.3 In its original sense, a cause is essentially the action of
an agent (human or supernatural) that motivates and compels another agent
into action. The word ‘cause’ becomes analogous to words like ‘making’,
‘inducing’, ‘persuading’, ‘urging’, ‘forcing’, and ‘compelling’.
The Practical Sense of Cause
The practical sense of cause, which is the most widely discussed in the philo-
sophical literature, concerns events in nature. In the practical sense, the word
‘cause’ means ‘an event or state of things which it is in our power to produce
or prevent’ (ibid). This idea of causation is practical because it presupposes
that we can control things in nature by manipulating their causes. Colling-
wood says that causation in the practical sense represents the Baconian idea
that knowledge is power: if we know how to manipulate the cause in the right
way, we will know how to control the effect. Collingwood is quick to point
3Ironically, the same reasoning is seen again in the next line. Genesis 3:13 reads: ‘Then
the Lord God said to the women, What is this you have done?’ And the women said, ‘The
serpent deceived me, and I ate’.
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out that the practical idea of causation is relativistic. In the practical sense,
a ‘cause’ is relative to an agent’s knowledge of ‘producing’ and ‘preventing’.
The so-called principle of the relativity of causes (p. 304) says that, ‘for any
given person the cause in sense II [the practical sense] of a given thing is that
one of its conditions which he is able to produce or prevent’ (ibid).
To illustrate the principle of relativity, Collingwood describes the case of
an automobile accident, where different agents with different skill sets and
expertise try to determine the cause of the crash. Imagine, for example
[A] car skids while cornering at certain point, strikes the curb,
and turns turtle. From the car-driver’s point of view, the cause
of the accident was cornering too fast, and the lesson is that
one must drive more carefully. From the county surveyor’s point
of view the cause was a defect in the surface or camber of the
road, and the lesson is that greater care must be taken to make
roads skid-proof. From the motor-manufacturer’s point of view
the cause was defective design in the car, and the lesson is that
one must place the centre of gravity lower. (ibid)
In the above example, causation is relative to individual expertise. However,
in many other cases, e.g., hunger, thirst, and fatigue, human agents will
share the same ‘point of view’ about the causes of these events, and thus
they will use the same manipulation strategies for producing and preventing.
That is, most human agents produce or prevent things like hunger, thirst,
and fatigue using similar manipulation strategies. So, for Collingwood, in
some cases, causation is relative to human agents in general, while in other
cases, causation is relative to a particular field of expertise (e.g., engineering,
medicine).
A cause in the second sense represents what Collingwood calls a handle
or a switch. A handle is something that gives the agent power. A cause is
a handle because if we know how to “work the cause” in the right way, we
can control the effect in some desirable form. A cause is related to human
agency because, as we would manipulate a door handle, we manipulate a
cause to ‘produce and prevent’. So, a cause in the second sense necessarily
relies on human agency. In the second sense, Collingwood notes, ‘for a mere
spectator, there are no causes’ (ibid, 307).
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The Theoretical Sense of Cause
The theoretical sense of cause concerns an ‘unconditional’ cause or a cause
as it would exist in nature apart from any human perspective. The theoretical
sense of cause is meant to be agent-independent. In this sense, there can be no
relativity of causes, and causes are not handles. Unlike the generality of cause
in the second sense, the theoretical sense of cause is “tight”, meaning the
cause will be indistinguishable from the effect. Collingwood makes reference
to Russell’s ‘On the Notion of Cause’ and likewise has difficulty analysing
the (theoretical) idea of cause within a time sequence. When we light a fuse
and see a corresponding explosion, there is no handle, so to speak, as there
was in the second sense that we deem “the” cause (e.g., lighting the fuse).
How the actual cause then persists from one event to the other is a problem
for the theoretical sense of cause.
Collingwood suggests that ‘cause’ in the third sense is empty. We assim-
ilate talk of causes in the third sense by assuming nature to have a unique
causal “power” or “force” by which we can describe the relationship between
natural events. Collingwood suggests that this is merely an antiquated belief
in animism or an inability to understand causality in non-anthropocentric
terms. Like Russell, Collingwood thinks that modern scientific laws (e.g.,
Newton’s laws of motion) have made the idea of (theoretical) causation a
relic. For Collingwood, the relic is not the law of causality but the animistic
metaphor. Yet, unlike Russell, Collingwood does not allow the demise of
causality in its theoretical sense to affect the notion of cause in the histor-
ical and practical sense. Since the idea of causality in the third sense is a
derivative from the first and second senses, its elimination cannot jeopardise
its earlier functions.
Interestingly, Collingwood agrees with only half of Russell’s conclusion:
the idea of physical (agent-independent) causation is incoherent and false;
however, given Collingwood’s conception of philosophy, Collingwood is happy
to leave things as they are. We would not eliminate the idea that causes are
handles, for example, because it is an absolute presupposition of medical
science that causes allow us to produce and prevent events. Nor would we
eliminate the idea that a cause can be a ‘free and deliberate act’ because it
is a presupposition in law.
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Causal Recipes
Another philosopher who argued that causation is related to human agency
was Douglas Gasking. At the beginning of his essay ‘Causation and Recipes’
(1955), Gasking admits that we often speak of one thing causing another.
But, he asks the important question: ‘in what circumstances do we do so’ (p.
479)? Gasking’s answer is that we can speak of one thing causing another in
circumstances where we have learned manipulation strategies or what he calls
‘causal recipes’. Bodily movements can lead to the discovery that manipulat-
ing certain things in certain ways tends to make things happen. If I walloped
the table with my knee, I might learn how to produce a large black spot on
the carpet, e.g., by spilling the inkwell. Gasking explains, ‘men found out
how to produce certain effects by manipulating things a certain way’ (ibid,
482). For Gasking, we speak of event A as causing event B when we have
learned to produce B as a result of doing A. Gasking calls this a ‘producing
by means of’ relation. Gasking says:
We learn by experience that whenever in certain conditions we
manipulate objects in a certain way a certain change, A, occurs.
Performing this manipulation is then called: “producing A”. We
learn also that in certain individual cases, or when certain addi-
tional conditions are also present, the manipulation in question
also results in another sort of change, B. In these cases the manip-
ulation is also called “producing B”, and since it is, in general,
the manipulation of producing A, in this instance, it is called
“producing B by producing A”. For example, one makes iron
glow by making it hot (ibid, 486).
According to Gasking’s definition, a cause is something that a human
agent can overtly manipulate. Strictly speaking, causation is related to hu-
man agency because when we say that A causes B, A will be something that,
by overtly manipulating it, allows us to produce B.
Explaining Causal Asymmetry
In, ‘On the Logic and Epistemology of the Causal Relation’ (1993), another
agency theorist, von Wright, asks the following question: ‘What distinguishes
cause from effects’? He answers, ‘the fact that by manipulating A, we can
bring about changes in B’. The idea is that if we think about the causal
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relation from a human perspective, viz., the perspective of human agents,
the problem of causal asymmetry does not arise. Asymmetry, von Wright
explains, is simply “built in” to our conceptual experience of agency and time.
VonWright suggests from this fact that there is an implicit dependency (what
he also called a ‘limitation’) of the notion of cause on the concept of agency
and action (p. 123).
As we will see in later chapters (viz., chapter 3), the idea that we should
think about causation from a human point of view, which is common to all
of the agency theorists we have seen thus far, allows us to explain the asym-
metry of cause and effect by grounding causal asymmetry in the asymmetry
of human action or agency. Indeed, we will come to see that an essential
component of Price’s agency theory is that the concept of cause is ‘situated’
in terms of human agency. In von Wright’s language, when we act, the ef-
fects of our actions lead to changes in the future. Thus, when we think of
causation in terms of acting on A to produce changes in B, the asymmetry of
action entails the asymmetry of the causal relation. The important point to
note here is that we can allegedly overcome the problem of causal asymmetry,
which is one of the two key problems that led to Russell’s eliminativism, by
relating causation to human agency.
2.4 Contemporary Agency andManipulation-
ist Theories of Causality
Effective Strategies
In considering contemporary agency and manipulationist theories of causal-
ity, a good place to start is with Nancy Cartwright’s influential theory of
effective strategies. While Cartwright herself is not an agency theorist, her
ideas regarding effective strategies sheds important light on the relationship
between agency and causation.
In her influential essay ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strategies’, Cartwright
distinguishes two kinds of laws: laws of physics, which she calls ‘laws of
association’, and ‘causal laws’:
Laws of association are typically causally neutral because they
provide no account of what makes things happen. Causal laws,
by contrast, have the word ‘cause’—or some causal surrogate—
right in them (1979, p. 21).
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Cartwright agrees with Russell’s localisation argument, that is, causal
laws cannot be derived from the laws of physics. Cartwright wishes to support
the claim that causal laws cannot be derived from the laws of physics, but
she wants to argue against Russell’s claim that causal laws can be eliminated
(much like Collingwood). For Cartwright, we need causal laws to distinguish
between effective and ineffective strategies. An effective strategy is defined
as a situation where the cause increases the probability of its effect. Effective
strategies, which Cartwright thinks of as causal laws, can be discovered by
‘partitioning’ (i.e., localising) the space of possible situations to include the
factors that are probabilistically relevant to the given strategy. Once we have
partitioned our situations accurately, we will be able to determine effective
strategies. Cartwright is subsequently able to claim that there is a ‘natural
connection between causes and strategies that should be maintained’ (Ibid,
36).
Although implicitly, Cartwright is suggesting that causation is related
to human agency, much like the agency theorists we have just considered,
by relating causation to manipulation. An effective strategy is simply a
manipulation strategy that allows us to produce or prevent some desired end
or goal. As I said in the previous chapter, if I wanted to reduce the spread of
malaria, an effective strategy would be to gas swamps. If I wanted to prevent
scurvy, an effective strategy would be to consume vitamin C.
Price’s Agency Theory
As explained in the previous chapter, the so-called agency theory of
causality is primarily associated with the work of Huw Price. In his 1993
paper with Peter Menzies, ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’, Price defends
the thesis that causation is essentially related to human agency. For Price, A
causes B means that an agent can ‘bring about’ B by bringing about (or do-
ing) A. For example, one might say that throwing rocks (A) causes windows
to break (B) because one can bring about B by bringing about A. According
to this definition, Price is claiming that for a causal relationship to exist,
there must be intentional action, or what he takes to be an occurrence of
overt human agency.4
4I will explain the standard concept of agency in greater detail in Chapter 6. For now,
it is important to note that an overt action is an action that involves bodily movement.
Overt actions include raising an arm, bending a knee, throwing, catching, running, driving,
etc.
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Regarding the agency approach, it is also common for philosophers to
reference two earlier papers by Price: ‘Agency and Causal Asymmetry’ (1992)
and ‘Agency and Probabilistic Causality’ (1991). In his 1992 article, Price
attempts to explain the asymmetry of causation—causes precede effects, and
effects never or almost never precede causes—by introducing the notion of
agency into a theory of causation. Because our actions affect the future and
not the past, the asymmetry of causation, according to Price, can be reduced
to the asymmetry of manipulation or human agency. In his 1991 paper, Price
argues that intentional actions raise the probabilities of certain events—for
example, by throwing a rock at your window, I increase the probability that
it breaks. Thus, when we read that A causes B means bringing about B by
doing A, we should interpret this in terms of probabilities: doing A raises
the probability that we can bring about B.
In the contemporary literature on causation, the tendency to relate the
agency approach with Price’s works (e.g., Woodward, 2003; 2013; Hausman,
1998) has led to the supposition that the agency approach relates to the
work of Price alone; the only serious advancement and defence of the agency
approach being seen as a selection of Price’s earlier works and some modifi-
cations over the last two decades (viz., Price 1991, 1992, 1992b, 1993, 1996,
2007, 2017). The sentiment in contemporary philosophy of science is that
the agency approach states that the causal relation depends on overt actions
or an occurrence of human agency (in other words, the agency approach is
as Price defines it).
In ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’, Price and Menzies (hereafter MP)
define the relation between cause and effect in terms of a ‘means/end rela-
tionship’. A causal relationship exists if and only if (iff) bringing about A is
an effective means of bringing about some end, B. Significantly, agency is ex-
plicitly introduced into MP’s theory of causation so that the causal relation
can be defined in terms of agent probabilities: ‘Agent probabilities are to be
thought of as conditional probabilities, assessed from the agent’s perspective
under the supposition that the antecedent condition is realised ab initio, as
a free act of the agent concerned’ (1993, pp. 187–190).
According to MP, causation is a ‘secondary quality’—that is, it is an
external relation among events that is explained by its connection to the
experience of agency. In much the same way that an apple looks red to an
ordinary observer under standard conditions, ‘an event A is a cause of a
distinct event B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A would be an
effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B’
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(ibid). The benefits and problems associated with MP’s notion of causation
will be explored in the next chapter.
Causal Perspectivalism
Price’s later work (e.g., 2007, 2017) is a slightly altered defence of the
agency theory that was developed in the early 1990s. In his recent work,
Price develops a much closer relationship with Ramsey (1929) and describes
causation as perspectival.
Price has us imagine a world where time runs in the opposite direction.
Price (2007) says that, ‘the hypothesis [of a time-reversed universe] simply
gives us an easy way to imagine the possibility that there might be creatures,
elsewhere in the actual universe, whose time-sense is a mirror-image of ours’
(p. 273). From our perspective, time for these creatures would run backwards
from future to past. The time-reversed world would be retrocausal, i.e., causes
would be preceded by effects. The important point to note is that agents
in the time-reversed location would disagree with agents from our location
about the causal relation: agents in our part of the universe would say that
causes preceded effects, and agents in the time-reversed part of the universe
would say that effects preceded causes. In the same way that our notion
of foreignness is perspectival, or relative to a specific location—from Y’s
location, X’s are foreigners, and from X’s location Y’s are foreigners—Price
argues that our notion of cause is perspectival, or relative to our situation
in time. In regards to the creatures who live in a world that we would call
retrocausal, Price notes, ‘their perspective would be as valid as ours’ (ibid).
Like Ramsey (and von Wright), Price thinks he can explain the asymme-
try of cause and effect by relying on facts about the agents themselves. The
idea is that causal facts, whatever they are, partly depend on facts about
human agents. Speaking of the connection with Ramsey, Price states:
Ramsey is famous as a pioneer of pragmatic subjectivism about
probability. In one of his last papers, [Ramsey] extends this sub-
jectivist viewpoint to laws and causation. He links the asymmetry
of cause and effect explicitly to the perspective we have as agents,
saying that, ‘the general difference of cause and effect’ seems to
arise ‘from the situation which we are deliberating’. He then goes
on to identify what he seems to take to be the crux of the agent’s
perspective, namely the fact that from the agent’s point of view,
contemplated actions are always taken to be sui generis, uncaused
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by external factors. As [Ramsey] puts it, ‘my present action is an
ultimate and the ultimate contingency (2007, p. 281).
Price argues that causal chains begin from the agent’s perspective with
a free act. He attempts to explain the direction of causation by appealing
to the process of deliberation. Deliberation is the asymmetric process of
reasoning about future events with the specific caveat that when we reason
about manipulations, we assume things like the direction of time. Of course,
agents in a time-reversed universe would argue that, from their perspective,
we experience retro-causation. The right way to think about causation, they
would say, is that effects always precede their causes. Causal perspectivalism
is the idea that neither our intuitions nor the intuitions of the agents in
the time-reversed universe are, technically speaking, false—the direction of
causation is simply a matter of perspective.
2.5 Interventionism
The last philosopher that I want to highlight is James Woodward. Woodward
defends a so-called interventionist theory of causation. The interventionist
theory of causation is remarkably similar to the agency approach. One of the
reasons that the two ideas are similar is that intervetionists and agency the-
orists are motivated by a key purpose—the discovery of causal relationships.
Another reason is that both theories are correctly regarded as manipulation
theories, where causes are regarded as handles. The notable difference is that
interventionism is claimed to be agent-independent. For example, Woodward
says that
an “interventionist” approach [to causation] avoids a classical
problem besetting manipulability theories—that of anthropocen-
trism and a privileged status for human action (2013, p. 14).
Woodward claims that ‘interventions’ (correctly construed) do not make ref-
erence to human agency and that interventionism, ‘is quite different from
traditional agency theories (such as those of von Wright & Price)’ (2003, p.
103).
While Woodward has continually criticised Price’s theory for being un-
acceptably anthropocentric and subjective, I will argue that much of Wood-
ward’s criticism of Price is misplaced and misguided (though not all of it).
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Indeed, there are significant differences between Woodward’s theory of in-
terventionism and Price’s agency theory. For now, I want to explain Wood-
ward’s approach and situate it within the context of the earlier work done
by Judea Pearl. Although I do argue (Chapter 6) that Woodward’s account
represents an agency approach to causation, here one should simply note the
details of interventionism, perhaps with a keen eye on the notion of ‘cause’
and ‘manipulation’ within or regarding the interventionist’s model. A helpful
question to bear in mind as you read through the details of interventionism
is the following: Is Woodward’s non-commitment to human agency consis-
tent with the manipulation approach that he prefers, viz., interventionism?
The answer to this question is quite difficult to discern when being provided
with merely a surface reading of the relevant material. However, recall that
for Price, Collingwood, Gasking, von Wright, and indeed even Cartwright,
agency was (albeit implicitly) taken to mean overt action. We agents overtly
do A and produce or prevent B. A key aspect of Woodward’s theory—and
his non-commitment to human agency—relies on the supposition that agency
means overt human action. Thus, what Woodward intends to show is that
interventionism does not rely on overt agency.
More on this later. For now, let us move on to consider interventionism.
Causal Modeling
Judea Pearl’s (2000) book Causality is considered to be the inception of
the interventionist approach. Therein, Pearl notes that the notion of ‘cause’
is a man-made concept. Indeed, Pearl believes that the concept began as an
anthropocentric explanatory tool. Much like Collingwood’s historical sense,
only God, people, and possibly animals could cause things to happen (since
‘cause’ is connected to something like ‘motivation’ and ‘will’). Natural events
would only later enter into causal explanation. Pearl writes
The agents of causal forces in the ancient world were either deities,
who cause things to happen for a purpose, or human beings and
animals, who possess free will, for which they are punished and
rewarded...this notion of causation was na¨ıve, but clear and un-
problematic (2000, p. 333).
According to Pearl, a problem for the concept of cause begins with the
science of engineering. As humans began to build complex systems, phys-
ical objects began to acquire causal characteristics. When a system like a
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catapult or a waterwheel broke down, ‘it was futile to blame God or the
operator—instead, a broken rope or a rusty pulley were more useful expla-
nations, only because these could be replaced quickly and make the system
work again’ (ibid). Causal explanation was still regarded in terms of purpose
(e.g., Aristotle’s notion of teleology), and engineering seemed to merely split
the concept of cause into two directions: one being the old sense of credit
and blame, and the new being a sense of flow or control. The split fits nicely
within the work of Collingwood. The science of engineering moves us into
‘cause’ in the second sense.
Pearl sees the real trouble for the notion of cause beginning with the
work of Galileo. Galileo wanted to put explanation aside and focus solely
on description. Also, he believed that the fundamental nature of description
was not going to be qualitative. Galileo thought we could describe nature
with incredible accuracy using only mathematical equations. Galileo’s insight
carries us into Collingwood’s theoretical idea of causation.
Pearl notes a similarity between Galileo and Hume. Hume was not con-
cerned with explaining the nature of cause and effect. Hume, like Galileo,
was concerned with description. Hume would only describe how we come to
think and speak in causal terms. Pearl says that Hume was not involved with
the why but with the how. Interestingly, Pearl notes a concern with Hume’s
treatment of the how. If experience leads us to observe individual correla-
tions, Pearl asks, ‘how do people ever acquire knowledge of causation?’ (ibid,
p. 336). This question is what Pearl calls the ‘first riddle of causation.’ The
‘second riddle of causation’ asks, ‘what difference does it make if [we dis-
cover] that a certain connection is causal?’ (ibid, 337). Pearl’s somewhat
obvious but no less important answer to the second riddle is that it makes a
difference to how we act. Pearl’s theory will be set against the background
of these two riddles.
Pearl’s Two Riddles of Causation
1. How do people acquire knowledge of causation?
2. What difference does it make if we know that a connection is causal?
Pearl is not a philosopher by trade. Pearl is an engineer, and he has a
practical question in mind when thinking about the two riddles of causation.
Pearl wonders:
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How should a robot acquire causal information through interac-
tion with its environment? How should a robot process causal
information received from its creator-programmer? (ibid, 343).
Pearl argues that causal modelling can solve the second riddle of cau-
sation and that this strategy has the double advantage of making the first
riddle much less formidable. Pearl would say that the motivation for the in-
terventionist is the discovery of causal knowledge and that this knowledge is
essential regarding human (or robotic) behaviour. Essentially, Pearl argues
that causal knowledge is discoverable via interventionism and that we can
learn about causation by causal modelling.
This solution includes three basic ideas:
• Treating causation as a summary of behaviour under interventions.
• Using equations and graphs as a mathematical language within which
causal thoughts can be represented and manipulated.
• Treating interventions as a surgery over equations. (ibid, 344)
This sounds rather abstruse. Indeed, Pearl develops a method of calculus
that he uses as a formal structure for representing the results of targeted
interventions. While Pearl’s so-called ‘do calculus’ is rather sophisticated,
the intuitive idea behind interventionism is quite simple. At its core, inter-
ventionism is a system that allows scientists to model specific ‘small world’
systems (i.e., limited aspects of the world that we include into a model called
‘variables’). Once we have a ‘small world’, investigators can make surgical
changes to any variables within that system (e.g., by severing one functional
link and replacing it with another or changing the value of individual vari-
ables) and observe the results. Once manipulated, a variable that produces
changes in other variables can be thought of as causally related. Variables
that produce no such changes can be thought of as not causally related (this
is why Pearl thought we could treat causation as a ‘summary of behaviour’
under interventions). Consider an alleged causal relationship between the
rooster and the sun. If we model the variables (where the arrow represents
an alleged causal pathway) as
rooster −→ rising sun
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we can “intervene” on the model by manipulating [rooster] (i.e., surgically
cut out [rooster], leaving [rising sun] completely untouched). The model then
becomes the following:
−→ rising sun
In the case that we manipulated (cut out) the variable [rooster] and we
observed no corresponding changes to the variable [rising sun], we can say
that there is no causal connection between roosters and the rising sun. Ad-
mittedly, this model is overly simplistic. A better model would include more
data, e.g., variables related to Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, the weight
of the rooster, and the inverse square law for sound. This way, we could
test whether it was somehow the physical presence of the rooster that af-
fected the sun (e.g., if our rooster was [variable X] an 8 pound bird, what
would happen if we changed variable X to 6 pounds?), or whether it was the
rooster’s crow (e.g., take the sound intensity, I, of the birds crow Ix, where
x equals the decibels ratio of a given intensity I relative to the threshold
of hearing intensity, and see what happens if we lower x). On noticing the
lack of change to variable [rising sun], we could be confident that there is no
causal relationship to [rooster]. The results of the model might indicate that
the two variables are effects of a common cause, e.g., the rotation of Earth.
Pearl claims that diagrams such as these capture ‘the very essence of
causation’, which is the ability to ‘predict the consequences of abnormal
eventualities and new manipulations’ (ibid p. 345). This leads us to what
is likely the most significant outcome of Pearl’s theory—deep understanding.
Deep understanding comes from ‘knowing how things will behave under new
circumstances’ and gives us a feeling of being ‘in control’ (ibid).
There are more interesting details to Pearl’s theory, some of which we
will consider in later chapters. For now, I want to highlight the work of
Woodward.
Woodward’s Interventionism
When thinking about causation, Woodward believes that a useful heuris-
tic is to ask what the notion is intended to contrast with. Not surprisingly,
Woodward claims that when we employ causal terms in the special sciences
and the context of ordinary life, ‘the relevant contrast is very often with
mere correlations or associations’ (2007, p. 72). As investigators, we want
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to determine genuine causal relationships so that these ‘might be exploited
for purposes of manipulation and control’ (ibid). According to Woodward,
the strategy that best allows us to achieve this is interventionism. Interven-
tionism allows an investigator to discover effective strategies or what Wood-
ward sometimes refers to as difference-making strategies. The idea behind
difference-making strategies is that causal claims are understood as claims
about what would happen (or what would be different) ‘under interventions
on...one or more variables’ (ibid, p. 73). For Woodward, X is said to be the
cause of Y iff under an appropriate intervention that changes the value of X,
there is an associated change in the value of Y .
Woodward has four basic criteria that capture the idea of an intervention
I on a given variable X:
1. I should cause (variation in) X (that is, I should have total control
over X and determine its new value).
2. I acts as a ‘switch’ for all the other variables that cause X (that is, I
cuts off X from any previous causal pathways).
3. Any directed path from I to Y must go through X(X will be ‘indepen-
dent’ of any other causal influence or pathway).
4. I is independent of any variable Z that causes Y and is on a directed
path from I to Y that does not go through X.
An intervention involves isolating the variable X (making X ‘indepen-
dent’) from other ways that X and Y might be correlated. By turning off or
‘breaking’ the influences of certain variables within a complex system, we are
essentially solving an inference problem—that is, we are discovering whether
or not two variables are causally connected or whether they are merely corre-
lated (like we did with [rooster] and [rising sun]). An intervention represents
An idealised experimental manipulation carried out on some vari-
able X for the purpose of ascertaining whether changes in X are
causally related to changes in Y ...[T]he idea we want to capture
is roughly this: an intervention on some variable X with respect
to some second variable Y is a causal process that changes the
value of X in an appropriate exogenous way, so that if a change
in the value of Y occurs, it occurs only in virtue of the change in
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the value of X and not through some other causal route (2003,
p. 94).
More simply:
Interventionist accounts take as their point of departure the idea
that causes are potentially means for manipulating their effects:
if it is possible to manipulate a cause in the right way, there would
be an associated change in its effect (Woodward, 2007, p. 20).
Woodward describes interventionism as a counterfactual theory and claims
that once we have discovered a causal pathway from X to Y , we can explain
Y by citing X (in counterfactual terms, ¬X → ¬Y ). Indeed, interventionism
is fundamentally a theory of causal explanation.
In his essay, ‘Causation With a Human Face’ (2007), Woodward describes
interventionism as both coarse grained and weak. Interventionism is coarse
grained because Woodward believes that causal explanations apply to high-
level, macroscopic events. Thinking in terms of macroscopic (coarse grained)
events, according to Woodward, is useful or relevant to sciences like eco-
nomics, law, medicine, psychology (see Gopnik and Schulz, 2007), and to the
context of ordinary life, and it is less useful (though not irrelevant) to micro-
scopic, fine-grained sciences like fundamental physics; this idea is consistent
with Collingwood’s endorsement of the practical sense of cause and his re-
jection of the theoretical sense of cause. Similarly, interventionism is weak
because causal explanations do not amount to, nor do they specify, nomo-
logically sufficient conditions. Causal explanations will include the kind of
invariant generalisations that we described above, which Russell described
as ‘vague’. So, what Woodward is attempting to offer is an explication and
a justification of the types of (causal) explanations that we ordinarily use
outside of physics.
The motivation behind the interventionist approach is causal discovery
and causal explanation. Significantly, once we are in a position to determine a
causal relationship, Woodward tells us, we are in a position to utilise causal
explanation. Causal explanations support, what Woodward calls, ‘what if
things had been different’ questions, that rely on a basic counterfactual the-
ory of causal explanation.
This chapter explained several difficulties that plague the notion of causa-
tion if we investigate the notion from the perspective of fundamental physics.
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As Russell pointed out, localisation and asymmetry pose serious, if not fatal,
challenges to our common notion of cause. I have argued that the agency
approach attempts to avoid the issues posed by investigating causation from
the perspective of fundamental physics by instead investigating the notion of
causation from the perspective of human agents.
We should note one important factor that agency accounts have in com-
mon and one that they do not. The most significant similarity is that they
all describe what appears to be an agent-dependent approach of causation.
Collingwood, Gasking, von Wright, Cartwright, Price, Pearl, and Woodward
all attempt to avoid Russell’s causal eliminativism by focusing on causation
from the perspective of human agents (or at least, in Woodward’s case, a
macroscopic view that aligns with a human perspective). For Collingwood,
causation cannot be eliminated because it is an absolute presupposition on
which some practical knowledge rests. The idea, which is now orthodox to
the manipulation approach to causation, is that causes act as handles be-
cause they allow us to do things in the world: doctors can cure diseases, and
engineers can repair broken machinery.
An important difference in these accounts has to do with what can be
called the commitment to agency, meaning whether or not an account of cau-
sation relies on human agency. Collingwood, Gasking, von Wright, and Price
are all explicitly committed to human agency; Woodward and Cartwright are
not. Instead, Woodward and Cartwright seem to rely on an implicit form of
human agency. In Cartwright’s case, it is clear that the idea of an ‘effective
strategy’ involves some reference to human agency, i.e., an effective strategy
is a manipulation technique that allows us to do something. In Woodward’s
case, it is much harder to locate a clear reference to agency. Often, this
is because Woodward is openly critical of Price’s use of agency, and he is
vocal about the fact that a successful manipulation approach must be agent-
independent. However, it may be the case that a manipulationist is unable
to avoid any commitment to agency since causation is being described from
the agent’s perspective and causes are regarded as handles.
Later, I will argue (Chapter 6) that much of the confusion stems from
ambiguity regarding the meaning of agency. As I explained earlier, most
agency theorists implicitly take agency to mean overt agency—that is, some
kind of bodily movement. However, it is not clear that agency is, in fact,
limited to actions of this kind. Indeed, Woodward may be correct that
his account of interventionism avoids a specific type of agency, e.g., overt
actions. Yet, and I will argue in Chapter 6 that this is true, it may be
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the case that interventionism relies on a different type of agency. In other
words, Woodward’s non-commitment to agency may turn out to be a non-
commitment to one type of agency, where the non-commitment is still friendly
to some other type.
Before all of the details can emerge, we must first consider in greater
detail both the leading prospects for the agency approach and the most
serious challenges associated with the idea that causation is agent-dependent.
Having explained and situated the agency approach, we can now move on to





In this chapter, I will show that Price introduces the notion of agency into
his theory of causation because he believes that, by doing so, we can improve
standard evidential and probabilistic theories of causation by (i) distinguish-
ing causes from correlations1 and (ii) explaining causal asymmetry. By con-
trasting Price’s approach with standard evidential and probabilistic theories,
I will locate the benefits and prospects for Price’s use of agency in a theory
of causation.
Despite these alleged benefits, I will further argue that the introduction
of agency into a theory of causation leads to two significant problems: the
problem of subjectivity and the problem of scope. I will locate these problems
in relation to Price’s use of agency and further reveal how they are related
to both the use of agency in Collingwood (1940) and the (implicit) use of
agency in Woodward (2003, 2007).
My arguments will be structured around three questions:
1. How does the introduction of agency into a theory of causation help us
improve standard accounts?
2. How does agency lead to the problem of subjectivity?
3. How does agency lead to the problem of scope?
1This benefit relates specifically to causal epistemology. An important aspect of Price’s
theory, indeed an important aspect of all the manipulation theories thus far considered, is
the ability to know that a relationship is causal.
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In §2, I will highlight the leading prospects for Price’s use of agency,
that is, the reasons why he thinks the notion of agency should be introduced
into a theory of causation. §3 will be used to explain the most significant
problems—subjectivity and scope—which seem to result from relating agency
to causation by investigating the use of ‘agency’ in the work of Price and
Collingwood. Lastly, I will use §4 to investigate whether or not the problems
of subjectivity and scope arise in Woodward’s interventionist theory.
3.2 Prospects
Before I discuss the problems with Price’s agency theory, I want to further
explain two of the reasons why Price thinks agency is vital to any plausible
theory of causation.
When thinking about the work of Price, it is important to bear in mind
that Price is attracted to the notion of agency because he is a pragmatist
who thinks that we should investigate causation by investigating what we
do and what we say as human creatures. Yet, Price’s argument, in his 1991
paper ‘Agency and Probabilistic Causality’ and in his 1992 paper ‘Agency
and Causal Asymmetry’, is that the introduction of agency into a formal
theory of causation can help us overcome long-standing problems associated
with the notion of cause. Price claims that by introducing the notion of
agency into a formal theory of causation, we can accomplish the following:
1. Overcome the problem of spurious causes and
2. Explain the asymmetry of cause and effect.
To put these problems in context, consider the highly influential theory
of causation known as the regularity theory.2 The Regularity theory is based
on the work of Hume. For Hume, causation was nothing more than a habit
of the mind. The ‘habit’ or ‘custom’, as Hume refers to it, is the process of
believing ‘like events’ to have ‘like causes’. After we have observed two events
to be constantly conjoined, we infer, by a habit of the mind, that they are
2There are various interpretations of the regularity theory [see Beebee, 2009; Noonan,
H.W. 1999] which I do not intend to support or analyse in this brief overview of Hume.
Rather, I intend only to express an important concern which was critical for Hume. The
concern is epistemological—with what can and cannot be know with certainty, and, more
critically, with what, if anything, justifies causal claims?
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causally related. Constantly conjoined events are events that regularly occur
in succession, that is, one regularly follows the other. These events include
day and night, fire and heat, and rain and wet. After we have observed
two events, e.g., rain and wet, as constantly conjoined, we come to call the
first event ‘cause’ and the subsequent event ‘effect’; we say that rain causes
wetness.
As I explained in the last chapter, Hume does not provide, nor is he
concerned with providing, an explanation for what causation really is, apart
from our psychological understanding of it. Hume offers a descriptive account
of how we come to think and speak in causal terms. In everyday life, Hume
thinks, we form beliefs on the basis of experience—in the case of causation,
the experience of observing ‘constantly conjoined events’, where experience
leads us to form the idea that two events, e.g., the flame and the sensation
of heat, are causally related.
While being extremely influential to modern theories of causality, Hume’s
account is not perfect. For example, Hume’s account does not address the
problem of spurious causes or the problem of causal asymmetry. Spurious
causes are two events that are in constant conjunction without one being the
cause of the other. The crow of the rooster and the sunrise are constantly
conjoined, and yet the rooster has no effect on the sun.
The problem of causal asymmetry concerns probability and regularity
relationships. When two events are constantly conjoined or in regular con-
junction, they are evidentially and probabilistically symmetric; two events
can be causally related when they are regularly or probabilistically conjoined,
and it does not matter which event comes first. For example, the evidential
and probabilistic relationships are approximate for wet/rain and rain/wet
and heat/fire and fire/heat. In other words, these relationships appear to
be evidentially and probabilistically symmetric. The specific problem relates
to the fact that we think causes and effects are asymmetric—generally, we
think that causes raise the probability of later events, viz., effects.3
3.2.1 Spurious Causes
Regarding the case of the rooster and the sunrise, on a regularity account of
causation, we have (experiential) evidence that the rooster and the sunrise are
3Admittedly, Hume’s account does not attempt to explain the asymmetry of cause and
effect because Hume thought it was simply a matter of convention to call the earlier event
‘cause’ and the latter ‘effect’.
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causally related—the past evidence or causal history of roosters and sunrises
leads us to infer that they are causally related. We do not know that the
rooster and the sunrise are causally related, we simply infer from their causal
history (our experience of their conjunction) that they are.
Allegedly, one benefit of Price’s agency theory is that it gives us the ability
to know whether or not two things are causally related. How might this be
done? Price’s answer is that we can discover whether or not a relationship
is causal by creating ‘independent causal histories.’ Notably, Price thinks
that we can create independent causal histories by performing an action. To
illustrate, we can act on the rooster by giving him sleeping pills. By observing
the subsequent sunrise without the rooster, we have created an independent
causal history, where one deprives roosters of their usual evidential bearing on
rising suns (e.g., the rooster would no longer be in conjunction with the rising
sun). The same can be done with many other cases, e.g., nicotine-stained
fingers. Having nicotine-stained fingers is evidentially and probabilistically
related to having lung cancer (likewise, in some cases the two events may
be in conjunction). Yet, we could have smokers act, say by washing their
hands after every cigarette or putting on gloves before every smoke, so they
no longer had nicotine stains on their fingers. These actions would have no
effect on the relationship between smoking and lung cancer. Significantly,
our actions would be creating new causal histories, where one deprives the
original events of spurious causes.
If we translate the case of the rooster and the sunrise into a case of so-
called joint effects of a common cause, we can further reveal a benefit for
Price’s use of agency. To illustrate, we know that the rooster and the rising
sun are merely correlated with the rotation of the earth; they are, so to speak,
joint effects of a common cause—joint effects of the rotation of the earth4
It just so happens that roosters typically awaken when the sun is about to
appear over the eastern horizon.5 There is no causal relationship between the
rooster and the sun—the rooster and the rising sun are merely correlated.
Price’s idea is that conditional on the realisation of X, manipulation via a
free act, e.g., causing the rooster to sleep in, will cause the correlation with
Y to disappear. The correlation disappears because we cannot manipulate Y
by acting via correlations, e.g., we could not manipulate the sun by getting,
4One might think that the sunrise causes the rooster to crow. But we know that the
sun does not actually rise. It appears to rise because of the rotation of the earth.
5This is because the earth’s day/night cycle sets the roosters circadian rhythm.
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or getting rid of, a pet rooster. This is why Price claims that the
common idea to agency accounts of causation is that an event A
is a cause of a distinct event B just in case bringing about the
occurrence of A would be an effective means by which a free agent
could bring about the occurrence of B (1993, p. 3).
A stock example can further reveal the idea. A low-pressure system ar-
rives at the weather station. First, the pressure system causes the barome-
ter’s needle to point to a low value. Later, it causes a rainstorm. There is a
higher probability that there will be a rainstorm given that the barometer’s
needle is pointing to a low value. But barometers do not cause rainstorms.
The evidential probability of a rainstorm is higher given that the barometer
has a low value because the low barometer reading is typically a good indi-
cator that a low-pressure system has arrived, which does causally raise the
probability of rain.
The question that Price wants to address is this: How are we to distin-
guish between evidential-probability raising and causal-probability raising?
The introduction of ‘agent probabilities’ (Price, 1993, p. 190–91) is meant
to distinguish between evidential relationships—which contain possible spu-
rious causes—and causal relationships. Agent probabilities are ‘the proba-
bility that should enter into calculations of a rational agent whose abilities
consist in the capacity to realise or to prevent C, and whose goal turns en-
tirely on E...the agent probability that one should ascribe to B conditional
on A (which we symbolize as ‘PA(B)’), is the probability that B would hold
were one to choose to realize A’ (1993, p. 190–1). Agent probabilities thus
measure the degree to which cause C is an effective means to bringing about
effect E. Price says that, ‘to say that A is an effective means by which an
agent could achieve B is to say that if the agent were to have an overrid-
ing desire that B should obtain, then an adequate rational decision theory
would prescribe realizing A rather than ¬A...In other words, A constitutes a
means for achieving some end B just in case PA(B) is greater than P¬A(B)’
(ibid, p. 191). Price believes that agent probabilities are helpful because
they ‘abstract away’ from the evidential import of an event. Significantly, by
abstracting away from the evidential import of an event, we have the ability
to break spurious causes.
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3.2.2 Causal Asymmetry
In ‘Agency and Causal Asymmetry’, Price asks:
What feature of our perspective could it be that manifests itself
in the cause-effect distinction? (1992, p. 513)
Price’s response is that,
The answer may lie in the agency or manipulation theory of cau-
sation in general. The core of this theory is the view that we
acquire the notion of causation in virtue of our experience as
agents. Roughly, to think of A as a cause of B is to think of A as
a potential means for achieving (or making more likely) B as an
end (1992, p. 514).
Following Price here, we can describe the asymmetry of cause and effect
as agency based. As agents, we know that our actions can only effect future
events, and it is through this fundamental experience—of doing one thing
now (in the present) and effecting something later on (in the future)—that
we come to think and speak in causal terms. This is to say, causal reasoning
comes to reflect the asymmetry of action and manipulation.
So how might ‘our experience as agents’ help us to make sense of causal
asymmetry? Consider the problem in terms of probability and regularity.
There are many cases where C is the cause of an effect E, and E is not
the cause of C. Alternatively, there are no cases where C is the cause of
E, and E is the cause of C. These facts reflect our intuition that causation
is asymmetric. However, standard probability and regularity approaches to
causation suggest that there will be cases of symmetric causation (here I
will only speak of probability, but the same results will follow for regularity
approaches as well).
Consider, for example, that turning the ignition on my car raises the
probability of the engine starting. This is not problematic. However, it
is also true that starting my engine is more likely preceded by turning the
ignition than by using jumper cables or hitting the engine with a hammer.
According to a standard probability theory, when the engine is running, there
is a high probability that the ignition has turned. This means that we can
switch the places of C and E. Probability raising runs equally from C to E
and from E to C. In terms of probability, the relationship appears symmetric.
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The common “solution” to the problem of causal asymmetry is not to
explain the source of asymmetry but to simply stipulate that causes must
precede their effects. This quasi-solution makes the asymmetry of causa-
tion a matter of convention. Price considers the alternative possibility of
explaining asymmetry in terms of some further modal notion, for example,
in terms of counterfactuals. But this just results in what Price calls ‘concep-
tual buck-passing’ (1992b, p. 254). Conceptual buck-passing is ‘the mistake
of appealing to some notion whose own temporal asymmetry and orientation
is no less problematic than that of causation itself’ (ibid). For Price, con-
ventionalism and conceptual buck passing is unhelpful because it does not
explain the problem of asymmetry, and this is precisely what Price wants to
do.
Price thinks that human agency can provide an explanation for causal
asymmetry. Ramsey, remember, argued that the asymmetry of cause and
effect was linked to the fact that we are agents. Ramsey says, ‘from the situ-
ation when we are deliberating seems to...arise the general difference between
cause and effect’ (Ramsey, 1929). Following Ramsey, Price argues that when
we emphasise the agent’s perspective, the unique perspective of ‘delibera-
tion’, we can explain or ground causal asymmetry. The asymmetry of our
modal notions (here causality) can be explained by something actual, viz.,
‘our own constitutions ’, as Price says (1992b, p. 263). Thus, Price argues
the distinction between cause and effect turns out to be anthropocentric.
To illustrate, consider the notion of deliberation. When we deliberate, we
reason about the effects of an action, φ. Given our epistemic constitutions—
our knowledge of the past, our limited knowledge of the future, and our
location in a future-directed world—when we deliberate about an action, we
consider our action to be the means to a later and desired end. Thus, a
free act, which always occurs before some desired effect, is considered to be a
cause. What results from the free act is considered to be the effect. For Price,
this is why the asymmetry of cause and effect is grounded by our perspective
as deliberative agents.
According to Price, there is no de re sense of the causal distinction—
that is, nothing “in the world” that aligns to our talk of causes and effects.
Causal asymmetry is simply something that reflects the agent’s perspective.
As agents, we take our actions to be statistically independent of everything
but their effects. Given that this ‘experience of agency’ includes our temporal
arrow, how we experience time, we know that our actions raise the probability
of later events and that our actions cannot raise the probability of earlier
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ones. It is not just that we say causes precede their effects. The distinction
naturally arises for us as situated agents.
So, given that we take into consideration certain facts about human
agency, e.g., our epistemic constitutions and our situation in time, we can
explain the cause-effect distinction: a cause, as a free act, always occurs up-
stream of some desired effect. The same is true for the problem of spurious
causes. Given that we consider certain facts about human agency, e.g., that
free actions have the ability to create new causal histories, we can discover
whether or not a certain relationship is causal (and thus solve the problem
of spurious causes). (Von Wright agrees. Von Wright (1975) claims that
the asymmetry of causation consists in the general truth that an event can
be manipulated by its causes, but never by its effects. I can, for example,
‘imagine’ controlling floods by controlling rain, but I cannot, however, imag-
ine controlling rain by controlling floods.)
3.3 Problems
Despite the benefits of introducing agency into a formal theory of causation,
relating causation to agency leads to serious worries. The most serious, those
which make up the most common objections to the agency approach, are the
claims that agency leads to an untoward subjectivity about causation and
that it severely limits what we are allowed to call causes (or the scope of
causation). I will begin with the problem of subjectivity.
3.3.1 Subjectivity
To understand the notion ‘subjective,’ one must understand the notion ‘ob-
jective.’ There are many ways to think about objectivity. Usually, something
is taken to be objective if it is mind-independent—that is, something is ob-
jective if it is viewed from nowhere. Mind-independence means aperspectival
and is often thought to be a hallmark of good science (in that objectivity,
as mind independence, constitutes ‘accurate representations’ of the external
world. See Daston and Galison [2007]).The products of good science, it is
further claimed, should be judgment free, that is, free from human experi-
ence, beliefs, or opinions. So, generally speaking, something is said to be
subjective if it is perspectival or if it relies on human judgment.6
6I will elaborate on this and other ideas of objectivity in Chapter 4.
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It is not difficult to understand how the agency approach can be seen as
subjective, given the idea of objectivity as aperspectival or mind-independence.
We have already considered how manipulationists like Collingwood, Price,
and Woodward are anthropocentric in the sense that causation relates to our
perspective as human agents. Furthermore, I argued that the agency ap-
proach is best developed in light of Russell’s rejection of mind-independent
causes. As we saw in chapter 2, a hallmark of the agency approach to cau-
sation is the belief that there are no mind-independent or agent-independent
causes. Indeed, Collingwood argues that causation is relative to what an indi-
vidual can ‘produce and prevent’, and Price argues that causation is relative
to what a human agent can ‘bring about.’
To illustrate the relativity of causation once again, consider a remark
from Collingwood. He says:
Suppose that the conditions of an event included three things, a,
b, c; and suppose that there are three persons A, B, C, of whom
A is able to produce or prevent a and only a; B is able to produce
or prevent b and only b; and C is able to produce or prevent c
and only c. Then if each of them asks, ‘What was the cause of y?’
each will have to give a different answer. For A, a is the cause;
for B, b; and for C, c (1940, p. 304).
Following this example, we could say that causation is subjective in the
sense that what causes what depends on what an individual agent is able
to produce and prevent. Price is explicit that causation is subjective in a
similar manner. He says:
Suppose that the world had developed in such a way that we had
fewer manipulative abilities and skills than we actually posses but
that we still apply our concept of causation roughly in conformity
with the agency approach. In this case the reference of the ex-
pression ‘relation between events such that an actual agent could
manipulate one event as a means to bringing about the other’
would have been fixed on different relations, even though our
way of fixing the reference would have been the same (Menzies
and Price, 1993, p. 99).
According to Price, causation is relative to the manipulative capacities of
agents. Whereas Collingwood seems to suggest that causes are relative to
46
an individual agent, Price thinks causation is relative to a group of creatures
who share the same manipulation capacities.
When we think about causation being subjective in either of the two
ways just described, it seems to go against our ordinary intuitions. Intu-
itively, what causes what seems to be objective and factual. Yet, if we follow
Collingwood’s principal of relativity, this cannot be the case. Recall the
example of the automobile accident. From the car driver’s point of view,
speeding is the cause of the crash, because this is what the driver can con-
trol. However, from the county surveyor’s point of view, the surface of the
road is the cause of the crash, because surveyors have control over the con-
dition of roads. And for the motor-manufacturer the design of the car is the
cause, again, because this is what they can control.
Following Collingwood, we could say that the agency approach represents
a form of epistemic relativism. You are justified to your belief B* based on
what you know how to produce and prevent; and I am justified in my belief
B based on what I know how to produce and prevent.
Even if we can grant that theoretical, or “real”, causes are nonsensical,
it seems extremely counterintuitive (and highly undesirable) to accept this
form of subjectivity. It is an essential desideratum of any viable approach
to causation that it provides some sense of objectivity. In similar (and often
more important) cases, e.g., the causes of cancer, autism, and the origins of
the universe, we need to be able to distinguish between contradictory beliefs
of the type B and B*.
Furthermore, Price’s claim that had our ‘experience of agency’ been dif-
ferent (that is, had we developed some alternative or fewer manipulative
capacities) we would have different answers to questions about causation
is counter-intuitive and unduly subjective. If this were true, it would mean
that agents with different capacities to our own will rationally disagree about
causal relationships and that there would be no objective basis to distinguish
between them. As Jon Williamson points out:
This looks to be a problem not just across possible worlds but
across agents in this world. Just as the capacities of a human, a
robot, and a Venus Fly trap differ, so too would causality-for-a-
human, causality-for-a-robot, and causality-for-a-Venus-Fly-trap
(2007, p. 119).
The problem with agency accounts is that causation becomes subject to
individual understanding (in Collingwood’s analysis) or to what an individual
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is capable of doing (in Price’s analysis), and there appears to be no objective
fact of the matter about what causes what.
3.3.2 Scope
The problem of scope says that the agency approach unduly limits what we
are allowed to call causes. Indeed, Price’s account makes causation subject
to what an agent can ‘bring about’ or to our ‘unique experience’ of agency
(1993). Woodward has been an open critic to these limitations:
If the only way we understand causation is by means of our prior
grasp of the experience (or notion) of agency, then we face the
obvious problem about the extension of causal notions to circum-
stances in which the relevant experience of agency is unavailable
(2003, p. 123).
Again, we are unable to answer some essential questions. For example, it
is not clear how we should assess the ‘agent probabilities’ for (what seem to
be) uncomplicated facts. What is the ‘agent probability’ for the claim that a
star’s mass caused it to become a supernova? What is the ‘agent probability’
that a large asteroid caused the dinosaur’s extinction? There does not seem
to be any straightforward answers to these questions, and yet we know that
explosions in space and extinction events have causes.
These difficulties translate to the problem of scope—that is, what are
we allowed to call causes on the agency theory model? The problem for
the agency theorist is that, by defining a cause as something we can overtly
manipulate or bring about, there seems to be many causes where we know
that C causes E but human agency (i.e., overt manipulation or bringing
about) does not or cannot apply to C. Thus, we unduly limit the scope
of what we are allowed to call causes. Here, again, is apt criticism from
Woodward:
To use [Menzies and Price’s example] what can it mean to say
that, “the 1989 San Francisco earthquake was caused by friction
between continental plates” if no one has (or, given the present
state of human capabilities, could have) the direct personal ex-
perience of bringing about an earthquake by manipulating these
plates? (2003, p. 124)
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Thus, according to Woodward, limiting causality to the manipulative capac-
ities of human agents unduly limits what we can call causes.
The agency approach, by defining causality in terms of manipulation and
control, clearly seems to unduly limit the scope of our causal indicators. In
other words, it does not seem practical to say that all causal claims will
relate to human agency. Even if it is true that our concept of cause developed
from our experience of manipulation, it appears to be much too rigid to
demand that the only appropriate bearing on our causal judgments is agency.
By gauging our causal judgments solely on the basis of agency, we risk the
possibility of limiting the scope of causal indicators to things that we can
manipulate and control, and this seems highly undesirable.
Indeed, there are many cases where we might appeal to further indica-
tors, such as causal mechanisms or causal processes. Wesley Salmon (1998)
and Phil Dowe (2000), for example, argue for a physical interpretation of
causality, one that can identify causal relationships with causal processes like
energy transfer or what Salmon calls ‘mark transmissions.’ Also, it would
seem in cases like the expansion of the universe and the San Francisco earth-
quake that we would be better off explaining some facts in terms of physical
processes, such as energy transfer, rather than facts about human agency.
3.4 A Problem for Woodward Too?
Woodward has been the most vocal critic of Price’s agency theory. According
to Woodward, Price’s use of agency makes causation unduly subjective. But
how much of the subjectivity does Woodward avoid? I have already suggested
that Woodward may be incorrect that his theory of interventionism is agent-
independent. For Woodward, causation is relative to what we include into a
causal model, to our interests, and to assumptions about serious possibilities.
For Collingwood, we could say that causation co-varies with our manipu-
lative know-how; for Price, causation co-varies with our manipulative capaci-
ties. Both kinds of variation lead to subjectivity. Interventionism is meant to
avoid the subjectivity by ‘idealising’ causal models and experimental manip-
ulations. For example, an idealised causal model would include what both of
us know about car accidents. Note that this still makes causation relative to
certain epistemic conditions. If you were to model the state of the accident
(i.e., you were the “scientific investigator”), you might include things like the
condition of the road and the speed of the vehicle. You might not include
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any details of the car’s design because you lacked the appropriate knowledge.
Likewise, when scientists create models, idealised or not, they have no way of
knowing, just like you and I, that they lack some type of relevant knowledge.
In a way, this brings us back to Russell’s localisation argument. When we
limit what we include into the definition of an event or a causal model, we
can never be certain that we have not left out something causal or, more
to the point with causal models, that we have neglected some (unknown)
variable that makes a difference to the effect.
Woodward understands these limitations. Indeed, interventionism is char-
acterised as ‘weak’ and ‘incomplete’ because the best we can do, Woodward
thinks, is describe coarse grained, invariant generalisations. Woodward says
that
The variables involved in [coarse grained] generalizations, shatter-
ing, non-shattering, window breaks, window does not break...take
their values across extended spatio-temporal regions with impre-
cise boundaries...In addition, coarse grained variables may fail to
partition the full possibility space as seen from the point of view
of an underlying fine-grained theory (2007, p. 81).
What Woodward is getting at, I presume, is that interventionism can
avoid some of the relativism and subjectivity that we saw in Collingwood and
Price but not all of it. For example, an idealised experimental manipulation
could avoid the subjectivity of the automobile accident given that we have
the appropriate knowledge. Yet, given that idealised experimental manipu-
lations are relative to knowledge, human interests, and to judgments about
serious possibilities, interventionism does not altogether avoid the problem
of subjectivity. Simply stated, interventions do not qualify as objective in
the sense of mind-independence.
A possible counter argument for Woodward would be that, while interven-
tionism is friendly to a type of subjectivity, the subjectivity is not untoward.
Indeed, Woodward’s argument against Price and the agency approach, as I
suggested in the last chapter, seems to specifically relate to the concept of
overt action. In other words, Woodward would likely respond by claiming
that interventionism is subjective according to a certain specification, e.g.,
mind-independence, but that interventionism is not subject to the specific
limitations that arise for the agency approach, e.g., making sense of the causal
50
relation in terms of overt action.7
Indeed, in an extended debate with the philosopher Michael Strevens,
Woodward (2008) explicitly argues that his theory of interventionism is not
intended to specify the nature of causation, or describe the causal relation
from an absolute, mind-independent perspective. When Strevens (2007) ar-
gues that Woodward’s theory of interventionism fails because it is relativistic
(e.g., interventionism is relative to variable sets and judgments regarding seri-
ous possibilities), Woodward argues that Strevens misrepresents his account
by framing interventionism as a metaphysical analysis of causation. Wood-
ward’s response to Strevens is twofold: (i) interventionism is not meant to
be a metaphysical or absolute theory of causation, and (ii) it does not fol-
low from (i) that interventionism is radically subjective. Woodward (2007,
2008) is quick to point out that a rejection of absolutism (what is sometimes
referred to as ‘objectivism’) does not entail a radical subjectivity. Hence,
Woodward’s debate with Strevens indicates that he does view the agency
approach as more subjective, indeed radically subjective, in contrast with
his own theory.
Happily, Woodward’s argument and his conflict with Strevens opens a
host of interesting questions for the agency approach. Is Woodward correct
that his theory of interventionism escapes a radical and untoward subjectiv-
ity to which the agency approach succumbs? Is Strevens correct that any
subjectivity is untoward and therefore preferably avoided?
In the following chapter, I will elaborate on Strevens’ position and gauge
the prospects for an absolute, i.e., non-relativist, approach to causation.










In this chapter, I will argue that objectivism about causation—the idea that
causation is objective if it is frame-independent or absolute and radically
subjective if it is not—fails by showing that it is impracticable, that it rests
on an invalid assumption, and that it is inimical to modern science. I will
achieve this by answering three questions:
1. What is objectivism about causation?
2. What is the Either-Or fallacy?
3. Does objectivism mean objectivity?
My arguments in this chapter will be focused on causation and will have
a significant impact on the prospects of the agency approach to causation.
If objectivism about causation is correct, the agency approach will fail for
the reasons detailed in the previous chapter, viz., because it makes causation
unduly subjective. However, if objectivism about causation is unsuccessful,
we will be able to view the relativity of causation, which is a consequence
of the agency approach, as non-problematic. Still, I will need to address
critical questions about the agency approach—specifically, questions regard-
ing whether or not (and if so, how) the problems of scope and subjectivity
can be solved. Significantly, my arguments against objectivism, if they are
successful, will allow us to investigate new possibilities. It is my belief that
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there is a viable solution to the problem of scope and the problem of sub-
jectivity. To support this claim, I develop a two-pronged approach. First, I
reveal how many of the objections regarding agency, subjectivity, and scope
rest on misguided intuitions, fears, and assumptions (Part II of this thesis).
The second prong of my approach is to develop a viable agency approach
that overcomes both problems of subjectivity and scope (Part III). My the-
ory of Causal Interactionism will be presented as an agency approach that
can overcome the problems of (i) subjectivity and (ii) scope.
In this chapter, §2 will be used to introduce two kinds of objectivity—
absolute objectivity and relative objectivity. The distinction between the
two ideas of objectivity is critical because I will argue that what is often
taken as the default picture of objectivity regarding causation (i.e., absolute
objectivity) is false, and I will provide what I take to be a feasible alternative
(i.e., relative objectivity).
In §3, I will locate the objectivist position on causation by focusing on the
recent work of Strevens. Strevens argues against a ‘frameworked’ notion of
explanation and causation and in turn defends the concept of deep, standalone
explanations as alternatives. I argue that Strevens is unable to eliminate
the need for frameworking and suggest that the reason for this is that deep
explanations are discordant with modern science. I will also elaborate on
the idea of relative objectivity and the idea that explanations in science are
better understood relative to frameworking.
§4 provides evidence to show that the objectivist position is based on a
false dichotomy. According to objectivism, something is thought to be either
frame-independent and objective or radically subjective. This dichotomy
reveals itself in the work of Strevens (e.g., 2007, 2009) and Russell’s famous
essay, ‘On the Notion of Cause’ (1913). I will argue that the Either-Or
mentality allows us to clarify and make sense of the objectivist position. This
will set the stage for §5, where I reveal how objectivism about causation fails.
§5 will be used to elaborate on the distinction between absolute and rela-
tive objectivity and, by relying on evidence from the history of objectivity in
science, argue that the Either-Or dichotomy is false. It is my belief that the
objectivist is working with an outdated sense of ‘objectivity’ and that the
two concepts, ‘objectivism’ and ‘objectivity,’ are often mistakenly conflated.
To the contrary, I will argue that objectivism does not necessarily mean ob-
jectivity. I argue that modern science reveals an alternative position, relative
objectivity.
In the last four sections, I will use these results to highlight and ulti-
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mately resolve the debate between Woodward and Price. In §6, I will argue
that the debate between Woodward and Price rests on the distinction be-
tween absolute and relative objectivity. I will show that the debate is a
matter of emphasis by highlighting Price’s advocacy of subjectivism as a re-
jection of absolute objectivity and Woodward’s support of objectivism as an
acceptance of relative objectivity. Furthermore, I will clarify Price’s idea of
subjectivity in §7 and locate a subtle form of objectivity that he implicitly
defends. Likewise, I will locate Woodward’s idea of objectivity and a kind
of subjectivity that he implicitly supports in §8. Finally, in §9, I will show
how Collingwood shares the same stance on objectivity as both Woodward
and Price.
4.2 Two Kinds of Objectivity
The influential anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, began his essay, ‘Anti Anti-
Relativism’ (1984), by saying that, ‘I want not to defend relativism, which is
a drained term anyway, yesterday’s battle cry, but to attack anti-relativism,
which seems to me broadly on the rise and to represent a streamlined version
of an antique mistake’ (p. 1). Like Geertz, I want to attack anti-relativism.
Generally speaking, relativism claims that something, e.g., truth, goodness,
or beauty, is relative to a frame of reference. A frame of reference can be
thought of as a context, perspective, or a point of view.
It is useful to note what is meant to be contrasted with when using the
term ‘relativism’. Generally speaking, when something is relative to a frame
of reference, we say that it is non-absolute; there are no absolute overar-
ching factual judgments about x, and there are no overarching standards
to judge between competing reference frames. When philosophers such as
Michael Krauz and Maria Baghramian claim that relativism contrasts with
absolutism (see Krauz, 2010; Baghramian, 2010), there are two different va-
rieties, so to speak, of what they mean by absolutism. One variety means
objectivism, which Krauz refers to as ‘a matter of frame-independence’ (2010,
p. 19). Objectivism affirms, Krauz says, ‘that sticks and stones exist as such
irrespective of reference frames’ (ibid, 23). The second variety of absolutism
is foundationalism, that is, the idea that whatever exists can be reduced
to one fundamental, ultimate level. Note that the next two chapters repre-
sent an extended argument against absolutism regarding causation. In this
chapter, I argue against objectivism.
55
When x is relative to a frame of reference, objectivists will claim that
x is subjective. Significantly, objectivism entails that objectivity is an ab-
solute term. According to objectivism, something is either frame- or mind-
independent or it is subjective. So, an objectivist believes that (i) objectivity
is an absolute term (i.e., they accept what I call absolute objectivity) and
that (ii) something is either objective in the absolute sense, or it is subjec-
tive (when I label someone as an objectivist, e.g., Strevens, [2007, 2009] it
will be in reference to (i) and (ii)). My aim in this chapter is to show that
objectivism is false; it is not necessarily true that relativising x to a frame of
reference means that x is radically subjective. The problem with objectivism
is that it works as a dichotomy—something is objective if it is framework-
independent and subjective if it is not. Regarding causation, the idea looks
like this:
Absolute Objectivity : There is a fact of the matter as to whether
A causes B irrespective of any context. The truth-makers of this
fact do not include the subject. If two rational agents disagree
about the causal relation, then at least one of them is wrong.
My claim is that one can reject absolute objectivity, as I will call it,
and avoid subjectivism. I will argue that x can be relative and objective.
Regarding causation, the idea looks like this:
Relative Objectivity : There is a fact of the matter as to whether
A causes B given a specified context. If two rational agents occu-
pying the same context disagree about the causal relation, then
at least one of them is wrong.
One can reject objectivism about causation and still view causation as
objective. What this shows, I argue, is that we can think of objectivity as
a trichotomy. In one sense, x, e.g., the causal relation, is considered to be
objective in the absolute sense—x is objective if it is frame independent. In
another sense, x is seen as relatively objective. X is relatively objective if one
rejects the absolute sense of objectivity (i.e., the idea that x is frame inde-
pendent) but still sees x as objective given a specified context. According
to relative objectivity, x is subjective in one sense because it rejects abso-
lute objectivity—i.e., it relies on some type of context or frame (contexts or
frames are limited, i.e, non-universal ‘points of view’, to use Collingwood’s
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phrase). Yet, it is believed that we can still think about objectivity once the
appropriate context has been specified. In another sense, x can be absolutely
subjective. X is absolutely subjective if one rejects the absolute and relative
senses of objectivity and sees x as subjective. Only by accepting this last
sense does one qualify as a subjectivist. A subjectivist is someone who be-
lieves that x is relative to some type of context or frame and that the context
is comprised of individual agents.1
When considering relative objectivity, it is important to consider the
frame of reference to which x is relative. For example, an objective Bayesian
(E.T. Jaynes, 2003; Jon Williamson, 2010) who thinks that probabilities are
relative to an ideal agent would not qualify as an absolute objectivist. This
is because the ideal agent, which represents an ideal or universal frame—a
frame that includes all human agents—still represents a specified context, al-
beit a large one. Thus, the objective Bayesian will accept relative objectivity,
where the appropriate frame of reference is ideal and universal. Alternatively,
a subjective Bayesian who thinks that probabilities are relative to individual
agents would qualify as a subjectivist about probability.
Before I analyse objectivism in more detail, it will be useful to situate
objectivism within the landscape of objectivity and frameworking that was
laid out above and to locate a few agency approaches within this landscape.
Table 4.1 plots theories of probability within the landscape of objectivity
according to my analysis of objectivity, that is, objectivity as a trichotomy.
For example, subjective Bayesians will fall under subjectivism because they
believe that probability is relative to individual agents. Objective Bayesian’s
fall under relative objectivity because they believe that probability is relative
to a frame of reference, for example, an ideal agent. Chance theorists will
fall under absolute objectivity because they believe that probability is non-
relative and absolute.
Table 4.1: Objectivity and Probability
Subjectivism Relative Objectivity Absolute Objectivity
Subjective Bayes Objective Bayes Chance Theory
1It’s true that the relative objectivist can think of the appropriate frame or context in
terms of human agency. But a relative objectivist will not think that the context is individ-
ual agents, because she will still want to make objective claims given a specified context.
And we would not be able to speak about objectivity if x was relative to individuals.
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Where would agency theorists be placed on the graph? Agency theorists
like Collingwood and Price think that causation is agent-dependent and thus
reject the idea that the causal relation is objective in the absolute sense.
Table 4.2 assumes objectivism, where something is either frame-independent
and objective, or it is subjective. Table 4.2 is useful because objectivism
about causation (which results in a dichotomy) is often taken as the default
structure of objectivity (e.g., it is assumed by Price, Woodward, Strevens,
and probably Ney, as we will see in the next chapter). Given this structure
of objectivity, I have plotted Collingwood under subjectivism, which is the
only option besides absolute objectivity. Because Collingwood thinks that
causes are handles and that causation is relative to manipulation (see Chap-
ter 2§3), he must be placed to the left of absolute objectivity. So, if we take
the philosophical literature on causation and objectivity, which often assumes
objectivism, at face value, it appears that Collingwood must be placed under
subjectivism.
For Price, causation is best thought of as a ‘situated’ concept (Price,
2017), where the situation in question refers to a creature’s place in time
and a creature’s manipulation abilities. So, Price, like Collingwood, must
be placed to the left of absolute objectivity because he takes the relationship
between c and e to be non-universal. Again, given the structure of table
4.2, which reflects objectivism about causation, Price must be placed under
subjectivism because it is the only option other than absolute objectivity,
which Price clearly rejects. As we will see in §7, the structure of table
4.2 reflects Price’s intuition that the causal relation is subjective. In other
words, given objectivism about causation, Price is correct, and he would be
a subjectivist about causation.
I have also plotted Alyssa Ney, Phil Dowe, and Woodward according to
the objectivist structure. Interestingly, the results in table 4.2 closely reflect
the intuitions of the philosophers themselves, or the position that they would
give themselves. I have placed Woodward under absolute objectivity because
he has referred to his potion as ‘objectivist’ (though it is not entirely clear
what Woodward means by this) and other philosophers, e.g., Strevens and
Price, also see Woodward’s project as some kind of defence for an objective
position on causation.
Table 4.3 shows the same philosophers given my analysis of objectivity.
Whereas objectivism works as a dichotomy, my analysis of objectivity results
in a trichotomy. Below, I have structured the graph in such a way that, ac-
cording to my arguments, causation and objectivity is shown how it really
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is rather than simply how it appears in the philosophical literature (where
objectivism is often assumed). Notably, Collingwood, Woodward, and Price
all fall under relative objectivity (I will argue that this is the correct place-
ment later in this chapter). I have placed Hume under subjectivism because,
according to a certain reading (see Beebee, 2007; Bernstein, 2017), one could
argue that the causal relation, according to Hume, is simply a matter of pro-
jection, or something an individual projects based on their unique experience.
In this chapter and the next, I will argue that absolute objectivity, a position
held by Strevens, Ney, and Dowe, is untenable. The position is untenable
because, even though a philosopher might endorse an absolute position, e.g.,
they may endorse the idea that the causal relation is in some way frame-
independent, what they actually say about the causal relation contradicts an
absolute position. For example, in this chapter, I will show that Strevens
fails to meet the criteria for absolute objectivity about causation because
he must rely on frameworking. In the next chapter, I will reveal that Ney
fails to meet the criteria for absolute objectivity about causation because
she relies on difference-making theories and ordinary pragmatics, which are
frame-relative.
It should be noted that, given the structure of objectivity in table 4.3,
one who falls under the middle category, relative objectivity, is not necessarily
an agency theorist. For example, Jon Williamson (2007) would fall under
relative objectivity, but Williamson would deny that his theory of causation
amounts to an agency approach. Likewise, Cartwright (1979) would fall
under relative objectivity, (recall that effective strategies can be discovered
by ‘partitioning’ (i.e., localising) the space of possible situations to include
the factors that are probabilistically relevant to the given strategy) yet she
does not endorse an agency approach to causation. For Woodward, even
though he denies an affiliation with agency theorists like Price, I will argue
(in Chapter 6 §5) that his theory does amount to an agency approach to
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causation because he relies on the notion of agency.
I should also point out that one can be a physicalist about causation (I
will explore the physicalist position in the next chapter) and yet fall under
relative objectivity. One could say that the causal relation is in some way
relative to frameworking and that any causal relationship will be reducible to
physical facts. (This is a position that likely results from a critical analysis
of Ney, Strevens, and Dowe.)
Table 4.3: Causation and Objectivity: How it is




That table 4.3 accurately reflects the positions of Collingwood, Wood-
ward, and Price will become more clear as we move ahead. For now, I would
like to investigate Strevens’ argument for an objectivist position on causation
and ultimately show that it’s unsuccessful.
4.3 Objectivism About Causation: An Ex-
ample
In Chapter 3, I suggested that Strevens misrepresentedWoodward’s approach
by framing interventionism as a metaphysical analysis of causation. Strevens’
argument, which Woodward has attempted to refute, is that a successful
approach to causation must be non-relativistic. While Strevens (2007) argued
that Woodward’s approach failed due to interventionism’s accommodation to
relativity, Strevens did not explicitly defend an objectivist position; instead,
he simply argued that Woodward’s theory failed to meet its standards.
Interestingly, Strevens has recently provided an argument for his objec-
tivist position. In Depth (2009), Strevens advocates ‘a two factor causal
account of explanation.’ According to Strevens, the first factor of a satis-
factory explanation is that the explanation of e is only made up of those
causal influences of e that pass the second test for ‘explanatory relevance’
(see Depth, Chapter 3). The second factor is supposed to single out those
causal influences that make a difference to the occurrence of e.
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Strevens defends an ontological sense of explanation. He says that ‘an
explanation [is] something out in the world, a set of facts to be discovered’
(p. 6). Additionally, Strevens claims that his project is ‘purely descriptive’
(p. 37). What Strevens intends to show is that deep or standalone explana-
tions are preferable to frameworked explanations. Frameworked explanations
are what Woodward calls ‘weak’ and ‘incomplete’ (see Woodward’s chapter
on invariance, 2003, p. 239–314). They are relative to variable sets, which
typically include high-level, coarse grained events and to assumptions about
things like serious possibilities and background conditions (see Woodward
[2007] for an overview). By contrast, standalone explanations are purport-
edly frame-independent. Strevens calls them ‘complete,’ i.e., sufficient for
understanding the nature of a phenomena, because they are grounded in
fundamental-level causal ‘realisers’ or influences (Strevens, 2009, p. 117).
To determine which fundamental-level influences bear on explanatory rel-
evance, Strevens develops the so-called Kairetic account of difference-making
(Καιρος is the ‘decisive moment’ or the ‘critical place’). A kairetic influence
makes a difference; a non-Kairetic influence, i.e., a trivial one (which may
bear some small influence), is readily dispensable. If a hurricane destroys my
home in California, according to Strevens, what made a difference (to the
state of my home) was the fundamental, physical properties that make up
the movement and force of the storm (among other things). What failed to
make a difference was the fundamental, physical properties of a ham sandwich
being eaten in Barcelona. Speaking of Strevens’ account, Federica Russo, in
her review of Depth (2011), says that, according to the kairetic account of
difference making, ‘causes explain because, when you go deep down in the
structure of the phenomenon to be explained, you will find the event-cause
there, where it has to be, namely at the ‘right place,’ such that it makes a
difference’.
According to Strevens, we can find kairetic difference makers by applying
an optimising procedure to a causal model. For any given event, there is
an optimised or idealised model that captures the fundamental level causal
processes that led to the event.2
2The optimising procedure alters the model according to two specifications: the model
is (i) made as abstract as possible while (ii) maintaining causal continuity among fun-
damental realisers. Continuity means that the trajectories or connections of the models’
many realisers remain unbroken. Strevens correctly acknowledges, ‘you may have to visit
many other university departments, finishing a course with the physics department’ (2009,
p. 161) to understand the depth that explanations require.
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For Strevens, standalone explanations are preferable because they are
purportedly sufficient for full understanding. Frameworked explanations are
only partial and are thus weak candidates for explanations in the ontologi-
cal sense. However, Angela Potochnik, in her article ‘Explanation and Un-
derstanding: An Alternative to Strevens’ Depth’ (2011), correctly points
out that Strevens employs explanatory frameworks ‘to accommodate var-
ious features of explanatory practice that otherwise would not align with
his account’ (p. 6). These features include ‘explanations that appeal to
functional specifications, reference multiply realisable high-level properties,
or sideline causal factors that qualify as difference-makers’ (p. 6).3 As an
example of frameworking, Strevens uses the Lotka-Volterra equation, which
can explain population dynamics across certain species, given the proper ex-
planatory framework.4 Strevens insists that, while such frameworks are often
practically indispensable, explanatory frameworks are inferior to standalone
explanations that purportedly specify the nature of predation.
Strevens’ account raises two serious concerns. The first is that Strevens
does not seem to provide a purely descriptive account of explanation in sci-
ence, despite his claim to the contrary. It seems much more fitting, given
Strevens’ strong ontological predispositions, that his account of explanation
in science is normative rather than descriptive; he’s depicting how scientists
ought to behave rather than how they do behave. Moreover, this raises the
second concern, that is, the value that Strevens places on standalone expla-
nations seems to rest too heavily on his supposition that only fundamental
causal relationships are relevant to explanation.
To his credit, Strevens provides a compelling argument for an objectivist
approach to causation. However, Stevens’ defence of objectivism about cau-
sation fails. Strevens’ defence of objectivism about causation fails because
his account cannot eliminate frameworking. If we take his account at face
value, that is, as a purely descriptive account of explanation in science, there
is no way to eliminate the practical need for frameworking. Indeed, Strevens
does not even try. The Lotka-Volterra model, which makes various preda-
3Strevens also relies on frameworking to accommodate explanations that cite omissions.
4Explanatory frameworks can be thought of as localised models. Models, such as the
Lotka-Volterra equation, generate certain predictions and explanations via inputting data
variables and manipulating the variables. If we are satisfied that the data is accurate,
the results generated from the manipulation of the model provide us with an explanation
of some target phenomenon. Thus the ‘explanatory framework’ can be thought of as a
limited context based on data selection and manipulation procedures.
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tion models relative to certain background conditions, is just one example
in science where full, ontological understanding has nothing to do with the
particular goal of scientific inquiry. Strevens uses this example to reveal that
there are cases in science where something less than a full understanding is
apparently useful. The problem for Strevens is that the example is far from
unusual. There are many cases in science, including many cases in physics,
where frameworking is used as an essential tool that enables understand-
ing, not something that detracts from it.5 In his book Causal Reasoning in
Physics (2014), Mathias Frisch forcefully argues that frameworking (Frisch
says creating ‘boundary conditions’) is an essential practice in physics. Physi-
cists use localised or frame-relative models (i.e., what interventionists would
call small world systems) because it enables them to answer questions and
make useful predictions. To illustrate the role of causal representation in
physics, Frisch uses the example of the Large Hydrogen Collider (LHC), the
world’s largest and most powerful particle accelerator. Frisch points out that
the experiments done with the LHC are highly coarse grained and localised
from the perspective of quantum field theory. Frisch notes that, inside the
LHC, a ‘proton beam is taken to interact directly with the highly localised
electromagnetic fields produced in various components of the accelerator,
such as bending magnets and focusing magnets...yet the micro state of a pot
of cheese fondue in a nearby mountain resort is not included in the model’
(2014, p.64).
Relatedly, one could argue that Strevens’ objectivism about causation
fails because it rests on the problematic supposition that scientists are pri-
marily interested in deep, metaphysical understanding. This supposition is
problematic for a number of reasons. First, as I have already elucidated,
Strevens’ account is too easily interpreted as a normative account of causa-
tion and explanation in science. Strevens fails to provide sufficient evidence
for the claim that scientists are primarily concerned with ontology. It seems
much more likely that working scientists in a variety of fields will have a
range of interests, which may or may not include ontology. Here, one worries
that Strevens misconstrues the regulative ideals that guide scientific inquiry.
Second, one could simply argue that the supposition that scientists are inter-
ested in deep, metaphysical understanding while lacking sufficient evidence
is not a supposition at all. Rather, it is a philosophical inclination being
5Examples abound in practical sciences like psychology, medicine, immunology, and
law. See Pickering, (1995) The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency & Science.
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imposed on science.
The second reason that Strevens’ defence of objectivism about causation
fails is that standalone explanations themselves rely on frameworking. Rather
than making causation relative to a model consisting of high-level, coarse-
grained variables (like Woodward, 2003), Strevens’ account of difference-
making makes causal explanations relative to models composed of ‘kairetic’,
fundamental, lower-level processes. Granted, Strevens’ account of difference-
making would considerably widen the explanatory framework. But Strevens’
account relies on frameworking nonetheless. In the end, Strevens’ argument
amounts to the idea that explanations in science (should) rely on fundamental
level, physical properties, and not coarse grained higher level variables that
are often taken as paramount.
4.4 The Either-Or Mentality
If objectivism about causation fails, what then? If there is no frame-independent
way for us to think about causation, wouldn’t our causal claims become rad-
ically relativistic and subjective? Also, if objectivism fails (and we are forced
to accept relativism about causation), do we not have a good reason to be
sceptical of causal claims in science?
In this section, I will argue that to be an objectivist about causation
requires one to think in terms of a specific (Either-Or) dichotomy.6 The
Either-Or mentality, which says that either causation is frame-independent
and objective or it is radically relativistic and subjective, is a mistake that
often leads to unwarranted and misguided assumptions. Perhaps the most
common, and indeed the most severely misguided, is the assumption that
frame-independence means objectivity, by contrast, that relativism means
subjectivity.
In his book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics,
and Praxis (1983), Richard Bernstein explains that the Either-Or mentality
(he uses this term) is a product of Cartesian Anxiety. Descartes’ Medi-
tations, Bernstein notes, is the ‘locus classicus in modern philosophy,’ for
the metaphor of the “foundation” and the conviction that ‘the philosopher’s
quest is the search for the Archimedean point upon which we can ground our
6The Either-Or mentality results from apparently sound reasoning: either x is the case
or y is the case. However, the conclusion, (x ∨ y) is not logically inclusive. For example,
it could be the case that (¬x ∧ ¬y). I present this as an alternative to (x ∨ y) in 4.5.
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knowledge’ (p. 16). Significantly, Bernstein sees objectivism as the product
of Cartesian Anxiety. He says
It would be a mistake to think that the Cartesian Anxiety is pri-
marily a religious, metaphysical, epistemological, or moral anx-
iety. These are only several of the many forms it may assume.
In Heideggerian language, it is “ontological” rather than “ontic,”
for it seems to lie at the very center of our being in the world.
Our “god terms” may vary and be very different from those of
Descartes. We may even purge ourselves of the quest for certainty
and indubitability. But the heart of the objectivist position, and
what makes sense of his or her passion, is the belief that there are
or must be some fixed, permanent constraints to which we can
appeal and to which we are secure and stable (ibid, p. 19).
I suspect that this belief—the belief in some fixed, permanent constraints—
is what leads Strevens to defend the counterintuitive idea that we need ad-
vanced courses in physics to understand a “real” causal relationship.
It seems likely that Strevens suffers from Cartesian Anxiety and falls prey
to the Either-Or mentality. Without sensing the anxiety, Strevens’ criticism
of Woodward’s interventionist approach can seem misplaced. Indeed, Wood-
ward acknowledges the subjectivity inherent with his approach (more on
this below), yet he makes numerous attempts to show how interventionism
avoids a radical or untoward subjectivity; Woodward has repeatedly said that
any viable theory of causation should be ‘agent-independent’ and ‘objective’
(2003, 2007, 2013).7 Yet, once we see Strevens’ anxiety for what it is (i.e., an
attempt to ground causation in some fixed, permanent constraints), we can
understand why he is so critical of Woodward (and others) who fail to suffi-
ciently ground or secure the notion of cause. Rather simply, my contention
is that Strevens’ position, along with his criticism of Woodward, rests on the
Either-Or mentality.
In the light of the Cartesian Anxiety, another objectivist about causation
becomes illuminated: Russell (1913). Russell’s (1913) position on causation,
7Woodward’s position on objectivity leads to criticism from both sides of the debate.
Strevens (2007) argues that Woodward’s approach is insufficiently objective, while Price
(2017) argues that Woodward’s approach is too objective. In 4.6–4.9 I will clarify these
issues and reveal a consensus between Woodward and Price (and Collingwood) regarding
objectivity.
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i.e., eliminativism, can easily seem misguided. Indeed, something about it
often seems obviously wrong (for example, see Field, 2003; Hitchcock 2007).
Yet, when we situate ourselves within the Either-Or mentality, Russell’s
conclusion seems quite reasonable. What Russell did in 1913 was to show
how there are no absolute causal relations. Russell was an objectivist about
causation because he tried to ground the notion of cause in such a way that
it could be described as frame-independent (recall that Russell thought that
causal generalisations, which are localised, were ‘much too vague’ and ‘otiose’
(1913, p. 8–10). And, when Russell concluded that this type of grounding
was impossible, he thought that the notion of cause should be eliminated.
Assuming the Either-Or mentality, Russell’s conclusion makes sense; because
there were no absolute structures to ground the notion of cause, the notion
of cause had to be eliminated—to do otherwise would lead to vagueness and
scepticism, both of which Russell thought were inimical to science.
Interestingly, Russell later came to see his objectivism as an error. Indeed,
it was a mistake that Russell corrected. In Human Knowledge (1948), Russell
maintains his position on physical causation. He says, ‘the concept ‘cause’,
as it occurs in the works of most philosophers, is one which is apparently not
used in any advanced science’ (p. 399). Yet, Russell’s stance in 1948 rep-
resents a more pragmatic approach to causation compared to his objectivist
approach in 1913. Even though causation was not grounded in fundamental
laws, Russell said in 1948, ‘[the concept ‘cause’] still has importance as the
source of approximate generalisations and pre-scientific inductions, and as a
concept which is valid when suitably limited’ (ibid). These generalisations
are ‘much weaker’ than fundamental laws, but the ‘assumption’ that A causes
B ‘may suffice to give a high degree of inductive probability’ (p. 400).
It is interesting to note that, as we will see in the next section, Russell’s
pragmatic stance on causation is compatible with the notion of objectivity
in modern science. The objectivist position of Russell (1913) and Strevens
(2009) is not. This is because objectivism is a value that is not commonly held
in modern science. Objectivity is valued in modern science, but objectivism
does not necessarily mean objectivity.
4.5 Objectivity in Modern Science
In this section, I want to further explore the two senses of objectivity that
I have identified. Particularly, I want to situate both absolute and relative
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objectivity in scientific practice by exploring the idea of objectivity in science.
In their book Objectivity (2007), science historians Lorraine Daston and
Peter Galison note that scientists in the nineteenth century took on the ideal
of absolute objectivity (what Daston and Galison call mechanical objectiv-
ity) because they wanted a more accurate and factual representation of na-
ture. For these scientists, objectivity could be secured by eliminating human
agency and frameworking. Agent-independence was thought to confer objec-
tivity by providing impartial, accurate, and compelling evidence, while the
subjective, by contrast, was thought to eliminate objectivity for the reason
that something about the subject was being included within our judgments
(for a useful review, see also Moser, 1999, pp. 19–28; Keller, 1997, pp. 313–
332). For example, the idealised images of human skeletons presented in the
Tables of the Skeleton and Muscles of the Human Body (1747), which were
beautifully drawn by the professor of anatomy at Leiden, Bernhard Siegfried
Albinus, were regarded with suspicion a century later for being overly sub-
jective. Mechanical devices, such as the single lens camera, came to replace
hand-drawn images because they were thought to represent nature more ac-
curately. A real skeleton could be captured by a photograph but not by a
human-made drawing.
The emerging idea of objectivity at the turn of the 20th century can be
seen in a debate between two histologists (histology is the microscopic study
of tissues). In 1906, Cajal and Golgi shared the Nobel Prize for medicine.
The scientists had both used the new staining method of black-reaction to
make visible the nerve cells in the human brain. The debate was centred on
the structural accuracy of the images that had been created, independently,
by Golgi and Cajal. Golgi had altered the images by adding hand-drawn
highlights and colour variations to reveal what he deemed to be significant.
Cajal, who refrained from changing the images in any way, charged that
Golgi’s images utterly failed to accurately represent the correct and objec-
tive images that he had elicited. As Cajal claimed that the goal of science
was to ‘see nature clearly,’ by which he meant independent of the human
subject, he subsequently charged that Golgi’s interventions were subjective
and ultimately unscientific.
Given the absolute sense of objectivity, a subjective judgment is a judg-
ment or belief supported by evidence that was compelling for some rational
beings and not others. For example, you may believe that the monument is
on the left, while I think that the monument is on the right. You say that




In contrast to absolute objectivity, relative objectiv-
ity relates objectivity to a particular context and means
non-arbitrary. It’s important to note that if the idea of
relative objectivity is successful (in the sense that is sup-
ported by modern science), the (Either-Or) dichotomy
described in the previous section, which represents the
objectivists’ position, can be shown to be false. Below,
I argue that the idea of relative objectivity is successful
in the sense that it is coherent with scientific practice. The importance of
the distinction between absolute and relative objectivity is to see that the
objectivist is working under the assumption that objectivity means absolute
objectivity. A vital question is whether or not scientific practice supports
this hypothesis. I argue below that it does not.
In Rethinking Objectivity (1997), the historian Allen Megill calls the rel-
ative sense of objectivity Dialectical Objectivity.8 Megill says that dialectical
objectivity, ‘involves a positive attitude toward subjectivity,’ because subjec-
tivity ‘is indispensable to the constituting of objects’ (1997, p. 9). I call this
type of objectivity relative objectivity because something is objective given,
and relative to, some parameter, perspective, point of view, or framework.
Given your position on the street, it is an objective fact that the monument is
on the left. Given the human visual system (and given that it is functioning
properly in an appropriate environment), it is an objective fact that certain
flowers are coloured.
In Objectivity, Daston and Galison primarily explore how the notion of
objectivity, in relation to scientific practice, was first developed in the nine-
teenth century and subsequently transformed over the following centuries.
Daston and Galison distinguish three unique and overlapping senses of the
word ‘objective’, while in Rethinking Objectivity, Megill distinguishes four
senses of objectivity. The takeaway message from both of these studies is
that the history of objectivity in science teaches us that the word ‘objective’
is often confounded as it is continually being adapted and re-adapted to fit
varying conceptions in science.
The modern sense of objectivity, as perceived by scientists beginning
8For a defence of dialectical objectivity, see Pickering, ‘Objectivity and the Mangle
of Practice’, 1997; Barnouw, ‘The Shapes of Objectivity’, 1997; Fabian, ‘Ethnographic
Objectivity Revisited’, 1997; and Galison, ‘The Journalist, the Scientist, and Objectivity’,
2014.
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around the 1930’s (see Daston and Galison, pp. 265–315), represents a move
away from absolute objectivity. In the modern sense, objectivity means jus-
tification and reliability and is defined by the elimination of arbitrary judg-
ments (ibid, p. 309–62). Objectivity in the modern era (what Daston and
Galison call objectivity as trained judgment) is modest when compared with
the absolute idea of objectivity. This is because objectivity is no longer
viewed as a binary notion. Something can be more or less objective as it
is a matter of degree. The reason for this is that objectivity as trained
judgment is concerned with justification and reliability rather than accurate
representation and truth.
One of the most significant contrasts between absolute objectivity and ob-
jectivity as trained judgment concerns the human subject and the notion of
perspective. The absolute idea views the subjective and perspectival as fun-
damental obstacles to accurate representation and real science. By contrast,
the idea of objectivity as trained judgment, much like dialectical objectivity,
sees the subjective and perspectival as necessary supplements to useful sci-
ence. What Daston and Galison make clear is that scientists working in the
second half of the twentieth century began to focus explicitly on the iden-
tification of the salient. Things like atlases, maps, and scientific textbooks
needed to include trained judgment based on familiarity and experience, so
that the user could understand the salient features of certain scientific prac-
tices.
In the sense of trained judgment, a belief or theory is said to be objective
if it is justified, and a belief or theory has justification if it is appropriately
functional. The evidence that provides justification, and therefore objectiv-
ity, is often a working distinction. To illustrate, when V.A. Firsoff published
his Moon Atlas (1961), he argued that expert opinion was ineliminable. Be-
cause the lights and shadows on the moon were so significantly affected by
its libration, many decisions were made concerning the magnetograms or
pictorial representations of the moon’s magnetic field. Of course, these deci-
sions were partly subjective as they involved human judgment. Nevertheless,
trained judgment was needed to make the image useful. Firsoff’s argument
was important because what scientists wanted in 1961 was a reliable map
of the moon—one that could, for example, distinguish between a mountain
and a crater. In certain operational contexts, e.g., given the question, ‘where
should one land a spacecraft on the moon’, the subjective, or the human
subject, was no longer thought to be inimical to science. Scientists viewed
the real, i.e., mind-independent, map of the moon as insignificant because it
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could not provide the necessary distinction.
The key aspect that separates absolute objectivity from objectivity as
trained judgment is a notable shift in what scientists perceived to be their
principal motives and regulative ideals. Scientists working in the nineteenth
century tried to discover and represent a world untouched by human hands.9
Significantly, scientists in the modern era began to reject the motive of elim-
inating human interaction in science and thus moved away from absolute
objectivity—the elimination of the subjective and perspectival—because the
motive for these scientists had shifted towards use. By including trained judg-
ment, the human subject became vital to scientists who wanted to convey to
apprentices ‘the means to classify and manipulate’ (Daston and Galison, p.
322).
These developments are significant for a number of reasons. First, we
learn that objectivity in the modern sense is in accordance with the relative
idea of objectivity and not the absolute. Human interaction, perspective,
judgments, and values that were once viewed as inimical to science are now
viewed as necessary additions to useful and functional science. Second, the
historical development of scientific ideals in the twentieth century shows us
that science is amicable to the idea of frameworking. Scientists are interested
in the salient features of certain systems or objects because their motive is
use or functionality. This supports Frisch’s idea in §3. Frisch’s argument
was that physicists relied on localised causal models because this enabled
them to answer important questions and make useful predictions. Indeed,
the claims of Collingwood, Price, and Woodward that causation is relative
to a point of view and that relativity is needed because we are focused on
use, far from being problematic, shares an important similarity with modern
science. Third, these developments are significant because they show us that
the Either-Or dichotomy is false. It is not true, according to modern science,
that something is either aperspectival, agent-independent, and therefore ob-
jective or it is radically subjective. Thus, we discover that a rejection of
absolute objectivity does not lead to a radical subjectivity. Indeed, modern
science presents us with an alternative view: something can be relative and
objective.10
9Daston, Galison, and Megill all note that philosophers in the twentieth century would
make this motive even stronger by adding the idea that science should represent the world
as it really is.
10I will argue in the following section that this is true for causation. I will also argue it
is a position held by Collingwood, Price, and Woodward.
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Two points are also worth noting. First, Russell seems to have shifted
from absolute to relative objectivity. Russell’s 1948 account of causation is
structured in terms of how we make inferences. Thus, causation becomes
relative to certain epistemic constraints. Yet, Russell thinks the notion of
cause is highly useful nonetheless, which is a major shift from his objectivist
position in 1913. Second, we can see more clearly why Strevens’ ontological
approach to causation fails as a purely descriptive account. As I noted above,
Strevens is forced to retain some level of frameworking in science because it
is a practical necessity. Again, Strevens thinks that standalone explanations
are superior because they have ontological precedence. But the history of
science indicates that ontology no longer has the precedence in science that
it once enjoyed. At the very least we can say that what also has precedence
is functionality—the very thing that validates relativity and frameworking.
4.6 The Debate BetweenWoodward and Price
An important question we might ask now is, what is the relationship be-
tween the manipulation approach to causation and objectivity? Notably,
Woodward and Price hold contrasting views on the status of the manipula-
tion approach and whether it should be given a subjectivist or an objectivist
interpretation. On the one hand, Price (1993, 2017) argues that the relation-
ship between causation and manipulation entails a subjectivist position on
causality, while on the other, Woodward (2003) argues that his manipula-
tion approach implies an objectivist position on causality. The discrepancy
between Woodward and Price on objectivity is problematic for two reasons.
First, it suggests that my claim of solidarity between Woodward and Price
is somehow mistaken. Second, and more significantly, the discrepancy be-
tween Woodward and Price, that is, the general lack of consensus on the
status between manipulation and objectivity, gives credence to the critics of
the agency approach. For example, Alyssa Ney (2009) argues that the so-
called subjectivity of manipulation approaches to causation provides support
for physical theories of causation, which she takes to be more objective. Ney
says that ‘insofar as one has reason to believe that facts about [manipulation]
are subjective...it can provide a powerful case for foundationalism’ (2009 p.
758; I pick up this argument from Ney in chapter 5).
The debate between Woodward and Price boils down to a matter of em-
phasis. By focusing on the alleged concerns regarding objectivity in the
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absolute sense, i.e., given the objectivist criteria, Price emphasises a subjec-
tivist position on causation. In contrast to Price, by placing emphasis on the
positive aspects of objectivity in the relative sense, Woodward stresses an
objectivist position. Because Price and Woodward are working without the
appropriate distinctions, i.e., absolute and relative objectivity, they simply
misinterpret each other’s position. In the end, my arguments will show the
two positions—a rejection of absolute objectivity and a acceptance of rela-
tive objectivity—are compatible. Indeed, the rejection of absolute objectivity
and the acceptance of relative objectivity is a stance held by Collingwood,
Woodward, and Price.
The distinctions between absolute objectivity, relative objectivity, and
absolute subjectivity are critical to understanding the debate between Wood-
ward and Price. By relying on these distinctions, I argue that we can actually
resolve the debate and build an objective agency approach to causation. In
the debate between Woodward and Price, both end up misinterpreting each
other’s position. Price is not a subjectivist, as Woodward claims, and Wood-
ward is not an objectivist, as Price claims. If objectivity means relatively
objective, the correct way to interpret Price’s “subjectivism” is in defence of
the relative in “relatively objective”, and the right way to interpret Wood-
ward’s “objectivism” is in defence of the objective in “relatively objective”.
4.7 Price’s Perspectivism
Up to this point, I merely suggested that Price accepted relative objectivity,
despite the fact that he explicitly defends a form of subjectivity. To show that
my claim is correct, I must demonstrate that Price’s defence of subjectivity is
a result of his rejection of absolute objectivity. Second, and more challenging,
it must be demonstrated that Price is amenable to some form of objectivity.
It is commonly supposed that Price supports a subjectivist position on
causation (e.g., Woodward, 2003, 2013). However, this supposition about
Price is misleading. Using the distinction between absolute and relative ob-
jectivity and pure subjectivism, we can see how a rejection of objectivism
or the idea of absolute objectivity would not necessitate a subjectivist po-
sition on causation. For example, one could reject absolute objectivity and
still accept objectivity in the weaker, relative sense. My claim is that this
rejection-acceptance model—that is, reject absolute objectivity and accept
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relative objectivity—is the correct interpretation of Price.11
Figure 4.2:
One could immediately object, citing Price’s 1993
essay ‘Causation as a Secondary Quality’, that my claim
simply misses the point. Clearly, one could argue, Price
wants to teach us that there is something fundamentally
subjective about our concept of cause. If, as Price ar-
gues, causation is a secondary quality, then Price’s point
is that it is something about us as human agents that
gets us to causation. To this I would reply in favour:
Indeed, Price’s point is precisely that it is something
about us as human agents that gets us to causation. What I would add is
that this merely prohibits us from holding an absolute position on objectiv-
ity about causation. If, as in the case of colour, we think of objectivity as
relative to the context of certain dispositions, e.g., the human visual system,
then there is still a sense in which we are allowed to speak about objectivity.
For example, there may be no absolute sense in which we can sensibly talk
about the colour of an object; however, it remains an objective fact, given
our disposition to see colour, that the apple in figure 4.2 is red. Given the
(normally functioning) human visual system, to call the apple green or blue
in this context would simply be false.
To get a better grasp of what Price means by subjectivity, consider Price’s
2001 essay, ‘Causation in the Special Sciences: The case for Pragmatism,’
where he explicitly defends a type of subjectivity. Price advocates what he
calls a practice-subjectivity about causation. Practice-subjectivity is meant to
be contrasted with a stronger form of ontological-subjectivity. The distinction
is useful because Price maintains that the concerns for causal realism relate
to the ontological axis; once again Price is arguing that when we think about
causation, we must turn inwards, as it were, and away from the objectivist’s
invocations of reality. The inward turn is necessary because any
adequate philosophical account of causation needs to begin with
its role in the lives of agents, creatures who have the primitive
experience of intervening in the world in pursuit of their ends
11Relative objectivity results from a rejection, rejection, acceptance model (reject ab-
solute objectivity, reject absolute subjectivity, and hence accept a relative objectivity).
However, for stylistic reasons, I will sometimes speak of relative objectivity in relation to
a rejection-acceptance model. The rejection should be read as a rejection of both absolute
objectivity and absolute subjectivity.
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(Price, 2001, p. 107).
For Price, causation is practice-subjective because an adequate philosophical
account of causation must make
reference to the role of the concept in the lives and practices of
the creatures who use it (Ibid, 106).
It is important to note again that Price’s defence of subjectivity, thus far
considered, merely entails a rejection of absolute objectivity. Indeed, Price
is explicit that he does reject absolute objectivity. To illustrate, note that
Price’s defence of practice-subjectivity is meant to contrast with the stronger
form of subjectivity, ontological-subjectivity. According to Price, causation
is ontologically-subjective if ‘the existence of causal relations depends on the
minds, speakers, observers or the like; if causal states of affairs are in this
ontological sense mind- or observer-dependent’ (2001, p. 106). What Price
rejects is the idea that causation is frame-independent. Price rejects absolute
objectivity and thus (given objectivism) claims that causation is subjective
because we have to reference the lives and practices of the creatures who
employ causal concepts. Yet, it seems plausible, indeed likely, that once we
have made the necessary reference, we can speak about objectivity.
However, Price is somewhat unclear on this point because he chooses
to talk about realism rather than objectivity. For example, Price takes
ontological-subjectivity to counterpoise strong realism. ‘Strong realism,’ as
Price (2001, p. 112) calls it, relies on the so-called inference to the best expla-
nation for believing in the reality of theoretical entities and states of affairs
postulated by science. Following this view, the best explanation of the avail-
able observational data is that these entities and postulates exist or obtain.
Price rejects strong realism about causation for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the reason that it would be viciously circular. However, Price points out
that his sympathies lie with another kind of realism—what he calls ‘minimal’
or ‘weak’ realism (ibid, p. 113). A minimal realist simply takes the existence
claims of science at face value, ‘and rejects any additional metaphysical or
philosophical viewpoint from which it would make sense to ask, ‘Do these
things (electrons for example) really exist’ (ibid). Price suggests that Arthur
Fine’s defence of the natural ontological attitude is compatible with minimal
realism. So, we could say that, because ontological-subjectivity counterpoises
a strong realism, Price’s acceptance of a minimal realism is compatible with a
weaker, minimal form of objectivity. I will return to this point in a moment.
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Moving ahead with Price’s work, we see the same defence of subjectivity
against those who he perceives to be causal realists. ‘Some writers (e.g.,
Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2001),’ Price says, ‘agree about the centrality of
notions of agency and manipulation to an understanding of causation, but
take the resulting view in a more realist or objectivist spirit’ (Price, 2004, p.
49). One question we might ask is, why is Price so worried about the ‘realist
spirit?’
Price motivates a kind of subjectivity because he is concerned that the
‘realist or objectivist spirit’ will lead to a sort of scepticism regarding causa-
tion. He remarks:
I think that Woodward’s view that his approach is more ‘realist’
than that of MP is likely to prove more of a hinderance than a
help at this stage, in that it makes him more prone to sceptical
worries about whether there is really causation inside the sun,
or whether causation really runs past-to-future in neighbouring
galaxies (2017, p. 93).
In a recent paper, ‘Causation, Intervention and Agency—Woodward on
Menzies and Price’ (2017), we can again see that Price’s defence of subjec-
tivity is an argument against what I call absolute objectivity—viz., frame or
human-independence. Price says that ‘it is the subjectivist view that does
the better job of recognising the contingencies and limitations of the hu-
man standpoint, and the objectivist view that confuses us with gods’ (2017,
p. 90). Though Price himself does not specify what he means by ‘objec-
tivism,’ I think it is clear that he means absolute objectivity (frame- or
human-independence). Moreover, I think it is also clear that Price relates re-
alism, that is, strong-realism, with absolute objectivity. Subsequently, when
Price mentions realism, he means absolute objectivity. So, the subjectivity
that Price defends can be understood as a reaction against objectivity in
the absolute sense. I will now discuss my claim that Price rejects absolute
subjectivity.
It seems to me that Price’s so-called minimal realism is interchangeable
with relative objectivity. For example, they both suggest that we should take
certain claims at face value (e.g., if we take a human point of view regarding
causation, we can make true, false, or otherwise factual claims about certain
causal relationships, and we need not ask, ‘are these really true’ or ‘do these
facts really obtain’); they both reject the traditional picture of objectivity as
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agent-independence, and they are both grounded in practical considerations
(whether or not weak realism deserves to be classified as a species of realism
is another question).
The most compelling evidence for Price’s acceptance of relative objectivity
comes from his idea that causation is perspectival. Price (2007) uses the
familiar example of ‘foreignness’ to introduce the notion of perspective to
our understanding of causation. As Price explains, we know that the notion
‘foreigner’ only makes sense from a certain location or perspective. From our
location z, it is appropriate to say that y’s are foreigners—from our location,
we apply the concept to them. However, the people on the opposite side of
the border apply the same notion of foreignness to us. From their location
z*, it is appropriate to say that x’s are foreigners. Significantly, Price points
out that this does not deny the reality of foreigners:
[Foreigners are] not figments of our collective imagination, or so-
cial construction, or useful fictions. They’re not mind-dependent,
and they don’t disappear when we don’t keep on eye on them.
Our ‘folk theory’ about foreigners isn’t subject to some global
error, and the term ‘foreigners’ certainly manages to refer. Some
of our beliefs about foreigners are mistaken, no doubt, but only
by failing to accord, case-by-case, with the objective reality to
which they are certainly answerable. There are many facts still
to be discovered about foreigners, such as their precise distribu-
tion in space and time. Moreover, these are matters for scientific
discovery...in a nutshell, foreigners are as real as we are. (Price
2007, p. 250)
Nonetheless, Price thinks we learn something when,
mind’s broadened by travel, we realised that foreigners themselves
use the very same concept, but apply it to us!...[T]he reality of
foreigners notwithstanding, there’s a sense in which foreignness is
a less objective matter than we used to think. (2007, pp. 250–51)
Here we can see the precise rejection-acceptance model that relative objec-
tivity requires. ‘Foreignness’ is not a mind-independent natural kind—it is
not aperspectival or human-independent as absolute objectivity would re-
quire. Nonetheless, it is not purely subjective. We can speak objectively
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about foreigners or ‘foreignness’ given that we specify context or given that
we understand the concept in terms of a given perspective.
Price claims that the same goes for causation. Causation is perspectival
because it relies on ‘our viewpoint, or location, in one way or another’ (Price,
2017, p. 91). Specifically, Price thinks that causation is relative to the
context of what he calls deliberation. How (or what) we deliberate (about)
as human agents is determined and limited by many factors, including how
we experience time and what we take to be within our control. Price says
that our deliberation as human agents is limited by options. Options are
propositions that the agent takes herself to have the option of ‘deciding to
make true’. Price says that fixtures, that is, all matters of fact that are not
held to be a matter of choice in deliberation, ‘denotes everything else’ (Price,
2017 p. 87). When I deliberate about getting into better shape, for example,
I take as options (i) what I eat and (ii) how often I go to the gym. These are
things that I can control or ‘make true’ in one way or another. Fixtures are
everything else that I take to be outside of my direct control, for example,
the weather, the fat content of certain foods, and so on. So, when you and
I are both deliberating about fitness, given that we share the same options,
if you and I disagree about the effects of diet on fitness, one of us must be
wrong. Given this context, it will be an objective fact whether or not eating
habits will affect fitness.
In the scenario where you and I are both deliberating—we both share the
context of deliberation—but we do not share the same context of options,
i.e., we take different objects to be within our control, Price says there is an
intramodal difference between us.12 There would be an extramodal difference
between us if we did not share the context of deliberation. Price explains:
We differ intramodally compared to creatures who are also agents
but have [e.g.,] the opposite temporal perspective to our own.
We differ extramodally from creatures who are not agents and
therefore lack what it takes to employ the concept of causation
in the first place (Price, 2017, p. 88).
So, we differ intramodally from creatures who are also agents but who
take different objects to be within their control, e.g., space aliens with the
12This is quite similar to Collingwood’s (1940) notion of handles in the practical sense
of cause. Options, like handles, are relative to what certain agents can bring about,
manipulate, or otherwise control. I will investigate this similarity in §9.
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opposite temporal perspective to our own or gods like Jehovah and Zeus. We
differ extramodally from creatures who are not agents at all, e.g., intelligent
trees. Generally speaking, Price would say that all human agents share the
same options; unlike Collingwood (1940), Price would say that human agents
do not differ intramodally.
The relevant point to note is that Price’s perspectivism can be classed
as relative-objectivity. Causation is not mind- or frame-independent as ab-
solute objectivity would require—causation is subjective because it is frame-
dependent. Nonetheless, causation is not purely subjective. Given that we
specify a relevant context, it is an objective fact whether or not I am a
foreigner or whether or not diet affects fitness.
4.8 Woodward’s Interventionism
For Price’s theory, the question of relative objectivity was whether or not
there was evidence of Price’s acceptance of objectivity. Placing Woodward in
the context of relative objectivity is beset with a different concern. Whereas
Price is misunderstood as a full-blooded subjectivist, Woodward is misun-
derstood as a full-blooded objectivist. So, the question for Woodward is
whether or not there is evidence that he rejects absolute objectivity.
Woodward and Price, like Collingwood, are manipulationists. Price’s
version of the manipulation theory argues that it is something about us as
agents that gets us to causation; causes are things that we regard as handles
and provide us with a sense of power and control. Woodward’s manipulation
theory, interventionism, would accept this claim but lose the emphasis.
The notion of an intervention is an abstract representation of
a human experimental manipulation that is stripped of its an-
thropocentric elements and characterised in terms that make no
reference to human beings and their activities. (Woodward, 2003,
p. 374)
So characterised, we can think of an intervention as:
An idealized experimental manipulation carried out on some vari-
able X for the purpose of ascertaining whether changes in X are
causally related to changes in some other variable Y. (ibid, 95)
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Interventionism is meant to provide a theory of causal explanation. If we
intervene appropriately on X and notice changes in Y we can explain Y by
citing X. If I go from eating one bowl of ice cream a week to eating two bowls
of ice cream a day, assuming I hold all the other relevant variables constant,
and I notice changes to my fitness, I can explain the changes to my fitness
by citing my diet—we can say that diet has a causal relationship to fitness.
Woodward takes the causal relation to be an objective fact. Nonetheless,
it is a complicated issue determining just how objective Woodward intends
to be. Recall the earlier quote from Price:
Some writers (e.g., Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2001) agree about
the centrality of notions of agency and manipulation to an un-
derstanding of causation, but take the resulting view in a more
realist or objectivist spirit (Price, 2004, p. 46).
Michael Strevens seems to agree with Price and takes part of Woodward’s
project to be an account of the nature of causation. Referencing Woodward’s
2003 book, Making Things Happen, Strevens says:
[Woodward] argues that according to the manipulation account,
causation is mind-independent, or objective, on the grounds that
the characterisation of causation offered by the account makes
reference only to counterfactual facts that are ‘not dependent
on human attitudes or beliefs’. This argument clearly supposes
that the Woodwardian characterisation of causation tells us about
the nature of causation (indeed, it had better tell us everything
about the nature of causation, or else we might miss some mind-
independent truth-maker for causal claims) (Strevens, 2007, p.15).
It is clear that both Price and Strevens take Woodward’s project to in-
clude a defence of objectivism and absolute objectivity according to my defi-
nitions of the terms. Indeed, there are a handful of passages where Woodward
speaks about objectivism and suggests that he endorses an objectivist view.
Consider the two passages from Woodward (2003) where Strevens and Price
base their allegations:
The counterfactuals on which causal claims are based seem to be
true in a mind-independent way (Woodward 2003, p.118).
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I would claim that this is essentially the objectivist position re-
garding causality and agency that I have endorsed (ibid, p.125).
Indeed, there are a handful of passages where Woodward speaks about ob-
jectivism and suggests that he endorses an objectivist view. This can be
misleading. Indeed it has been. Both Price and Strevens take Woodward to
mean that he is an objectivist according to my understanding of the term.
But this is not whatWoodward means—it seems quite clear from reading the
passages above that there is more to say about Woodward’s “objectivism”.
Indeed, Woodward writes that causal claims seem to be mind-independent
because, as he explains three lines earlier,
I suggested above that there may be a limited sense in which
[subjectivism] may be true: which causal claims we accept as
true (or at least readily accept) are influenced by what we take
to be a “serious possibility”. However, once we fix which possi-
bilities are serious, it seems to me that...there is no other sense
in which counterfactuals about the outcomes of hypothetical ex-
periments associated with typical causal claims are in some way
dependent on human attitudes and beliefs. In other words, the
counterfactuals on which causal claims are based seem to be true
in a mind-independent way (ibid p.118)
Unless we are willing to contend that Woodward entirely contradicts himself
within the same paragraph, i.e., as accepting subjectivism and yet somehow
emerging as an objectivist, we should view Woodward’s comments on ob-
jectivity as a statement of relative objectivity. For it is only when we fix
the so-called serious possibilities that we can make objective claims about
counterfactuals and causal relationships.
It is worth considering the idea of serious possibilities in more detail.
According to Woodward (e.g., 2003), what we consider to be a serious possi-
bility is based on a variety of factors: the various questions we ask, what we
are interested in explaining, and the conditions and factors that we hold to
be invariant all determine a sense in which we hold some possibilities to be
more serious than others. Consider the example of a patient who died from
a failure to receive an antibiotic. In the case of the patient’s death, we do
not hold strangers from distant cities who fail to administer the shot causally
responsible. To understand why this is so, that is, why a counterfactual such
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as, If Y, who is not a doctor and a complete stranger to patient X, had ad-
ministered z to X, X would have lived fails to provide a plausible explanation
for the patient’s death, we have to consider our ordinary interests. In such
cases, we are interested in preventing similar deaths. So, while it may be true
that the patient would have lived had a stranger (Y) administered the drug,
we do not consider strangers to have a causal effect on the patient because we
do not hold strangers accountable and/or responsible for preventing/failing
to prevent similar deaths.13
As I argued in chapter 3, Woodward thinks that the idea of serious pos-
sibilities leads to a kind of relativity. ‘What we want to explain and what
we take as serious possibilities is relative to our interests’, Woodward says.
However, relativity, Woodward points out, should not be considered as a
threat to objectivity:
it does not follow that for a fixed explanandum M and for a fixed
explanans E, whether E explains M is itself interest-dependent.
Obviously, it is not puzzling and no threat to the “objectivity” of
explanation that the explanans E may explain M but a different
explanans E’ may be required to account for M’ (2003, p.230).
On Woodward’s account, interest-relativity will simply determine which
factors or variables we include in a causal model. Thus, interventions are
relative to a variable set V, where any particular model can reveal the causal
relationships between the relevant variables. Interventions (so construed)
allow us to answer what Woodward calls what-if-things-had-been-different-
questions (w-questions for short). In terms of my fitness, the w-question
that I want to answer is how changing [diet ] will effect [fitness ]. If we change
variable X [diet ] and notice changes in Y [fitness ], we can say that there is
a causal relationship between X and Y—in some sense, we can explain Y
by citing X. This type of explanation, Woodward admits, is somewhat weak.
We may not discover, for example, the precise mechanism that links diet and
fitness when we attempt to answer the w-question about diet and fitness.
Nonetheless, the explanation is not inconsequential or arbitrary. If a change
to X produces a change in Y, there is a causal relationship between X and
Y.
13I will explore the relationship between accountability and serious possibilities in chap-
ter 9.
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Seemingly, interventionism is open to a Strevens-type worry (see §3),
which claims that it is flawed because it does not provide an adequate account
of causation at the fine-grained, fundamental level. However, Woodward
does not see this as a threatening charge since ‘the manipulationist theory
assigns a more limited significance to correctness at the level of fundamental
ontology’ (Ibid, p.231). The limited concern with ontology is eclipsed by the
concern for functionality—knowing how changes in one variable will affect
another is practical and highly useful in the context of ordinary life and the
special sciences. Thus, a large part of Woodward’s project (see Woodward,
2007) is focused on motivating what he calls a macroscopic view of the causal
relation. Analysing causation from the macroscopic perspective of ordinary
life and the practical sciences, while highly pragmatic, makes causation coarse
grained and causal explanations weak (as we saw in chapter 2). Nonetheless,
Woodward calls himself a moderate realist (2007, p. 103) about causation
and claims that the causal relation is objective and real.
The claim that causation is coarse grained and relative to a certain macro-
scopic perspective (see Chapter 2§5) seems to contradict Woodward’s claim
that causation is objective and real. However, as I claimed above, unless we
are willing to contend that Woodward is open to such an obvious contradic-
tion, I think we can more accurately view Woodward’s defence of objectivity
as a defence of relative objectivity. Indeed, in his 2007 essay ‘Causation with
a Human Face,’ we find the precise acceptance-rejection model that relative
objectivity requires. In his article, Woodward argues that causal claims are
relative to ‘small worlds’—that is, macroscopic systems where agents are able
to intervene—and that from this context, modal notions such as probabili-
ties, chances, and causes can be interpreted as objective and real (p. 102).
However, Woodward points out that if we take our criterion for ‘objectivity’
to be fundamental physics in a deterministic world, where the notion of small
worlds does not apply, then probabilities, chances, and causes are subjective
(see pp. 98–103). Speaking about the chances that we ordinarily associate
with gambling devices such as a roulette wheel, Woodward says that
If our criteria for the objective reality of such chances is whether
they appear in fundamental physical laws then the answer is clear:
the chances we associate with such devices are not objectively
real, however useful they may be for summarising the behaviour
of the devices and guiding betting behaviour. (ibid, 100)
Woodward rejects this criterion for objectivity. Notice that this posi-
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tion merely entails that Woodward rejects the absolute sense of objectivity.
Woodward suggests that if we take our criteria for objectivity to be mind-
or frame-independence, then causation is subjective. However, Woodward is
keen to point out that if we take different criteria for objectivity, then we
can claim that causation is objective. If we mean that objective probabil-
ities, as Woodward does mean, are probabilities that reflect patterns ‘that
a macroscopic agent is able to impose or learn about’ (ibid)—probabilities
that are stable and invariant from our perspective as agents—then there are
nontrivial objective probabilities associated with the roulette wheel’ (ibid).
Regarding causation, Woodward says that there are objective facts about
causes given that we take as our criteria some macroscopic perspective. Also,
because we know that the relevant perspective for the interventionist is causal
models, we can interpret Woodward as saying that we can think of the causal
relation as objective and real in relation to a causal model and a variable
set V. Thus, Woodward rejects absolute objectivity but accepts the idea of
objectivity which says that our criterion for objectivity is frame-dependent.
A large part of Woodward’s project is meant to teach us that causation
is a concept that strictly applies to small-world standards, and subsequently
that causation is objective. We can be moderately realist about causation
because a (functional) causal relationship, even though it is relative to a
certain context, is objective and real.
For Woodward, causation is objective, but Woodward is not an objec-
tivist. What matters for Woodward is the functional relationship between
individual variables in a causal model. Given that causal explanation and
causal relationships applies to small worlds, causation is relative. However,
once we have specified a small-world-context, viz., a causal model and a
variable set V, we can make objective judgments about the causal relation.
4.9 Collingwood and Objectivity
Labelling Collingwood as a relative objectivist about causation is somewhat
complicated. The complication stems from the fact that Collingwood did
not speak of either objectivity or subjectivity in relation to causation (or
in relation to anything else, as far as I am aware). Despite the fact that
Collingwood does not explicitly address the topic of objectivity in relation
to causation, my argument is that the best interpretation of Collingwood is
as a relative objectivist. This claim is based on a distinct argument: inves-
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tigating the relationship between the different ideas or senses of causation
that Collingwood identifies in An Essay on Metaphysics (1940), with the
two senses of objectivity and subjectivism that I have identified, entails that
Collingwood is a relative objectivist about causation.
For my argument to be successful, I must show that Collingwood rejects
both absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity and hence that he ac-
cepts a form of relative objectivity. To begin, I will focus on Collingwood’s
metaphysics and its relationship to his idea(s) of causation.
Recall that Collingwood’s idea of metaphysics was the search for absolute
presuppositions (see chapters 2§3). As I explained in chapter 2, Collingwood
uses the term “cause” to illustrate how different sciences, each with their
own unique presuppositions, hold contrasting ideas about causation. By
investigating the idea of causation in historical, practical, and theoretical
sciences, Collingwood speaks of three distinct meanings of the term “cause.”
In the historical sciences (sciences that deal with the mind) ‘that which is
caused is the free and deliberate act of a conscious and responsible agent,
and causing him to do it means affording him a motive for so doing’ (1940,
p. 285). The sense of causation that governs practical sciences like medicine
and engineering assumes ‘that which is caused is an event in nature and its
cause is an event or state of things by producing or preventing which we
can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be’ (ibid, pp. 296–7).
While theoretical sciences assume ‘that which is caused is an event or state
of things and its cause is another event or state of things such that (a) if the
cause happens or exists, the effect must happen or exist even if no further
conditions are fulfilled (b) the effect cannot happen or exist unless the cause
happens or exists’ (ibid, 285–86).
Here, Collingwood shows that the term ‘cause’ is relative to certain prac-
tices and ultimately the presuppositions that guide each form of enquiry. In
other words, to be a doctor or an engineer requires presupposing that it is
possible to change the course of nature and thus that a cause ‘is an event by
producing or preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose cause
it is said to be’. To be a historian requires presupposing that man is ratio-
nal and thus that ‘that which is caused is the free and deliberate act of a
conscious and responsible agent.’
So how does all of this relate to objectivity? Like the term ‘cause’, it is
clear that Collingwood would take the concept of objectivity to be relative to
certain presuppositions and thus to certain forms of enquiry. When we try to
relate the notion of objectivity to Collingwood’s metaphysics, specifically his
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ideas of cause, we must situate ‘objective’ within the specific sense of ‘cause’
in question. So, in one sense, objectivity is relative because it is non-absolute.
That is, we must apply the notion of objectivity to specific contexts, viz.,
certain disciplinary contexts that rely on specific presuppositions. Yet, as we
have seen, relativity does not entail absolute subjectivity. For instance, we
might say that causation is objective once we apply the notion of objectivity
to a specific sense of cause. For example, we might say that ‘A causes B’ is
an objective fact in the practical sense if a cause is something that allows
an agent to produce or prevent. So, if I can manipulate A to bring about or
prevent B, then ‘A causes B’ will be an objective fact.
Of course, this assumes that more than one agent will share the same
frame of reference regarding manipulation (i.e., producing and preventing).
If causation is relative to what an agent can produce or prevent, in many
(general) cases, human agents will share the same frame of reference. In
more technical cases like the automobile accident, there may be a greater
degree of relativity, which I call the relativity of expertise (see chapter 2§3).
In the case of the automobile accident, different agents disagreed about the
handle or the cause of the event. Yet, even in cases where the context is
expertise, there is bound to be more than one expert, and thus when one
of them disagrees about the cause of an event, at least one of them must
be wrong. So, for Collingwood, there is a compatible frame for relative
objectivity—either human agents in general or expertise.
In the scenario where two agents who share the same frame of reference
disagree, and hence that one of them must be wrong, we come to see how
Collingwood avoids absolute subjectivity. It is incorrect to view the practi-
cal sense of cause as absolutely subjective because what causes what is not
relative to individual agents.
It might be argued that Collingwood accepts the idea of absolute ob-
jectivity once we apply the notion of objectivity to the theoretical sense of
cause. Remember that theoretical causes are taken to be agent-independent
and absolute. So, according to the theoretical sense of cause, we might say
causes can be absolutely objective when a cause is something that exists
wholly in nature, independent of any human agents. However, this argument
would not hold because Collingwood rejects the theoretical sense of cause
for being nonsensical. Russell (1913) had argued the notion of cause was
nonsensical because it was outdated and incompatible with advanced sci-
ences like physics. Collingwood believed that the (theoretical) idea of cause
was nonsensical for a different reason. Collingwood argues that the idea of
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theoretical causation results in a contradiction. The notion of theoretical
causes, where a cause is absolute and exists wholly within nature, (i) rests
on the idea of compulsion—a cause is something that compels the effect. Yet,
Collingwood points out that (ii) the idea of compulsion is derived from our
experience as agents. He says that the idea of compulsion ‘is derived from our
experience of occasions on which we have compelled others to act in certain
ways...and conversely, occasion in which we ourselves have been compelled
to act’ (ibid, p. 322). Collingwood concludes that causation in sense three
is an anthropomorphic idea applied to nature: ‘Causal propositions in sense
III are descriptions of relations between natural events in anthropomorphic
terms’ (ibid).
For Collingwood, causation is completely agent-relative. So, we would not
apply the notion of absolute objectivity to causation (i) because causation is
essentially anthropocentric and agent-relative; also, (ii) the notion of objec-
tivity is itself contextual. Yet, causation is not absolutely subjective because
once the notion of objectivity has been applied to a certain context, e.g., the
practical sense of cause, whether or not A causes B will be an objective fact.
Indeed, Collingwood holds the same position on objectivity and causa-
tion as Woodward and Price. The consensus that I have revealed in this
chapter regarding causation and objectivity is significant for two reasons.
First, the debate between Woodward and Price is resolved—they emphasise
different aspects of the objective/subjective debate, but I have shown that
their respective positions support the same conclusion, viz., that causation
is relatively objective. Second, the agency approach to causation is not sub-
jective, either by design or by accident. This last result is quite significant.
That the agency approach can capture a coherent sense of objectivity means
that the agency approach does not entail a radical or untoward subjectivity,
which is a common assumption in the literature on causation. Indeed, as I
argued in chapter 3, any viable theory of causation must capture some sense






In the last chapter, I argued against the form of absolutism called objectivism.
I argued that objectivism about causation was impracticable, based on an
invalid assumption, and inimical to modern science. In this chapter, by
focusing on the work of Alyssa Ney, I will argue against another form of
absolutism, the doctrine known as foundationalism. Foundationalism is the
idea that whatever exists can be reduced to one basic property or level.
To achieve this, I will answer three questions:
1. What is Ney’s theory of foundationalism?
2. Can Ney avoid extreme foundationalism?
3. Is Ney’s foundationalism successful?
§2 will introduce the traditional idea of foundationalism about causa-
tion and a modified version of foundationalism about causation provided by
Alyssa Ney. In §3, I will outline Ney’s moderated foundationalism. In §4,
I will describe how Ney allegedly avoids traditional foundationalism by fo-
cusing on her ideas about difference-making. In §5, I will reveal why Ney’s
foundationalism fails; §6 will be used to motivate an alternative position.
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5.2 Foundationalism About Causation
The debate regarding foundationalism about causation usually concerns whether
our common sense causal claims or causal claims in the special sciences have
a basis in fundamental physical theory. A traditional causal foundationalist
believes the following:
Fundamental physical laws supply a causal foundation for all of
the causal claims occurring in the special sciences and...every ap-
plication of a fundamental physical theory must be interpretable
in terms of a notion of ’cause,’ possessing all of the features of
the notion that figures in common sense and the special sciences.
(Woodward 2007, p. 70)
By contrast, anti-foundationalists believe that causal claims of common sense
and the special sciences have no basis in physics. For example, Woodward
(2007) (and also, Hitchcock [2007] and Elga [2007]) argues that our ordi-
nary causal claims have to reference the notion of an intervention. Since
Woodward does not believe that the notion of an intervention can be anal-
ysed in terms of the concepts of fundamental physics, Woodward is an anti-
foundationalist.
One of the most serious problems facing the traditional foundational-
ist concerns Russell’s localisation argument. Fundamental physical laws are
highly abstract and schematic. According to fundamental physics, for any
high-level event e, the kind of event that factors into our ordinary experi-
ence, the range of physical influence(s) acting on e is so vast that it becomes
practically immeasurable. Russell thought that this fact showed us that fun-
damental science did not support the conventional notion of cause. Another
possibility, mentioned by Field (2003), is that, according to fundamental
physics, we are simply wrong about causation. Field has us imagine two
people standing near a fire. Both bystanders want to extinguish the fire.
One bystander, Suzy, grabs a hose and begins to spray the fire with water.
Another bystander, Sam, decides to pray for the fire go out. According to
fundamental physics, our intuition that Suzy’s spraying will make a differ-
ence to the fire and that Sam’s praying will not is mistaken. We are mistaken
because, according to fundamental physics, Suzy and Sam both make a dif-
ference to the fire. That is, both Sam and Suzy, regardless of their actions,
have a physical influence on the fire.
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The problem for the traditional foundationalist is that they are forced to
reject the distinction we ordinarily insist on making between causes and back-
ground conditions or between significant and insignificant difference makers.
As we have already seen, the distinction is vital to things like human action
and effective strategies.
Traditional foundationalism is extreme and, unless one would be willing
to concede that we are wrong about causation, indefensible. However, in
a recent paper, ‘Physical Causation and Difference-Making’ (2009), Alyssa
Ney argues for a moderated foundationalism that attempts to avoid some
of the problems with traditional foundationalism, specifically the issue of
localisation. I call Ney’s foundationalism about causation moderated because
she allows for frame-dependence regarding the causal relata. Ney attempts
to account for localisation by taking into consideration the ordinary function
of causation. By taking into account specific interests—whether explaining,
predicting, or acting—Ney believes that we can determine the causal relata
and thus localise a particular causal relationship. Ney’s theory qualifies as
foundationalism because she thinks that a (local) causal relationship, the
relationship between c and e (a cause and an effect), is reducible to and
ultimately grounded in physical facts. Because Ney claims that the causal
relation depends on physical facts, she says that a causal foundationalist is
anyone who looks to physics to discover the nature of causation or the nature
of the relationship between c and e.
To support her theory, Ney identifies two kinds of causal facts: difference-
making facts and physical facts. Ney’s argument is that difference-making
facts depend on physical facts and that the nature of causation is physical.
Ney says that
I will call this view about the relationship between physical cau-
sation and difference-making: ‘foundationalism about causation’.
Causation is fundamentally a microphysical phenomenon, which
can be discovered by looking directly at our fundamental physical
theories. The obtaining of facts about difference-making depends
on the obtaining of facts about physical causation (740).
Ney thinks that the most compelling argument for foundationalism is
‘based on the physicalist point’ that
Physics does not just provide us with a comprehensive account
of what exists in the universe but an account as well of why
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these events occur. That is, physics provides us with not only an
ontology and laws for allowable synchronic states but dynamical
laws as well. These laws single out those features of systems that
are causally relevant to the production of effects. (2009, p. 757)
Dynamical laws tell us, given the initial conditions of some event, how a
physical system develops or alters over time. Linear dynamics, for example,
can explain the acceleration of a moving object, such as a bullet, by identi-
fying (among many other things) the force of the small explosive charge in
the primer of the bullet. Ney’s idea is that dynamical laws can tell us about
the nature of causation.
My arguments will show that Ney’s foundationalism does not lead to the
conclusion that, by looking directly at our fundamental physical theories, we
can capture the nature of causation. Rather, what Ney’s account reveals
is that we can only make sense of a particular causal relationship in terms
of physical facts given that we have specified some initial system by taking
into consideration certain facts about difference making. Accordingly, Ney’s
conclusion that the nature of causation is physical is somewhat misleading.
Ney repeats many times throughout her essay that for the foundationalist,
‘causation is fundamentally physical’ (p. 760). This gives the reader the
impression that causation is nothing above or beyond physical facts. Yet, as
I will reiterate, Ney thinks that we have to consider facts about difference
making and ordinary pragmatics—the things we are interested in doing—to
make sense of the causal relation. Assuming that these kinds of facts are
capable of being described in terms of physical properties, Ney’s argument
may hold. However, I also intend to show that if Ney’s argument does hold,
what she says about the causal relation makes the nature of causation inter-
actional (I elaborate on this point in 5.6). In other words, I intend to show
that if Ney’s argument is successful, the causal relation is not absolute or
mind/agent-independent.
5.3 Ney’s Foundationalism
We can already summarise Ney’s basic position. This is my understanding
of her primary claims:
Ney’s Foundationalism Thesis (NFT):
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(P1): When we want to capture the nature of causation, i.e., the relationship
between c and e, we should look to physics.
(P2): When we look to physics, we can capture the nature of causation.
(C): Therefore, the nature of causation is physical.
According to Ney, (P1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for foun-
dationalism about causation—one qualifies as a foundationalist by accepting
(P1). Ney is a ‘positive’ foundationalist because she accepts (P2). A posi-
tive foundationalist also accepts (C), the idea that the nature of causation
is physical. If one accepted (P1) but rejected (P2), they would be a ‘neg-
ative’ foundationalist. Ney calls Russell (1913) a negative foundationalist
(Ney, 2009, p. 748). Collingwood, Woodward, and Price all reject (P1) and
qualify as anti-foundationalists.
Throughout her essay, Ney assumes physicalism, the thesis that every-
thing is physical. To understand how NFT avoids being a mere tautology,
one must consider Ney’s important distinction between causal facts. For
Ney, there are two kinds of causal facts: facts about difference-making and
facts about physical causes. Naturally, Ney takes the physical facts to be
fundamental. NFT is thus also a thesis regarding the relationship between
difference-making facts and physical facts, viz., the claim that difference-
making facts depend on physical facts. In essence, Ney believes that when
we say (in ordinary language) that A caused B, A makes a difference to B
because of the physical relationship between A and B. So, NFT will need
to be modified to accommodate Ney’s ideas about the relationship between
difference-making facts and physical facts, which I will do below after we have
learned more about the alleged the relationship between difference-making
facts and physical facts.
Ney considers her antagonist to be anyone who holds the view that ‘the
physical causal facts are not fundamental’ (p. 740). Causal facts, from
this view, ‘are necessarily facts about difference-making’ (ibid).1 Further-
more, Ney argues that ‘Russellians’ about causation, essentially negative-
foundationalists, are misguided. Ney thinks that Russell was right to look
to physics to understand causation, but she argues that he was wrong to
conclude that there was nothing in physics to ground causation (p. 747–52).
Ney says that,
1Ney suggests that David Lewis (2004) and Barry Loewer (2001) hold this view.
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When we are looking for a physical theory of causation, we are
looking for something in the fundamental physics that can tell us
how a later event may evolve out of an earlier one (p. 751).
Note Ney’s use of the term ‘event’. One thing that distinguishes NFT from
Russell (1913) is that it assumes localisation. That is, instead of asking
whether or not our ordinary notion of cause is grounded in physics, like
Russell, Ney asks, given that the causal relata is of the category event, can
causation be grounded in physics?
There is a significant difference between the two questions. Russell’s
question was whether or not our ordinary notion of cause, which is localised
and asymmetric, had a basis in fundamental physics. Ney’s question differs
from Russell in that she assumes localisation and asymmetry. She assumes
localisation and asymmetry by granting our ordinary notion of events. While
Ney correctly points out that she and Russell are in agreement regarding P1,
it is implicit within her account that she and Russell are also in agreement
regarding the answer to Russell’s question. Our ordinary notion of cause
(when causal relata are of the category event) is not grounded in fundamental
physics. If we look to physics tout court, Ney says
[T]here are a lot of causal relations at this world, perhaps a lot
more than we ordinarily assume. The fields of our best physical
theories are spread out across the entire universe and interact
with everything in their reach. They link small events like your
leaving the house this morning with those more significant ones
transpiring in Iraq a little later and more distant ones farther
away in the galaxy. It is not quite true on this picture that
‘everything causes everything,’ but things come close (p. 741).
Ney says that the above quotation represents ‘the first part of the foundation-
alist’s account of causation, but, not the whole story ’ (ibid, my emphasis).
To get the rest of the story and to see why Ney’s position differs from Rus-
sell’s, we must consider the alleged relationship between difference-making
facts and physical facts.
5.4 Physical Facts and Difference Making
According to Ney’s theory, difference-making facts and physical facts ‘bear an
important relationship to each other’ (p. 739). On Ney’s account, difference-
92
making facts are important because they eliminate most of the ‘multitude of
causes’ (p. 741) that make up an event. Ney can avoid the extreme version
of foundationalism, she thinks, because her theory accounts for facts about
difference making and thus solves the problem of localisation.
Consider again what Ney says about events. When she says that, ‘we are
looking for something in the fundamental physics that can tell us how a later
event may evolve out of an earlier one’ (p. 751), the important question is,
how do we determine the relevant event? If we just look to physics, as Ney is
well aware, our concept of ‘event’ has no meaning (indeed, this is the lesson
that we learn from traditional foundationalism). Events are localised, and
fundamental physical relationships are not. One possible answer is that we
can determine the events by considering facts about difference making before
we look to physics. For example, according to Ney’s theory, it is correct,
given particular facts about difference making, to say that Suzy’s spraying
the fire with a hose made a difference to the fire and that Sam’s praying did
not. Perhaps once we have considered these difference-making facts, we can
look to physics to tell us how two events, e.g., spraying the hose and the fire
going out, are fundamentally related.
While this interpretation seems plausible, Ney would argue that it mis-
takenly inverts her view. She would say that the foundationalist does, in fact,
look to physics to tell us about causation before she looks to facts about dif-
ference makers. We look to physics and discover the vast array of physical
causes that exists at the fundamental level, then we ask, which out of the
wide range of physical causes made a difference to the effect? I think that
this is what Ney would have us believe. Indeed, she says that
According to the foundationalist, a theory of causation must start
with an account of what fundamental physics tells us about the
causal relations that obtain at our world. Physics does not just
tell us what there is and what happens. In other words, it does not
merely give us an inventory of the fundamental properties or kinds
of entities there are, and the types of events that take place. It
also tells us why these events occur—what is responsible for what
in a causal sense. This is the first part of the foundationalist’s
account of causation, but not the whole story (p. 741).
In reply to Ney’s paper, Luke Glynn (2013) argues that Ney’s theory
indicates that we must first look to difference-making theories, likely because
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this will allow us to make sense of the notion events. Glynn argues that, given
his interpretation of Ney’s theory, what it shows, contrary to Ney’s claim,
is that the nature of causation is difference making. However, given that
Ney explicitly denies this, I will grant her position—a foundationalist theory
of causation must start ‘with an account of what fundamental physics tells
us about the causal relations that obtain at our world’ (ibid). However,
if we are ‘looking for something in fundamental physics to tell us how a
later event may evolve out of earlier one’ (p. 751), the question of how to
determine the relevant events remains. Ney does provide an answer. Ney
thinks that we have to consider the standard function of causation. That is,
she thinks the foundationalist needs to take into consideration how we are
using the notion of cause, given our particular interests. Ney says that ‘in
ordinary circumstances,’ we are interested in ‘the explanation and prediction
of large macroscopic events, and the planning of our own actions’ (p. 742).
So, by considering our interests—be it explaining, predicting, or acting—the
foundationalist can establish the relevant events.
A summary of Ney’s position thus far looks like this: when asked, ‘why
did the fire go out?’, the foundationalist can look to physics to understand
how the event, Y there being no fire, evolved out of the earlier event, X
there being a fire. Then a difference-making theory can tell us which of the
fundamental facts made a difference. The dynamical laws that tell us about
the relevant difference-making facts reveals the nature of causation.
Initially, we said that Ney’s thesis, the idea that the nature of causation is
physical, followed from Ney’s idea that the only way to understand causation
was to look to physics. Given what we have learned, NFT must be modified.
Ney’s Foundationalism Thesis* (NFT*):
(P1): When we want to capture the nature of causation, i.e., the relation-
ship between c and e, we should look to physics and to facts about
difference making.
(P2*): The causal relata depend on our interests. By considering our interests,
we can determine the causal relata and the relevant events. (hidden
premise)
(P3): Facts about difference making supervene on physical facts.
(C): Therefore, the nature of causation is physical.
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To accurately capture Ney’s argument, the original argument NFT had
to be modified. We added (P2*) so that we can determine the relevant events
to show how, again in Ney’s words, ‘one event evolved out of an earlier one’
(751). We also added the caveat, ‘and to facts about difference making’, to
(P1).
5.5 The Fate of Ney’s Foundationalism
The problem for moderated foundationalism should now be apparent. Ney’s
thesis that the nature of causation is physical does not easily follow from
(P1)–(P3). On the surface, NFT* appears to be invalid.
A further problem arises when we consider what Ney initially claimed
about foundationalism about causation. If you recall the quote from §2, Ney
claimed that ‘causation is fundamentally a microphysical phenomenon that
can be discovered by looking directly at our fundamental physical theories’
(p. 740, my emphasis). This is a claim that seems to directly contradict
NFT*. It is not true, given (P1)–(P3), that causation, if it is a microphys-
ical phenomenon, can be captured by looking directly at our fundamental
physical theories. If we want to derive a physical theory of causation from
(P1)–(P3), it cannot be obtained by simply looking to physics. According to
Ney’s theory, we also consider our ordinary interests to determine the causal
relata as well as certain facts about difference making, which tell us about
contextually related background conditions (I argue for this point regarding
contextually related background conditions below).
However, despite the fact that we cannot derive a physical theory by
looking directly at physics, Ney could still argue that NFT* holds. NFT* is
plausible, according to Ney, because she thinks that we must assume (P3),
viz., that facts about difference making supervene on physical facts. Ney
accepts supervenience because she assumes physicalism, the idea that every-
thing is physical (she says as much in a footnote on page 740). If we grant
(P3), it is plausible that (C) follows.
The problem for the moderated foundationalist is that they have not pro-
vided a compelling reason for us to allow an exclusively physical description
of causation. In fact, it could be argued that both traditional and moderated
foundationalism provide compelling reasons to reject a physical interpreta-
tion of causation. Indeed, as a physicalist, Ney is intensely aware of the
problem. She understands how traditional foundationalism is both extreme
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and undesirable. Accordingly, Ney must admit that ‘there is a bit more
that needs to be said about causation beyond whatever can be learned from
physics ’ (741, my emphasis).
As we have seen, the bit more is just what a standard counterfactual
or probabilistic theory of difference making tells us about causation. For
example, a counterfactual or probabilistic theory of difference making will
say that the cause of the fire going out was likely that Suzy sprayed the hose.
However, before we make this judgment, the foundationalist believes there is
still more to be said. We must specify particular interests, i.e., how we want
to use the notion of cause—whether we want to explain something, predict
something, or perform an action. My argument is that once we are forced
to rely on standard difference-making ideas and ordinary pragmatics, the
claim that the nature of causation is physical is misleading and ultimately
dubious. To see why, consider what we are typically interested in doing
with causation. As agency theorists like to point out, the notion of cause is
useful because it serves a unique function. We want to explain things like
why the forest burned down or why forests sometimes burn down; we want
to predict earthquakes, stock market crashes, and sporting events, and we
want to prevent things like cancer, wars, poverty, and famine. Note that
the foundationalist will not be interested in doing any of these things per
se. Foundationalism is purely a metaphysical theory about the nature of
causation.
Before we move on, one particular point needs to be made clear. As a
physicalist, Ney is limited to a narrow metaphysics. She believes that (or
accepts something like the thesis) ‘everything is physical’ or ‘the real world
consists simply of the physical world’. For the physicalist, everything super-
venes on or reduces to the physical. The mind supervenes on the physical
properties of the brain, colour supervenes on physical properties of light and
(some combination of) physical properties of observers. Note: I do not take
Ney’s thesis, the nature of causation is physical to be the claim that, (i)
whatever causation is, it is physical. Nor do I take that claim to be overly
controversial. Rather, by claiming that the nature of causation is physical,
I take Ney to be arguing that (ii) we can capture the essence of the causal
relation, i.e., the indefeasible quality which determine its being so, by un-
derstanding a (certain) combination of facts. Claim (i) is not something
most philosophers, including agency theorists, would deny (causation isn’t
‘spooky’ for example). Furthermore, if Ney were arguing for (i) her argument
would be viciously circular. Her position (ii) differs from (i) in that she is
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claiming that we can capture the causal relation simply by understanding the
physical properties or facts of which it is associated. The important thing
to note, something I have been trying to indicate above, is that Ney’s the-
sis (moderated foundationalism) takes the causal relation to be associated
with more than just whatever our best physical theories tell us about the
(mind-independent) world. The more, as I did indicate above, concerns facts
regarding difference making relationships and ordinary pragmatics. Ney is
a positive foundationalist because, once she has made the move to include
difference making and pragmatic facts into the causal relation, she can claim
(via [P3]) that the nature of causation is physical. Seeing Ney’s position in
this way always us to discover a critical point. The point is this: what Ney is
really saying is that we can capture the causal relation by looking at physical
facts given that we include facts about difference making and facts about
pragmatics and given that these facts supervene on physical properties.2
Allow me to explain all of this with an analogy. Consider the ordinary
notion of colour. Many philosophers and scientists (e.g., Descartes, Locke,
Galileo) have argued that colour is a secondary quality. That is, colours (like
all secondary qualities) are something that can only be understood in terms
of how they appear. Primary qualities (Locke uses the example of shape)
can be understood independently of how they appear. In terms of an ob-
jects’ qualities, say, those of a chair, its primary qualities, e.g., its height and
its length, are taken to be mind-independent. That is, if all observers were
removed, the chair itself would not disappear. This is not so for secondary
qualities. The chair may have some “power” to affect our senses—say, that
it looks blue. But blue is a secondary quality because if we removed the ob-
server(s), the “blueness” of the chair would likewise be removed. So, and to
my point above, if we wanted to capture the nature of colour (e.g., blueness)
by looking to physics, we couldn’t just look to those physical facts which
were mind-independent. We would also have to consider some complicated
set of physical facts about the observer. In relation to foundationalism about
causation, the traditional foundationalist about causation seems to think of
the causal relation as a primary quality—something in the natural environ-
ment that exists independently of the mind. What Ney seems to do with
her modified account of foundationalism is to put the observer, so to speak,
2In some way, Ney’s thesis is circular (e.g., she assumes physicalism and argues that
the nature of causation is physical). Whether or not it is viscously so will depend on how
close one takes her to be defending (i).
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back into the equation. It’s as if Ney is saying, following the colour analogy,
we can capture the nature of colour in terms of physical facts given that we
consider (along with the physical properties of light) certain (physical) facts
about the observer. In fact, this is just what we see in terms of her thesis
regarding causation. When we want to capture the nature of causation, Ney
admits that we cannot just look to our best physical theories, perhaps as
Russell did in 1913. Ney argues that to make sense of the causal relation in
terms of physical facts (like we would with colour) we have to put something
else into the equation. To reiterate once more, the something else in question
is facts about difference making and ordinary pragmatics.
Following the colour analogy, one could argue that Ney’s theory amounts
to the idea that causation is something like a secondary quality. For exam-
ple, one could argue that if we removed human agents from Ney’s theory, we
would lose the ability to sensibly speak about causation (i.e., we would be
forced to accept traditional foundationalism). However, I won’t pursue this
argument here, as it could easily misconstrue Ney’s emphasis on objectivity.
Although I did indicate in the previous chapter that we could speak objec-
tively about colour (and causation) given that we specify context, I think a
more accurate representation of Ney’s theory is to say that it’s interactional.
What I mean to convey by ‘interaction’ is that Ney’s theory shows us that
the causal relation is something that emerges from, or is constituted by, a
specific interaction. I will explain this in more detail below.
Now that this is hopefully more clear, I want to investigate the relation-
ship between physical facts, difference making, and the nature of causation.
In doing so, I will argue that Ney’s thesis leads to the conclusion that the
nature of causation is interactional.
5.6 Foundationalism and Interactionism
Until now, the relationship between physical facts, difference making, and
the nature of causation has seemed mostly untroubled. I want to challenge
this conception and argue that, given the foundationalist’s reliance on prag-
matics and difference-making theories, the idea that the nature of causation
is physical is somewhat fraudulent.
If the nature of causation is physical, as the traditional foundationalist
claims, causes can be thought of in terms of natural or physical relationships
that exist in the world independent of human beings. Much like Colling-
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wood’s theoretical sense of cause, the traditional foundationalist pictures
causes as real, or, as Putnam (1982) remarks, some ‘furniture of the world’.
My argument is that once we are forced to consider difference-making facts
and ordinary pragmatics, the idea of mind-independent, real causes exist-
ing in nature is inconsistent and false. It may be that a specific causal
relationship depends on physical facts, but these facts are not absolute or
mind-independent.
Mackie claimed that what we call a cause is ‘what makes the difference
in relation to some assumed background or causal field’ (Mackie 1974, p.
35). To illustrate, consider what Hart and Honore´ (1985) called relativity
to the context of inquiry. The context of inquiry tells us that one and the
same situation elicits different judgments about difference making depending
on the type of enquiry. Here is an example used by Menzies, in the article,
‘Difference-Making in Context’ (2004), where he defends Hart and Honore´’s
idea that causation is relative to context:
The Indian Famine
The cause of a great famine in India may be identified by an
Indian peasant as the drought, but the World Food Authority
may identify the Indian government’s failure to build up reserves
as the cause and the drought as a mere condition (Menzies, 2004,
p. 144).
When we ask the question, what caused the famine, we will have two different
answers.
In a similar example, Putnam tells a story about a fire. Putnam has
us imagine that Venusians land on Earth and observe a forest fire. One
of the Venusians says, ‘I know what caused that—the atmosphere of the
darned planet is saturated with oxygen.’ Putnam says that this shows us
that one man’s (or extraterrestrial’s) background conditions can easily be
another man’s cause. What is and what is not a cause or an explanation
‘depends on background knowledge and our reason for asking the question’
(Putnam, 1982, p. 150). When we ask the question, what caused the forest
fire, we will have two different answers.
The idea that causation is relative to a type of context is something that
agency theorists have embraced. Agency theorists argue that causation is
relative to a context and that the context in question has something to do
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with human agency. Collingwood, for example, describes causes as handles
because they allow us to produce/prevent certain effects. Handles (or causes)
are relative to what an agent knows how to produce or prevent. In other
words, something makes a difference because it acts as a handle. In the
example of the car accident, different agents come up with different answers
to the question of what caused the accident. For Collingwood, there is no
such thing as a real cause because the practical idea of causation presupposes
the notion of a handle. Also, real causes are thought to be absolute and
independent of context, which repudiates the idea of a handle.
Ney could argue that the relativity of causation is not problematic for
the moderated foundationalist. She could argue that, given P2*, we can
determine the relevant context (e.g., the person asking the question). Fur-
thermore, she could argue that, given that we have considered certain facts
about difference making in P1, we can also determine the relevant back-
ground conditions. Also, assuming P3, we can grant C (this would amount
to a rejection of the claim that the foundationalist holds an absolute position
on causation or has an inherent interest in real causes).
Consider a representation of Ney’s theory, as outlined above:
c→ e
Fundamental Physics Difference-Making
Dynamical Laws (the nature of causation)
The representation was constructed as follows: c −→ e represents the
idea that we have granted the events that make up the causal relata (by
taking into consideration our ‘ordinary interests’). After this, we move to
Fundamental Physics to discover ‘the multitude of causes that exist at the
fundamental level’, and to Difference-Making facts that provide us with
the necessary means to determine the relevant background conditions and
which of the physical causes made a difference. Lastly, because Ney believes
we can describe the relevant difference-making facts in terms of physical,
Dynamical Laws, she claims that the nature of causation is physical.
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Table 5.1: Causation and Objectivity




Notice again the position of Ney’s theory, table 5.1.
Ney is placed under absolute objectivity because she thinks that the causal
relation is physical and absolute. The important thing to note is that, given
my critical review of her theory, Ney’s position in the table is incoherent.
That is, much like Strevens, what Ney actually says about the causal relation
does not lead to the conclusion that the causal relation is frame-independent
or absolute. Because Ney has to rely on difference making theories and
ordinary pragmatics, we cannot say that her position, foundationalism about
causation, represents absolute objectivity about causation.
If my argument holds, Ney’s reliance on difference-making facts would
amount to a rejection of the idea that the causal relation is mind-independent
and real, and indicate that the causal relation is interactional. That is, ac-
cording to my analysis of Ney, the causal relation appears to be something
that emerges from a particular interaction. To better understand what I
mean by ‘interaction’, consider what Stephen Palmer says about colour in-
teractionism in his book, Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology
The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and
lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these
physical properties are different in important ways from the colors
we perceive. Color is more accurately understood as the result of
complex interactions between physical light in the environment
and our visual nervous systems (1999, p. 95, my emphasis).
Palmer is arguing that colour is something which emerges from an interaction
between the physical world and the human visual system.
In Ney’s case, I’m arguing that the interaction involves human agents—
what kinds of questions we ask, what we want to explain, or how we might
act—and the physical world. For example, the truth-makers for the claim,
‘the cause of the fire going out was Suzy’s spraying’, are not mere (physical)
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facts about the world. If they were, it would also be true (to some extent)
that the cause of the fire going out was Sam’s praying (this is because both
Sam and Suzy, by there mere presence, have an effect on the fire). Rather,
the truth-makers for the claim, ‘the cause of the fire going out was Suzy’s
spraying’ are based on facts about (the interaction between) human agents
and the physical world. Ney’s theory is an asymmetric version of interaction-
ism because she emphasises the physical aspect due to her other philosophical
inclinations (viz., physicalism). Even still, if we removed the human agents
from the interaction, there would be no way to make sense of difference mak-
ing facts and the ordinary pragmatics of causal enquiry. If we removed these
facts, as Ney herself indicates, the ‘bit more’ that needs to be said in order to
avoid traditional foundationalism—which Ney rejects—would be lost. And
once this is lost, according to Ney’s own theory, we lose the ability to capture
the nature of causation.
Because difference-making ideas are contextual and mind/agent-dependent,
it follows that the causal relation is frame-dependent and non-universal. I
did not place Ney under relative objectivity because she does not endorse a
relative position, although it may be the case that foundationalism about
causation fits better under this category. Again, the important point to note
is that her theory, along with Strevens’, does not amount to a coherent po-
sition for absolute objectivity (I have placed a line through both Ney and
Strevens to represent this).
This leaves the moderated foundationalist with a dilemma. She can (i)
resort back to traditional foundationalism, or (ii) reject any form of founda-
tionalism altogether. Given my arguments, I take the most reasonable choice
to be (ii), a rejection of foundationalism.
It is interesting to note that the rejection of foundationalism, the idea that
the nature of causation is physical, does not lead to the idea that the nature of
causation is difference making (as Ney thinks) or to the idea that the nature of
causation is somehow anthropocentric. Rather, what it demonstrates is that
causation involves a complicated relationship between different kinds of facts.
In other words, it supports the idea that causation requires a certain kind of
interaction. I will explore and defend a version of causal interactionism in
chapters 7 & 8.
Though it is clear that Ney herself does not support an agency approach
to causation, I take her position (as I have outlined it) to be compatible with
an agency approach. If my argument, which says that Ney’s position leads
to the conclusion that the nature of causation is interactional, is successful,
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there are obvious parallels between moderated foundationalism and more
familiar agency approaches (e.g., Collingwood, 1940). Given my arguments,
what I wish to point out is that, rather than being seen as an argument
against the main tenets of the agency approach, Ney’s position offers latent
support for the idea that causation is agent-dependent.
5.6.1 A Note on Fundamentality
This chapter has focused on Ney’s versions of foundationalism. However, a
brief note on her use of the term ‘fundamental’ may be helpful. Note what
Ney says about fundamentality. She claims that ‘Causation is fundamentally
a microphysical phenomenon, which can be discovered by looking directly at
our fundamental physical theories’ (p. 740, my emphasis).
So, what does Ney mean by ‘fundamentally’? The notion of fundamen-
tality (in metaphysics) typically aims to capture the idea that there is some-
thing basic or primitive in the world. Given Ney’s claim, and the use of
‘fundamentally’ above, we could interpret Ney to mean that causation, at
the most basic level, is physical. I take it that Ney would support this claim.
However, given the worries for traditional theories of foundationalism about
causation presented above, particularly those related to Russell’s localisation
argument, the claim that ‘causation is fundamentally physical’ needs to be
elaborated.
Ney is, of course, aware of this, as her essay is rightly taken to be a
defence of foundationalism, specifically one that can handle localisation re-
quirements. Since one essential task for the notion of fundamentality is to
help us articulate the view that there is a hierarchical structure to reality,
whatever Ney means by ‘fundamental’, she is indicating that she takes physi-
cal facts about the world to (somehow) ground the causal relation. However,
as we saw in this chapter, Ney’s foundationalism is nuanced by the fact
that her theory relies on facts about difference-making. While there are cur-
rently many ideas regarding fundamentality (e.g., Primitivism [see Glazier,
2016; Schaffer, 2009], Absolute Independence [see Bernstein, 2016], and a
weaker version of fundamentality sometimes called Restricted Independence
[see Dixon, 2016; Bennett 2017]), Ney’s foundationalism aligns best with a
version of fundamentality know asWell-Foundedness (see Raven [2016]; Jago
[2018]).
As I mentioned above, one of the critical tasks for the notion of fun-
damentality is to capture the idea that there is a foundation of being and
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that everything else depends on the fundamental entities. This idea about
fundamentality is often expressed concerning well-foundedness. A standard
formulation of this general idea is as follows: a priority/dependence chain is
well-founded if and only if it terminates, i.e., has an end constituted by one
or more entities that do not depend on any other entity.
Regarding Ney’s use of ‘fundamentally’, I take her claim to be that
the ‘end’ or entities that do not depend on any other entities are physi-
cal facts. Likewise, she maintains that facts about difference-making are
non-fundamental in the sense that they depend on physical facts.
Granting its plausibility, I do not take Ney’s claims regarding fundamen-
tality to threaten the agency approach to causation. As I have indicated,
whatever a particular causal relationship turns out to be (say a relation-
ship between two events), it is a further question to inquire about the well-
foundedness of these events. Ney’s thesis should thus be taken as two distinct
arguments. She argues (1) that we need facts about difference-making to
establish causal claims (in regards to the question, how can we improve tra-
ditional theories of foundationalism?). And she argues (2) that these claims
are well-founded in physics (in regards to the question, what are the basic
entities that make up the causal relation?). Note that the second question
is one that manipulationists are generally not interested in pursuing. But
the lack of interest should not indicate a refutation of the claim that causal
relationships (once they have been established) are well-founded in physics.
The claim that agency theorists refute, in regards to the first question, is
that the causal relation is merely physical—that agency does not do any of
the work in establishing causal claims.
Note further that, for Ney, these two questions have to be asked simul-
taneously. Given Ney’s moderated version of foundationalism, we have to
ask both questions. For if we only inquire about the basic entities that make
up the causal relation, that is, if we inquire about well-foundedness with-
out establishing specific causal relationships, we would be led to traditional
foundationalism, which Ney rightly rejects.
In regards to Ney’s foundationalism, my argument has been that Ney’s
foundationalism is misleading because her two arguments often seem con-
flated. Ney’s repeated claim that we can discover causation by looking di-
rectly at physics is about the question regarding fundamentality. In regards
to the first question, how can we improve traditional theories of foundation-
alism, part of the answer is not by looking directly at physics. The other part
of the answer to this question, as Ney herself is aware, is that we must rely
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on difference-making facts and human agency. Moreover, I don’t see any rea-
son why agency theorists should be worried about further enquires regarding
fundamentality. Indeed, they should be able to accommodate whatever our





In chapter 3, I argued that the agency approach faces two critical problems:
the problem of subjectivity and the problem of scope. In chapter 4, I sug-
gested that the problem of subjectivity could be overcome by distinguishing
between two kinds of objectivity: absolute objectivity and relative objectiv-
ity. I defended the idea of relative objectivity by arguing that the notion
of absolute objectivity (regarding causation) was misguided, incompatible
with modern science, and the result of a false dichotomy. My arguments
supported the idea that the agency approach can be seen as objective in the
relative sense. In the previous chapter, I showed how foundationalism about
causation, the idea that the nature of causation is physical, is flawed, and I
argued that Ney’s moderated theory is compatible with an agency approach.
In this chapter, I will suggest that the problem of scope rests on a certain
type of agency, pointing out that the problem does not necessarily arise for
an agency approach to causation. Because the problem of scope is similar to
and often conflated with the so-called problem of anthropocentrism (Wood-
ward, 2003; Price, 2017), I will explain anthropocentrism in the context of
the agency approach to causation and reveal its relation to the problem of
scope. I do not intend to solve the problem of scope in this chapter (I do
attempt to solve it in Chapter 8). In this chapter, I show how the problem
of anthropocentrism can lead to the problem of scope, and I suggest that the
agency approach can avoid the problem. My arguments will show that the
agency approach is anthropocentric, but not in a way that is untoward or in
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such a way that it necessarily leads to the problem of scope.
Subsequently, I will clarify the notion of ‘anthropocentric’ and investigate
the anthropocentrism associated with the agency approach to causation. To
support my argument, I will distinguish between three different views of
anthropocentrism: a common view, a projective view, and a metaphysical
view. I will also distinguish between two kinds of agency: overt agency and
mental agency. These distinctions will allow me to show that Woodward’s
interventionist account is anthropocentric according to the common view and
that Woodward’s interventionist account relies on the notion of agency. I will
achieve this by investigating three questions:
1. How can we understand ‘agency’ and ‘anthropocentrism’?
2. In what way are the accounts of Collingwood, Price, and Woodward
anthropocentric?
3. Does interventionism involve agency?
In §2, I will reveal three different ways to think about anthropocentrism:
the common view, which says that causation is anthropocentric when we
give human agents a privileged status (i.e., we take a human point of view)
regarding causation; the projective view, which says that causation is an-
thropocentric because we project human qualities onto the natural world;
and the metaphysical view, which says that causation is anthropocentric be-
cause causal relationships are created by human agents (in some way, human
agents “make” the truth-makers of causal claims). I will also distinguish
between two kinds of actions or agency: overt actions, which include bodily
movements like walking or throwing, and mental actions, which include rea-
soning about the effects of bringing something about, e.g., reasoning about
what would happen if I were to φ. In §3, I will locate the anthropocentrism
within the manipulationist accounts of Collingwood, Woodward, and Price.
I will show that all of the accounts are anthropocentric according to the com-
mon view, only Price’s account is anthropocentric according to the projective
view, and how all of the accounts avoid anthropocentrism according to the
metaphysical view. §4 will be used to clarify the notion of agency, and to
elaborate and defend the two notions of agency that I endorse. I will argue
that mental agency is real agency by relating the notion of mental agency
to the standard definition of (overt) agency. Finally, in §5, I will clarify and
highlight the agency found in Woodward’s interventionist account, arguing
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that Woodward’s account of interventionism relies on the notion of (mental)
agency, and I will conclude by showing that the agency approach does not
support an untoward anthropocentrism, contrary to Woodward’s claim.
6.2 Agency and Anthropocentrism
Thus far, I have merely suggested, following the criticism of Woodward, that
the agency theory is unduly anthropocentric. It will be important now to see
whether or not this is true, and to clearly understand the connection between
agency, manipulation and anthropocentrism.
To introduce the problem of (untoward) anthropocentricity, consider a
well-known objection made by Woodward. Regarding the manipulation ap-
proach to causation, Woodward (2003, 2013) thinks that agency theory fails
because it is unacceptably anthropocentric. He says:
[Price’s agency theory] flies in the face of any plausible version of
naturalism: it makes agency out to be a fundamental, irreducible
feature of the world...it leads us toward an undesirable anthro-
pocentrism or subjectivity regarding causation (Woodward, 2003,
p. 123).
Although Woodward seems to conflate the issue of anthropocentrism with
subjectivity, it is important to understand what Woodward means by unde-
sirable. Notably, Woodward’s criticism of Price’s use of agency is in regards
to Price’s solution to the problem of spurious causes, specifically in the con-
text of a manipulationist approach to causation. If you recall from chapter
3, Price argues that we can overcome the problem of spurious causes by in-
troducing the notion of agency, i.e., a ‘free action,’ into a probabilistic theory
of causation. According to Price, a free action can break the correlation be-
tween X (an alleged cause) and Y (an alleged effect of X ) by creating an
‘independent causal history’ (ibid). In the context of spurious causes, Price is
arguing that a free act can break the correlation between X and Y by acting
on or manipulating X in such a way that the correlation between X and Y
disappears. Allegedly, the correlation will disappear because the agent’s free
act will create a level of independence or separation (an independent causal
history) between X and Y. Woodward’s criticism is that the notion of acting
on X to create the necessary independence, and thus break the correlation
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with Y, is too anthropocentric and thus fails as a solution to the problem of
spurious causes.
What this means is that Woodward thinks that Price’s use of agency,
as a solution to the problem of spurious causes, is unduly anthropocentric.
If we break the correlation between X and Y by a free act, it simply does
not make sense to talk about causation between events where an agent’s free
act is incapable of creating the necessary independence, i.e., when an agent
would not be capable of acting in such as way as to distinguish causes from
correlations.
Significantly, Woodward’s argument that Price’s approach is unduly an-
thropocentric leads to the problem of scope. The problem is not that Price’s
account relies on agency per se. Rather, according to Woodward, the prob-
lem is that when we base the solution to the problem of spurious causes on
the notion of free action, the solution becomes dependent on the manipula-
tion capabilities of human agents. According to Woodward, there is no way
for us to distinguish between causes and correlations that do not involve a
human action, and thus we unduly limit the scope of what we are allowed to
call causes.
While Woodward’s criticism of Price is significant, I believe that we have
to be much more clear about what we mean by anthropocentrism and by
agency because there is no single understanding of the word ‘anthropocen-
tric,’ nor is there a unique understanding of the word ‘agency.’
There are three ways that something can be anthropocentric.
The Common View : Anthropocentrism means human beings enjoy a cen-
tral and privileged status in the world. For example, many Christians
believe they were created in the imago dei and that this gives them
a privileged status over animals and the natural world. In terms of
causation, this view says that human agents are regarded as having a
central and privileged status (e.g., over things like metaphysics—i.e.,
the nature of causation—and the relationship between causation and
the natural world). Anthropocentrism entails a privileged status for
the human ‘point of view’ regarding the causal relation.1
1Because these terms can easily be misconstrued, my use of ‘metaphysics’ will mean
ontology ; also, when I say the ‘natural world’, I mean physical facts about the world.
Moreover, I say that human agency is given a privileged status over things like metaphysics
and the natural world rather than things like astrology and 14th century literature because
there is a common conception in the literature on causation that when thinking about
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The Projective View : Anthropocentrism means human characteristics are
being projected onto something that is non-human. For example, when
ancient people used to think volcanic eruptions were caused by gods, or
when the pilgrims blamed a witch for their poor harvests, their think-
ing was anthropocentric because they believed that these events came
about by some specialised agency. Regarding causation, the projective
view says that we project a kind of power that naturally belongs to
human agents onto the natural world.
The Metaphysical View : Anthropocentrism means anti-realism. The anti-
realism is taken to mean that the world is only knowable through our
cognitive faculties. This is true for Berkeley, Kant, and Nelson Good-
man, to name only a few. To illustrate, Goodman’s ‘irrealism’, a de-
velopment of Kant’s transcendental idealism, stated that the empirical
world was somehow human, ‘made by us’ as he put it (Goodman, 1978).
Regarding causation, the metaphysical view says that the causal rela-
tion is somehow created by human agents.
To help us understand Woodward’s charge of unacceptable anthropocen-
trism and the problem of scope, we can also distinguish between two kinds
of agency.
Overt Agency : Overt agency includes intentional actions. Intentional ac-
tions are deliberate bodily movements made by human beings. These
actions include raising one’s arm, moving one’s leg, and more com-
plex movements such as walking, throwing, opening, pushing, carrying,
pulling, taking, etc. Overt actions allow us to control or achieve certain
outcomes or effects. For example, I can raise my heart rate by running
up a large hill, or I can reduce the chances of catching a cold by taking
vitamin C. We can say that overt agency provides us with practical
control—when I do X, I will achieve Y.
causation, we are at least tacitly concerned with metaphysics and the natural world and
not with things like astrology or 14th century literature. As I mentioned in chapter 3,
influential theories of causation such as Salmon’s mark theory of causation and Dowe’s
process theory of causation suggest that what’s important about causation is physical
facts. And as we saw in chapters 4 & 5, people like Strevens and Ney, among others,
have argued that what’s important about causation are metaphysical facts—ontological
theories about what causation is or what grounds causation in the natural world.
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Mental Agency : Mental agency is the process of reasoning about the ef-
fects of bringing something about. We reason about the effects of
bringing something about to enable understanding. Significantly, we
can reason about the effects of possible actions, such as changing your
diet, and impossible actions, such as altering the distance between the
moon and planet Earth (we can also reason about non-actions, like
imagining that you are in France). Reasoning about possible or impos-
sible actions enables control over some outcome or effect. For example,
you have control over your weight after you reason about the effects of
a particular diet, or you have control over the tides on Earth after you
reason about altering the distance between the moon and Earth. We
can say that mental agency enables hypothetical control—if I did X, I
would achieve Y (I will discuss the concept of mental agency in §4).
Having made these distinctions, we can now assess the anthropocentrism
and agency that is associated with the accounts of Collingwood, Woodward,
and Price. I will also reveal why Woodward interprets Price’s use of agency as
problematic by arguing that Woodward takes ‘agency’ to mean overt agency.
6.3 Anthropocentrism in Collingwood, Wood-
ward, and Price
I will begin my discussion of anthropocentrism by looking at Collingwood’s
practical idea of a cause. Collingwood is the most explicit about anthropocen-
trism, and his account shares important similarities with both Woodward and
Price. In many ways, as I will argue in §5, Collingwood can serve as a use-
ful model when thinking about things like agency, anthropocentrism, and
metaphysics. Following the discussion of Collingwood, I will analyse Wood-
ward’s interventionist account and finish with Price, who holds a slightly
more complicated view of agency and causation.
6.3.1 Collingwood’s Anthropocentrism
Collingwood tells us that ‘that which is caused (in the practical sense) is
an event in nature, but the word ‘cause’ still expresses an idea relative to
human conduct, because that which is caused is something under human
control’ (1940, p. 296).
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To better understand this sense of cause, consider again Collingwood’s
example of the automobile example. When a county-surveyor, an automobile
manufacturer, and a driver meet at the site of the accident, they all have
different answers to the question of what caused the crash. Why? The
answer lies in Collingwood’s definition of a cause in the practical sense. A
cause is something in nature, but it is relative to what an agent can produce
or prevent. The driver will think that speeding caused the crash because
he can prevent speeding; the surveyor will think that defects in the road
caused the crash because he has an in-depth understanding of roads, and the
manufacturer will think that the car’s design caused the crash, since she is
an expert in car design.
Now imagine that a bystander entered the scene and said, ‘It is true that
you feel a sense of control over the things you understand and can manipulate,
but beyond that, beyond the mere control of things, there is a real cause of
the car crash, and, ultimately, that is what we should be concerned with. So
what is the real cause of the crash?’
As we have seen, Collingwood thinks the idea of a real cause is nonsensi-
cal. Unlike the generality, and relativity, of the word ‘cause’ in the practical
sense, theoretical causes, which are purportedly real causes in nature, are
‘tight’ or absolute (see Chapter 2§3). Collingwood thinks that there is no
sensible way for us to answer the question regarding “real” causes because
it is an absolute presupposition of practical sciences like law and engineering
that causes are handles. So, in the practical sense, we are concerned with
what agents can manipulate and control rather than metaphysical truths or
“causes” that exist independently of human agents.
This reveals that Collingwood’s account is anthropocentric according to
the common view. Regarding causation, human agents enjoy a privileged
status. That is, we investigate the causal relation not by looking to nature
itself but by looking at nature through the eyes of a practical agent. Colling-
wood clarifies this point nicely. He says that the practical idea of cause rests
on an important idea about the relationship between man and nature. The
idea is this:
The anthropocentric idea that man looks at nature from his own
point of view; not the point of view of a thinker, anxious to find
out the truth about nature as it is in itself, but the point of view
of a practical agent, anxious to find out how he can manipulate
nature for his own ends.
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Ultimately, the word cause means the following:
Something that exists in nature, though [something] that is rel-
ative to what an agent can produce and prevent (Collingwood,
1940, p. 321).
Technically, and if we follow Collingwood’s philosophy, it is not correct to
view Collingwood’s account as non-realist or anthropocentric according to the
metaphysical view described above. Collingwood’s idea of metaphysics was
the historical investigation of absolute presuppositions and precluded ontol-
ogy. To call Collingwood’s account of causation ‘metaphysically non-realist’
would be a mistake. Collingwood was interested in describing the presuppo-
sitions that guide our practical investigations, not ontological truth (here, I
only intend to show how Collingwood avoids metaphysical anti-realism. In a
later chapter (7), I will explain my position on realism).
It should be noted that Collingwood thinks the idea of theoretical causes
(causation in sense three) is anthropocentric according to the projective view.
Theoretical causes are anthropocentric, Collingwood argues, because when
the animistic conception of nature, the idea that natural events were caused
by supernatural agency, was replaced by the mechanical conception in the
seventeenth century, the agency or power that naturally belonged to man and
was once attributed to supernatural beings was transferred to the natural
world. Thus, Collingwood says
When we come to Newton, and read (e.g.) the Scholium ap-
pended to his Definitions, we find him using as a matter of course
a whole vocabulary, taken literally, ascribes to ‘causes’ in nature
a kind of power which properly belongs to one human being in-
ducing another to act as he wishes him to act. Causes are said, in
the twelfth paragraph in that Scholium, to be ‘forces impressed
upon bodies for the generation of motion. True motion is neither
generated or altered, but by some force pressed upon the body
moved’. The cause, for Newton, is not that which impresses the
force, but the force itself. (ibid, p. 325)
Collingwood thinks that theoretical causes that are purported to be agent-
independent are anthropocentric in the sense that we project a power that
naturally belongs to human beings onto nature. Therefore, theoretical causes
are nonsensical because the idea of causation involves ‘a relic of animism’
(ibid, p. 327) and yet is claimed to be agent-independent.
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6.3.2 Anthropocentrism in Woodward
Recall what was said about interventionism in §2.5. Interventionism allows an
agent or a scientist interested in a particular set of questions to discover effec-
tive strategies, or what Woodward sometimes refers to as difference-making
strategies. The idea behind difference-making strategies is that causal claims
are understood as claims about what would happen (or what would be differ-
ent) ‘under interventions on...one or more variables’ in a causal model (ibid,
73).
To illustrate, the causal model in Figure 2.1 shows that an intervention
on X would make a difference to Y and Z, whereas an intervention on Z
would make no difference to Y . Thus, according to the model, we can infer a






In Figure 2.1 and 2.2, a researcher who only observes the correlations
X, Y , and Z will be unable to determine which figure is correct. Both
figures agree about which correlations exist (for example, between Y and
Z), but they disagree about what would happen under certain interventions.
Figure 2.2 claims that an intervention on X will change Z, that there is an
intervention on Y that would change both X and Z, but that no intervention
on X will change Y . By contrast, Figure 2.1 claims that an intervention on




As we have already seen, Woodward describes interventionism as a counter-
factual theory and claims that when we discover a causal pathway from X
to Y , we can explain Y by citing X.
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According to Woodward (2007), causation is best understood from a hu-
man point of view—like Putnam’s internal realism, it is said to have a human
face (see Chapter §2.5) because the explanations that are most useful to us
are ones that align with a human view of the world—a macroscopic view that
is essentially coarse grained.
Thus, we can say that interventionism is anthropocentric according to
the common view. When thinking about causation, human agents are given
a privileged status. Because interventionism is explicitly described as coarse
grained and weak,2 Woodward thinks that it is incorrect to view intervention-
ism as a metaphysical theory of causation (recall the debate with Strevens).
Woodward believes that interventionism is a pragmatic theory of causation
that is fundamentally concerned with causal discovery and causal explana-
tion (see Woodward, 2003, p. 331–33). Consequently, it is incorrect to view
interventionism as anthropocentric according to the metaphysical view.
6.3.3 Price’s Anthropocentrism
Now that we have seen the complexity of anthropocentrism in Collingwood
and Woodward, we can juxtapose their accounts with Price.
It is easy to understand how Price’s account is anthropocentric in the
common sense (see Chapter 3§1). Price is a pragmatist who believes that
philosophers should begin by examining the role of a problematic concept,
like ‘cause’, in the practical and cognitive life of the creatures who use it (see
Price [2011]). Moreover, Price thinks that concepts are tools, and the types
of tools we use depend on the kinds of creature we are. In a sense, the agency
approach to causation that Price defends simply links our concept of cause to
the fact that we are a certain type of agent. For Price, agency is a contingent
feature that grounds the concept of cause. Agency is contingent because
our so-called situation or experience as agents could have been different (see
Price, 2007) So, as epistemically limited beings who are situated in time, the
concept of cause directly reflects our experience of agency: acting towards an
uncertain future guided by an incomplete knowledge of the past. Moreover,
Price thinks that by emphasising the notion of agency in the context of a
2Recall from chapter 2 that interventionism is weak in the sense that causal explana-
tions do not amount to, nor do they specify, nomologically sufficient conditions. Rather,
according to Woodward, causal explanations will include the kind of invariant generalisa-
tions that we experience as macroscopic agents.
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theory of probabilistic causation, we can overcome significant problems (see
Chapter 3§2).
So, Price’s approach, like Collingwood’s and Woodward’s, can be cate-
gorised as anthropocentric according to the common view. When thinking
about causation, human agents are given a privileged status. Price would
say that it is our concept, in which the “our” stands not so much for us
as speakers and concept users but to our unique experience or situation as
human agents.
Price’s approach is also anthropocentric in the projective sense. The
“projection” is rather different from the Newtonian sense discussed above
(in terms of Collingwood’s theoretical sense of cause). In that sense, we
stained or gilded reality with an anthropomorphic ‘power’. For Price, what
we project is not an anthropomorphism but our natural view of the world—
the way we see the world as agents but also as human beings with a unique
physiological makeup. To illustrate this point, consider an analogy with
models. When we model something, for example, when we model an event,
the variables we include into the model are ones that we deem relevant and
necessary to that event. The model is distinct from the actual world—the
model represents a part of the world, but it is not the world itself—this being
true from an external perspective, or a view from outside of the model.
However, given a view of the model from the inside, i.e., given a situated
perspective in the model, we could say that the model represents a unique
ontology. Likewise, when we project our point of view or perspective as
agents, we project our reality in the world to some reality outside of it. Price
says, ‘we think of projection as the production of a fictional ontology’ (2004,
p. 57).
If we follow Price’s thinking, Price is not anthropocentric in the meta-
physical sense. This may seem counterintuitive. Because Price thinks that
causation is relative to our experience of agency, one could argue that causa-
tion becomes relative to our cognitive makeup, as Kant did, or that we ‘make
the world,’ as Goodman did. Price argues that his position, although simi-
lar to the views of Kant and Goodman, avoids similar metaphysical results
because he advocates a global expressivism (see Price [2013]). An expres-
sivist is someone who takes the primary function of certain statements to
‘express’ an attitude rather than a matter of fact. For a causal expressivist
like Price, the primary function of causal language is the expression of an
evaluative attitude rather than a truth regarding a mind-independent real-
ity. For example, a moral expressivist would interpret the claim ‘abortion
116
is not murder’ as an expression that reflects the cultural and philosophical
attitudes of a given speaker. Similarly, Price believes that we should inter-
pret the claim ‘X causes Y’ as an expression that reflects the situation or
‘attitude’ of a given agent. For Price, causal vocabulary is not intended to
be descriptive or factual.
Price takes the resulting position to entail a certain kind of subjectivity
regarding causation, but he argues that it is incorrect to correlate subjectivity
with metaphysics. As we saw in Chapter 4, Price (2017) defends his posi-
tion by arguing that Woodward’s ‘objectivist’ position is misguided precisely
because it leads to metaphysical concerns.
It is important to note that Price clearly endorses the common sense of
anthropocentrism that is supported by both Collingwood and Woodward.
Moreover, because Price believes that we project a kind of fictional ontology,
I take it that his “projectivism” is simply a continuing effect of his anthro-
pocentrism in the common sense (e.g., in terms of causation, we give the
agent’s ‘fictional’ ontology a privileged status). We are not staining or gild-
ing reality with an anthropomorphic power whereby human agents create
causal relationships; rather, we are simply projecting a human point of view
of the world onto the world itself. This does entail some kind of subjec-
tivity (as does Woodward’s account, which similarly states that we should
investigate causation from a human point of view). Yet, it does not entail
the metaphysical view that causation is created by human agents. Rather
simply, I take Price’s projectivism to mean that the claim ‘A causes B’, while
possibly true from a human point of view, is false given a mind-independent
sense of reality. So, when we say (it is true that) A causes B, we are pro-
jecting a human point of view—a fictional ontology—and subsequently take
‘A causes B’ to be an objective fact about the world (i.e., objective in the
relative sense discussed in Chapter 4).
Why Woodward is Worried About Anthropocentrism
Before I reveal the agency that is implicit within interventionism, I want
to consider an important question: why, according to Woodward, is Price’s
notion of agency so problematic?
The answer concerns Price’s notion of manipulation, viz., free action.
Recall from chapter 2 that Price introduces the notion of ‘free actions’ as a
way to abstract away from the evidential import of an event (i.e., from ideas
about what causes what). As an illustration, recall the earlier example—a
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structure in which atmospheric pressure (variable Z) is a common cause of
the reading X of a barometer and the occurrence of a storm Y , with no
causal link between X and Y . According to Price, manipulating X via a free
act would make the correlation between X and Y disappear.
Woodward argues that the notion of a ‘free act’ in this context is much
too vague. For example, Woodward says that ‘if we wish to follow [Price] in
defending the claim that if an association between A and B persists when A
is given the right sort of “independent causal history” or is “manipulated”
in the right way, then A causes B, we need to be much more precise by what
we mean by the quoted phrases’ (Woodward, 2013, p. 13).
Woodward believes Price’s concept of agency, as a solution to the problem
of spurious causes, is unduly subjective or unacceptably anthropocentric. If
we break the correlation between X and Y by a free act, it simply does not
make sense to talk about causation between events where an agent’s free
act is incapable of creating the necessary ‘independence’, i.e., when an agent
would not be capable of acting in such a way as to break the correlations and
discover whether X causes Y or whether X is merely correlated with Y . In
the situation in which an agent would not be able to perform a manipulation
or free action, e.g., inside the sun, there is no way to distinguish between
causes and correlations.
Significantly, Woodward’s argument that Price’s approach is unduly an-
thropocentric leads to the problem of scope. The problem is not that human
agents or human beings are given privileged status in regards to causation.
Nor is the problem that Price’s account relies on human agency (per se) or
even that human agents project a fictional ontology. Rather, the problem,
according to Woodward, is that when the solution to the problem of spurious
causes relies on overt manipulations, the free act of an agent, there is no
way for us to make sense of causal claims that do not or cannot involve an
overt human action. The problem of scope arises (given Woodward’s inter-
pretation of the agency approach) due to the fact that we cannot sensibly
talk about causal relationships where an agent’s (overt) act is incapable of
distinguishing causes from correlations. Thus, the problem of scope, from
this interpretation, comes to rest on the idea that causation relies on the
notion of overt agency, and we cannot sensibly talk about causes that do not
or cannot involve an overt action.
I will pick up the issue of scope in a later chapter (8). For now, I want to
defend my claim that Woodward’s concern is not about agency and anthro-
pocentrism per se by revealing the agency implicit within interventionism.
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To do so, I will defend the claim that agency includes both overt and mental
actions.
6.4 How to Understand the Concept of Agency
My aim in this section is to clarify the notion of agency and to explain how
agency involves mental actions.
For an agency theorist, one who accepts the idea that causation is agent-
dependent, it is often taken by default—due to a lack of positive alternatives—
that ‘agency’ means overt action. As I have previously explained, if agency
means overt action, then the agency approach has several, possibly fatal,
flaws. However, as I will argue below, there are numerous ways to think
about agency. I will defend the idea that agency includes more than overt
action by first considering the standard theory of overt or bodily agency and
then relating the standard theory to the notion of mental agency. I conclude
that mental agency qualifies as real agency because mental agency meets the
standard criteria for agency.
The standard conception of agency (see Anscombe, 1957; Davidson, 1963,
1971; Schlosser, 2015) says that actions include intentional or deliberate bod-
ily movements. Mele (1997) calls these actions ‘overt,’ because they are ‘ac-
tions that essentially involve peripheral bodily movements’. Consider this
well-known passage from Davidson:
This morning I was awakened by the sound of someone practicing
the violin. I dozed a bit, then got up, washed, shaved, dressed,
and went downstairs, turning off a light in the hall as I passed. I
poured myself some coffee, stumbled on the edge of the rug, and
spilled a bit of coffee fumbling the New York Times. (Davidson,
1971, p. 3)
Which of these events include agency? Davidson says that ‘some of these
items record things I did; others, things that befell me’ (ibid). Among the
things that Davidson did were getting up, washing, and going downstairs.
Among the things that befell or merely happened to him were being awakened
and stumbling on the edge of the rug. Davidson’s actions include what he
did, not what merely happened to him. That is, Davidson’s actions were
bodily events that were intentionally made by him and not the events that
were automatic or unintentional. I display agency when I intentionally raise
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my arm, but I do not when you move my arm by accident or when I move it
while I am asleep.
When thinking about agency, it is crucial to understand what philoso-
phers mean by ‘intentional.’ In Intention (1957), Anscombe argues that
when we speak of human agency, we are referring to something that the
agent does with intention. An agent acts intentionally when their action
comes under the description of a ‘Why’ question. A ‘Why’ question can be
answered by giving reasons for doing X. For Anscombe, reasons stand in
place of something like a means-end utility function, which usually can be
captured by the words because or so that I could..., where these words specifi-
cally reference some future-oriented goal or intention. (Doing X is the means
for achieving some end Y.) So, we can say that Davidson acted by walking
downstairs and not when he stumbled on the rug because we can capture
Davidson walked downstairs in terms of some (future-oriented) intention. In
other words, if we ask Davidson why he walked downstairs, he could reply
that he walked downstairs because he wanted to get some coffee or so that he
could read the news. Also, it is plausible to think that we could not capture
Davidson stumbled on the edge of the rug in the same manner.
If we take actions to be ‘basic,’ that is, as mere bodily movements, then
there is a way to subsume Davidson’s stumbling as a distinct action. In-
tentional actions can then be seen as distinguishable from basic movements
like stumbling. Anscombe called basic movements (e.g., stumbling on the
edge of the rug) unintentional actions. The term ‘agency’ is typically used
in a narrow sense to denote the performance of intentional actions. So, we
can say that, according to the standard theory, something is an action iff
it has a reason explanation (e.g., in terms of the agent’s desires, beliefs,
and intentions).3 One way to make the distinction between basic and inten-
tional action more clear is to say that Anscombe and Davidson, and indeed
philosophers today, are interested in the distinction between intentional and
unintentional actions.
3This entails a coarse grained (or minimising) view (Anscombe 1957; Davidson, 1963)
on the individuation of actions, in which you perform an action under a description
(Anscombe thought the description should provide reasons, where Davidson thought it
should provide causes). When I flick the switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room,
and alert the bugler, I perform only one action under the description I flick the switch.
Under a fine-grained view, how many actions you perform depends on how many act-
properties are instantiated. If you instantiate four act-properties, then you perform four
distinct actions (Goldman, 1970).
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So, agency includes overt actions. But is agency limited to them? In
the contemporary literature on agency, it is common to accept that some
forms of thinking, or so-called mental actions, also involve agency. In her
essay, ‘Is There a Sense of Agency for Thought?’ (2009), Joe¨lle Proust asks
the question, ‘can we ascribe a sense of agency to thought?’ Her answer is
positive. Proust says that a sense of bodily agency arises when ‘a subject has
a feeling of agency for her movements when she is in a position to anticipate
and evaluate the consequences...[that] are associated with them’ (ibid, p.
256). Implicitly, Proust recognises the standard criteria for action by saying
that we evaluate the consequences of certain movements, movements which
we can assume to be directed at a future-oriented end or goal. In other
words, Proust is saying that a sense of bodily agency arises when we act
intentionally and that we lack a sense of agency when we act unintentionally.
According to Proust, we also have a sense of mental agency—that is, a
sense of agency that arises when we think. Proust’s argument is that ‘what
holds for bodily actions should hold for mental actions as well’ (ibid, p.
266). In other words, Proust thinks that if we can show that mental actions
meet the standard criteria for agency, then we can ascribe a sense of agency
to thought. To do this, she distinguishes intentional thoughts from unin-
tentional ones. ‘Automatic thinking,’ as Proust calls it, are unintentional
thoughts. These thoughts arise as part of a ‘past conditioning’ and are dis-
tinguishable from thoughts that are intentional. Intentional thoughts are
‘active’ or directed towards some end. When Davidson stumbles on the edge
of the rug and thinks, ‘yikes!’ his thinking is automatic. When he thinks or
rather wills himself to walk downstairs, his thinking was active. It is in such
a willing that we come to feel a sense of agency for thought. To distinguish
the directed mental event from the automatic, Proust says that, in the for-
mer case, ‘the operation is called,’ while in the later, ‘it is activated.’ As a
matter of definition:
A willing or trying is a mental event through which an operation
is (1) called because of its instrumental relationship to a goal, and
(2) is thereby made available to executive processes. In bodily
action, the goal is [that an external change be brought about
in virtue of this trying]. In mental action, the goal is [that an
epistemic—or motivational change be brought about in virtue of
this trying] (ibid, p. 267).
The ‘executive processes’ that Proust refers to is a kind of reasoning.
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Proust says that ‘mental agency occurs in the context of critical reasoning’
(ibid, p. 260). The ‘motivational change’ that she speaks of applies to our
beliefs or attitudes. Proust’s conclusion is that in the context of critical
reasoning, which effects our attitudes and/or beliefs, we experience a sense
of agency for thought.
Mele (1997; 2009) also argues that mental actions involve agency. In
‘Agency and Mental Action’ (1997), Mele argues that certain forms of rea-
soning are intentional and therefore qualify as real agency. Examples of
mental agency include solving a chess problem in one’s head (1997, p. 231),
deliberating about accepting a job offer (ibid), or deciding to A (1997, pp.
204–3). Like Proust, Mele argues that mental agency results from the pro-
cess of trying. ‘Trying to x,’ Mele says, ‘is making an effort to x ’ (2009, p.
18). Types of trying like solving, deliberating, and deciding qualify as agency
because they are intentional and directed towards a possible end or goal.
Relying on the standard conception of agency, Mele argues that some mental
actions qualify as agency because mental actions can be intentional and goal
oriented.
Like Mele and Proust, Pamela Hieronymi claims that certain forms of
thinking qualify as agency; however, unlike Mele and Proust, Hieronymi
argues that mental agency amounts to a unique kind of agency. In the
article, ‘Two Kinds of Agency’ (2009), Hieronymi argues that mental agency
qualifies as real, yet distinct, agency because it gives us a unique sense of
control, which Hieronymi calls evaluative control. For example, whereas I
have actual or practical control over the state of the window when I throw
my computer at it, there is another sense in which I control the window
by deliberating about what will happen when I throw my computer at it
or deciding to do so. Hieronymi argues that mental actions like deliberating
and deciding warrant evaluative control because they provide us with control
over our attitudes. Attitudes embody a person’s answer to a question or a
range of questions. To control our attitudes, Hieronymi says that, ‘you must
simply bring it about that [you] settle positively the question of whether p
or whether to φ...we bring it about that we are committed to p as true or to
φ-ing’ (ibid, 141). If I believe that p, throwing the computer at the window
will cause the window to break, and, in the case that I want to break the
window (and my computer), I will have settled the question of whether to φ.
Indeed, the idea that mental actions involve agency has been widely en-
dorsed (see, for example, Mental Actions, 2009). Most of these arguments
take the general form of an argument made by Peacock:
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Mental action is a genuine subspecies of action in general. The
differences between mental action and bodily action are funda-
mentally only the differences between the mental and the bodily.
(2009, p. 1).
Peacock argues that mental actions can qualify as real agency, given that
we can form a link between the standard concept of (bodily) agency and
mental action. Rather simply, and like Mele and Proust, Peacock argues
that if we can show that certain forms of thinking are intentional and goal
oriented, then they will qualify as real agency.
6.4.1 Hypothetical Agency
Given that agency includes both overt and mental actions, I want to make a
distinction that can help improve the agency approach to causation. I want
to argue that certain kinds of thinking amount to hypothetical agency. Hypo-
thetical agency is a type of mental agency that involves deliberate reasoning
about the effects of bringing something about.4 Our mental lives are filled
with hypothetical action. You reason about what would happen if you miss
a meeting, whether or not to attend the wedding, to wear the blue dress or
the red one, to give to charity, to walk next door, etc. Hypothetical action,
in general, is the process of reasoning about the effects of bringing about.
Reasoning about the effects of bringing about is a type of active delibera-
tion. Active deliberation affects our beliefs (what we believe to be true) and
possibly our attitudes (how we intend to act). My argument is that hypo-
thetical agency is real agency because it is intentional (active) and oriented
towards an end or goal, viz., understanding the effects of bringing something
about. Significantly, understanding the effects of bringing something about
enables what Pearl called ‘deep understanding’.
If hypothetical agency is real agency, we should be able to form a link
between it and the standard concept of agency. According to the standard
concept of agency, an agent acts intentionally when their action comes under
the description of a ‘Why’ question. As I said earlier, a ‘Why’ question
4In many cases, hypothetical agency—that is, deliberate reasoning about the effects of
bringing something about—will involve reasoning about the effects of some overt action.
However, hypothetical agency is not limited to reasoning about overt actions. I can reason
about the effects of imagining that I was back in France. For example, I reason that If I
were to bring it about that I imagine being in France, I would become cheerful.
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can be answered by giving reasons for doing X. Reasons stand in place of
a means-end utility function, which usually can be captured by the words
because or so that I could.... One could say, ‘I did X (as the means) so
that I could...’ (achieve some end). The important question is, in terms of
hypothetical agency, can we answer the ‘Why’ question? Indeed, we can.
So, how can we answer why did you X? where X means reason about the
effects of bringing something about? The answer to this question, following
Anscombe, is that I did X—that is, I reasoned about the effects of bringing
something about—so that I could understand what would happen if I were to
bring this particular something about (Pearl and Woodward would note that
we do X—that is, reason about the effects of bringing something about or
what they call hypothetical manipulations—so that we can make predictions
and enable deep understanding).
I conclude that hypothetical agency is real agency because it meets the
standard criteria for agency. Moreover, that satisfying the criteria for the
standard concept of agency amounts to real agency is commonly supported
in the literature on agency (e.g., Mele, 1997, 2009; Peacock, 2009; Proust,
2009).
The standard concept of (overt) agency is linked with the notion of con-
trol, i.e., overt actions allow me to practically control individual objects
and/or events. We might ask: Can we form a connection between hypotheti-
cal agency and control? The answer is also positive. Hypothetical agency en-
tails hypothetical control. Hypothetical control stems from reasoning about
what would happen if I were to bring something about, where an approxi-
mate understanding of the effects of bringing about Z, for example, provides
me with hypothetical control over Z’s effects. Note this quote from Pearl:
When we have such understanding, we feel “in control” even if we
have no practical way of controlling things. For example, we have
no practical way to control celestial motion, and still, the theory
of gravitation gives us a feeling of understanding and control,
because it provides a blueprint for hypothetical control (Pearl,
2000, p. 345).
Say that I want to know what will happen if I throw a cannonball at my
wall. I do not have to throw the cannonball to know some of the effects of
doing so. I only need some approximate knowledge about the effects of large,
heavy objects coming into contact with permanent ones. Alternatively, I
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may have some approximate knowledge regarding Newton’s laws of motion
and the materials used to construct the wall. Seemingly, this is all that is
required for me to know that throwing the cannonball at my wall will damage
the wall. Thus, by having approximate knowledge of the effects of bringing
something about, I gain (hypothetical) control over individual objects or
events. In the example of the car crash, the driver, the motor-manufacturer,
and the surveyor gain control over the car crash by reasoning about what
they understand. The control they have over the car crash is hypothetical,
but the control is real nonetheless.5
It is worth explicitly mentioning that hypothetical actions do not neces-
sarily lead to overt actions. When you reason about what would happen if
you miss a meeting, your hypothetical actions can result in overt action, for
example, you go to the meeting, or you go home. However, when you delib-
erate about what would happen if you threw your computer at the window,
you could refrain from doing so. You might avoid throwing the computer
simply because the effects of doing so are undesirable.
As it happens, hypothetical actions do not necessarily involve even pos-
sible actions. Possible actions are the overt actions that are possible for a
human agent. Possible actions include simple movements of the body, e.g.,
moving my arms or legs. Possible actions also include more complex actions,
like helping in the construction of a jumbo jet or flying one from London to
New York. Impossible actions are overt actions that cannot be performed
by human agents. Impossible actions include running at 35 mph or flying a
jumbo jet to Mars. Hypothetical actions include both possible and impos-
sible human actions. For example, I may reason about the consequences of
throwing a 2-kg cannonball at the wall at 25 mph (something that is humanly
possible). Or, I might reason about what would happen if I threw a 75-kg
cannonball at the wall at 200 mph (something that is humanly impossible). I
can reason that if I were to throw the 2-kg cannonball at the wall at 25mph,
I would create a large hole in my wall. I can also reason that if I throw the
75-kg cannonball at the wall at 200 mph, then I would produce a large hole
in my wall along with a loud noise and severely damage my neighbour’s car
parked on the opposite side of the wall.
But, what happens if we do not have an approximate knowledge or un-
derstanding of the effects of bringing something about? Interestingly, inter-
5I disagree with Pearl that hypothetical control amounts to a sense or mere ‘feeling’ of
control. If hypothetical agency is real agency, hypothetical control is real control.
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ventionists like Woodward and Pearl are interested in discovering knowledge
of this kind. They want to know whether X is the cause of Y or whether X
is merely correlated with Y. They want to settle the following question: Is X
causally related to Y ? As we have seen, causal modelling allows them to do
this. To illustrate, if we learn that X is causally related to Y , then we can
reason about the effects of some action related to X and gain (hypothetical)
control over Y . And recall, discovering causal relationships, according to
Woodward, allows us to learn answers to ‘what if things had been different
questions’ (Woodward, 2003). I will explain in the next section how causal
modelling involves agency and interaction with the world.
Consider the relationship between hypothetical control and ‘deep under-
standing’. To illustrate, consider two things that I cannot physically ma-
nipulate (or practically control): the gravity of massive bodies in space (the
gravitational field due to/experienced by bodies) and the tides on Earth.
While it is true that I cannot overtly manipulate the moon in such a way as
to effect the tides, given that I have some approximate knowledge of New-
ton’s theory of gravity, I can hypothetically control the tides on Earth. For
example, given Newton’s theory, I can understand what would happen if I
doubled the moon’s mass or what would happen if I moved the sun a million
miles closer to Earth. This understanding enables hypothetical control.
So, agency includes (i) overt actions, which involves intentional bodily
movements, and (ii) hypothetical actions (a type of mental agency), which
involves reasoning about the effects of bringing something about. Now that
we understand that agency includes hypothetical action, an interesting ques-
tion follows: How do different manipulation approaches utilise the notion of
agency?
On one hand, standard agency theories, e.g., Price (1993, 2007) and
Collingwood (1940) are commonly thought to utilise the concept of overt
agency. For example, as I explained in chapter 3, by defining a cause as
something that agents can ‘bring about,’ Price is often interpreted as using
agency to mean overt agency. Similarly, Collingwood, it could be argued,
utilises overt agency because he describes a cause as a ‘handle,’ where the
handle in question provides the agent with practical control.
Although it is common to suppose that Collingwood’s theory exclusively
employs overt agency, it should be noted that his theory has the tools to
make use of hypothetical agency as well. Collingwood is easily understood,
or perhaps easily misunderstood, as exclusively utilising overt agency. Causes
are described as practical and as handles that allow us to produce and prevent
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‘in nature.’ All of this gives the impression that when Collingwood speaks
about agency, he is talking about overt agency. However, this impression is
misleading. Again, in the example of the car crash, the driver, the motor-
manufacturer, and the surveyor arrive on the scene of the crash and try to
determine the cause. What they end up doing is reasoning about the effects
of some action. The surveyor, for example, does not physically manipulate
the curvature of the road and then determine the cause of the crash. Rather,
he reasons that if he had manipulated the road, he would have prevented
the accident.
However, it is important to note that Collingwood denies reasoning about
impossible human actions. In one example, Collingwood speaks about the
failure of a car to drive up a large hill. He says that, had we been able to
stomp down hills, we could say that the cause of the car’s failure to drive
up the hill was the hill itself. As Collingwood points out, because we cannot
stomp down hills, the hill cannot be considered a cause. So, Collingwood can
utilise hypothetical actions, but only hypothetical actions that are humanly
possible.
As I will explain in more detail in the following chapter, Price’s theory
clearly relies on the concept of overt action. In regards to the problem of
scope, Price, like Gasking and von Wright, argues that we can overcome the
problem by analogical reasoning. As we will soon see, analogical reasoning
entails that we reason—by analogy—between events that can be overtly ma-
nipulated and events that cannot. I will pick up this argument in Part 3,
viz., chapter 8.
It is often difficult to say how interventionists like Pearl and Woodward do
or do not rely on the concept of agency. My argument is that interventionism
differs from standard agency approaches because they rely on, and therefore
utilise, the notion of hypothetical agency. This is because interventionists
reason about the effects of manipulations within a causal model. The correct
way to structure Woodward’s relationship to the notion of agency, given his
theory of interventionism, is to say that Woodward does not rely on the
concept of overt agency like Collingwood and Price but that he does rely on
the concept of mental agency. This will be fully revealed in §5.
Before I explain the connection between interventionism and agency, it
will be helpful to briefly clarify who the concept ‘agent’ refers to and why.
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6.4.2 Who’s an Agent?
In the literature on agency, it is usually taken by default that ‘agency’ refers
to human agency. When other kinds of agency are discussed—mental, shared,
or collective—it is still in the context of human agency. I have already
discussed the arguments for mental agency. Shared agency occurs when two
or more individuals do something together (such as sing a song). Collective
agency occurs when two or more agents act as a group (such as a social
movement). The one notable exception in the literature is the discussion
of artificial agency. The central question in relation to artificial agency is
whether or not robots have the appropriate internal states to ground mental
representation and intentional agency. Whether or not a robot can be called
an agent (in terms of the standard concept) depends on whether or not robots
can form intentions (reasons for action).
According to less demanding views, the standard concept of agency pro-
vides an interesting and central kind of agency. Barandiaran et al. (2009)
claim that the standard concept is compatible with the claim that there are
more kinds of agency, including kinds of agency that do not require repre-
sentational mental states. Another kind of agency is what Barandiaran et al.
calls ‘minimal agency.’ A (minimal) agent is an entity that is distinguishable
from its environment and that is doing something by itself in accord with a
particular goal. For example, a beaver, which builds a damn, or a lion, which
kills a gazelle, could be called a minimal agent. This view departs from the
standard conception in its characterisation of action—‘doing something’—in
terms of the agent’s environment and its adaptation features. Barandiaran
et al. suggest that animals and even very simple organisms can be said to
have the fundamental goal to be: to continue their existence.
Similarly, Harry Frankfurt (1978) has pointed out that the behaviour of
animals constitutes a low-level doing or ‘acting’. When a spider walks across
the table, the spider directly controls the movements of his legs, and they
are directed to take him from one location to another. Likewise, flowers
that bloom at certain times of the day display ‘action’ in some weak sense.
Frankfurt’s influence on this point has been the elucidation of ‘full-blooded’
human agency.
Intuitively, this seems plausible. If we called a lion or a seal an ‘agent,’
we would be referring to its minimum capacity to hunt, eat, or mate. Based
on the behaviour of other animals, such as chimpanzees and orcas, the dis-
tinction between minimal and full-blooded agency becomes blurred.
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In general, however, the term ‘agent’ applies to any being with the ap-
propriate mental states—the ability to form intentions and act for known
reasons. We can only speculate that “other” agents exist—perhaps intelli-
gent aliens or intelligent fish. In the meantime, ‘agency’ has been reserved
for distinctly human actions.
Regarding the literature on causation and agency, philosophers have also
been primarily concerned with human agency (though indeed, what human
agency entails has remained frustratingly vague). Despite the occasional
foray into hypotheticals, only human action has been discussed. One inter-
esting hypothetical, which I introduced in chapter 5, was put forward by
Putnam (1982). Putnam has us consider a group of aliens who travel to
planet Earth and happen upon a forest fire. Assumed to be full-blooded
agents like us humans, the aliens determine that the cause of the fire is the
abundance of oxygen in the atmosphere (we’re told the aliens are from Venus,
where there is little oxygen). The alien’s conclusion about the fire is meant
to strike us as odd. We humans would not come to the same conclusion.
Speaking of Price’s agency theory, Jon Williamson (2007) argues that this
potentially represents a problem for the agency approach. Are we to conclude
that there are two kinds of causation—causation for Earthlings and causation
for Venusians? Williamson’s concern, I presume, is that the agency approach
seems to lead to the worrying conclusion that causation varies with different
agents, perhaps with manipulation abilities or with what an agent considers
to be a serious possibility.
Given that different full-blooded agents are likely to have differing ma-
nipulation abilities and contrasting “serious possibilities,” I would argue that
what varies is the causal relata. As I will argue in the following two chapters,
different agents will interact with various worlds in varying and contrasting
ways. How we interact with any possible world depends on facts about the
agent. Collingwood thought that causes would vary with control, that is,
what an agent can produce or prevent. Price believes causes will vary with
the agent’s situation, e.g., the way an agent is situated in time. Woodward
also thinks causes will vary with the kinds of questions we ask and what we
model (which depends on what we take to be serious possibilities). This vari-
ation does not entail that there are different kinds of causation, just different
ways of interacting. I will defend the idea that the causal relata (and thus
what we take to be causes) will vary alongside variations in interaction in
chapter 8.
How interactions vary may depend on something about the agent them-
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selves, for example, the agent’s situation or their manipulation abilities. In
an example used by Price, what human agents think of as causes will vary
with aliens from a faraway galaxy, where the direction of time is reversed.
Human agents and time-reversed agents differ in terms of their situation in
time. What human agents take to be a cause, the time-reversed aliens take
to be an effect. In Putnam’s example, causes vary with the variables being
taken into consideration rather than with variations pertaining to the agent’s
themselves. In an ad-hoc model of the fire, the Venusians, who are surprised
by the level of oxygen in the area, consider this to be a significant factor in
the fire and determine the cause of the fire to be oxygen. Human agents do
not consider this variable important (they do not include it in their ad-hoc
model of the fire); instead they come up with a different conclusion about
the cause of the fire.
As I will explain in more detail in chapters 7 & 8, causal variation is
simply a predictable feature of the agency approach. Contrary to any initial
concerns, I will show that this is a benefit of the agency approach that I
defend (Causal Interactionism) and the agency approach in general.
6.5 Do Interventions Involve Agency?
I have noted important similarities between Collingwood’s and Price’s theo-
ries with Woodward’s theory of interventionism. All of the theories are cor-
rectly regarded as manipulation approaches; both the agency theory and the
interventionist theory consider the discovery of genuine causal relationships
as a primary motivation, and all three of the accounts are anthropocentric
according to the common view. What I want to do now is bring to light the
agency that is implicit within interventionism.
6.5.1 Interventionism and Agency
Making the agency within interventionism more explicit will be useful. To
do this, I will focus on one of Collingwood’s important ideas—the notion
of a handle and the associated notion of control. After I have fully artic-
ulated the use of these terms following Collingwood, the association with
interventionism should become apparent.
A cause in Collingwood’s practical sense was said to concern events in
nature. However,
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The word ‘cause’ [practical sense] still expresses an idea relative
to human conduct, because that which causes is something under
human control, and this control serves as a means whereby human
beings can control that which is caused. In this sense, the cause
of an event in nature is the handle, so to speak, by which human
beings can manipulate it (Collingwood, 1940, p. 298).
Significantly, Woodward agrees with Collingwood that causes are handles.
Woodward says that ‘for manipulation theories of causation...causes are to
be regarded as handles or devices for manipulating effects’ (2013, p. 1).
Indeed, Collingwood’s idea of handles fits nicely with Woodward’s no-
tion of an intervention. Recall that the motivation behind Woodward’s
(and Pearl’s) idea of an intervention was the discovery of genuine causal
pathways—distinguishing between causes and correlations. The way that we
go about doing this, Woodward claims, is by making a change in X via an
intervention within a causal model and producing a change in Y . Signifi-
cantly, once we have discovered a causal relationship between X and Y , we
can in theory control Y. Thus, X becomes a ‘handle’ in Woodward’s sense
of an intervention.
The practical sense of cause takes the Baconian mantra that knowledge
is power. Woodward says that we want to determine genuine causal rela-
tionships so that they ‘might be exploited for purposes of manipulation and
control’ (2007, p. 72). Pearl’s answer to the so-called second riddle of causa-
tion (chapter 2§5), ‘what difference would it make if I told you that a certain
connection was causal,’ is that knowing causal relationships makes a differ-
ence to how we act. ‘The central theme [of causation],’ Pearl writes, ‘is to
view causation as a computational scheme devised to facilitate prediction of
the effects of actions’ (2000, p. 347)
Formulated as hypothetical manipulations, interventions allow us to dis-
cover what would happen if we did X or what would happen if we did Z (this
is one way that interventionism leads to what Pearl calls deep understanding.
See Chapter §2.5). Whether or not we overtly do X or Z does not actually
matter: if we know that ¬c→ ¬e (or c→ e) we can effectively explain e by
citing c, and c becomes, albeit hypothetically, a handle for e. Pearl sums up
these ideas by saying,
Deep understanding means knowing not merely how things be-
have yesterday but also how things will behave under new hy-
pothetical circumstances, control being one such circumstance.
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Interestingly, when we have such understanding we feel “in con-
trol” even if we have no practical way of controlling things (2000,
p. 348).
Handles and the associated notion of control can be captured by what
Pearl has called ‘small world’ systems. To illustrate, consider a simple model
of the tides on Earth. When we model the tides, we include variables such as
the mass of the moon, the mass of the sun, the oceans, and Newton’s law of
universal gravitation. We do not include things like the weight of the Eiffel
Tower or the number of whales in the Pacific Ocean. Interventionists model
small-world systems because ‘handles’ would disappear if we considered the
universe as a whole. Pearl says:
If we wish to include the whole universe in the model, causal-
ity disappears because interventions disappear—the manipulator
and the manipulated lose their distinction (2000, p. 350).
If we go back to Collingwood, we can again note that it is only through
a certain form of relativity that we can make sense of ‘handles’. For Colling-
wood, the relativity of causation was explicitly represented by the practical
nature of causation. Upon reflection, he says, ‘we know that the conditions
of any given event are quite possibly infinite in number, so that no one could
thus martial them for selection even if he tried’ (Collingwood, 1940, p. 303).
Of course, we know that this is not a problem for Collingwood. He says:
If I find that I can get a result by a certain means I may be sure
that I should not be getting it unless a great many conditions
were fulfilled; but so long as I get it, I do not mind what these
conditions are (ibid).
What Collingwood is expressing here is that we consider a very limited
range of factors when we set out to determine—and potentially utilise—
causes. In the case of the automobile accident, all three of the witnesses
ended up considering slightly different conditions. Collingwood suggests that
some of the conditions that they come to consider are those in which they
have some sense of understanding or expertise—those that give them a sense
of control. The motor-manufacturer understands car design, and this gives
her a viable sense of control over car crashes. She would represent the han-
dle as safer design because in some sense that is what she understands—and
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that is what she can control. A crude representation for the manufacturer
might look like the following:
Condition 1: Car crash
Condition 2: Defective design in the car
Handle: Safer design
This is likely all the motor-manufacturer would need to consider to achieve
her result. If the result in question were preventing automobile accidents, the
manufacturer would have an acceptable means (represented by her conditions
above).6 This leads Collingwood to say that causality in the practical sense
is relative to a certain point of view.
It is important to remember that Collingwood’s idea of causation (practi-
cal sense) can accommodate the notion of mental agency and the associated
notion of hypothetical control. For example, it is plausible that when the
surveyor considers the car crash, given his expertise and the conditions he
represents for the crash, he determines the cause by reasoning—he reasons
that changing the road to such and such a geometry would have prevented
the car crash. He does not overtly manipulate the road and then determine
the cause of the crash. Rather, he simply reasons that if he did alter the
condition of the road, then he could have prevented the crash. The same
is true for the driver and the manufacturer. Given the conditions that they
consider for the crash, they reason that if they did manipulate the cause in
the right way, they could have prevented the crash.
I have been arguing that this is also true for interventionists. The inter-
ventionist simply replaces what Collingwood calls ‘conditions’ with a variable
set V. On an interventionist model, the driver, the surveyor, and the manufac-
turer all get different causal explanations for the crash because they included
different variables in their model of the crash. Pearl and Woodward would
argue that we should model all of the conditions (i.e., variables) then inter-
vene on selectively isolated pairs and determine a more objective explanation.
Indeed, interventionism, although similar to Collingwood’s analysis of causa-
tion, is a significant development of Collingwood’s general idea that causation
6Alternatively, the county surveyor understands the geometry of roads, and he comes to
represent Condition 1, replaces Condition 2 with Dangerous road, and replaces the handle
with Safer roads. The driver would represent Condition 1, add condition 2, Speeding, and
replace the handle with Safer driving. All three witnesses would hold things like the
surface temperature of the sun and gravity to be invariant.
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is relative to individual judgment. Woodward agrees that causal judgment
is itself relative. However, Woodward thinks that causation is relative to
our judgment regarding difference makers and ‘serious possibilities’—these
being key factors to our judgment of what variables to include into a causal
model. To illustrate, recall the earlier example: if a patient dies at a nearby
hospital because someone neglected to give them their daily shot, we do not
hold strangers in a distant city who failed to administer the shot causally
responsible because we do not consider their doing so a ‘serious possibility’
(see Woodward, 2003 pp. 39–57).
Woodward’s definition of a cause shares a kind of relativity with Colling-
wood’s practical sense of cause, where our causal judgments represent a cer-
tain point of view. The difference is that Collingwood takes causation to be
relative to human agents with unique skill sets and understanding, whereas
Woodward takes causation to be relative to a model or a modeller with a
unique set of questions and assumptions about serious possibilities.
Both kinds of relativity represent a form of utility. Steven Sloman, in his
2009 book Causal Models, captures this insight perfectly when he writes that,
‘animals are selective in what they attend to. They tend to the properties
that serve their goals as best they can, while ignoring properties that are
irrelevant’ (2009 p. 11).
The fact that causal judgments rely on a form of relativism leads Wood-
ward to characterise interventionism as weak and incomplete (see Chapter
2§5). If weakness and incompleteness become worrisome, recall the sugges-
tion from Collingwood in the quote above.
So how does interventionism involve agency? Unlike Price’s explicit use
of agent probabilities, Woodward’s use of agency is implicit but no less signif-
icant. Woodward’s account relies on agency in two ways. Firstly, and more
generally, Woodward approaches the concept of cause from the perspective
of human practice—things we do as human beings (viz., explain and pre-
dict). Secondly, and more significantly, interventionism relies on a notion of
hypothetical agency (and thus hypothetical control). Causes are regarded as
handles because we think that if we could manipulate the cause in the right
way, there would be an associated change in the effect. Woodward writes:
Interventionist accounts take as their point of departure the idea
that causes are potentially means for manipulating their effects:
if it is possible to manipulate a cause in the right way, there would
be an associated change in its effect (Woodward, 2007, p. 20).
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Basically, Woodward suggests that causes can be thought of as (i) practi-
cal handles, where overtly doing A effects B, and (ii) potential (or hypothet-
ical) handles, because if it were possible to manipulate A in the right way,
we could effect B. Potential handles represent causes that cannot be overtly
manipulated. Yet, they are still considered handles because we know that,
via interventionism, if we were to manipulate A in the right way, we could
control B.
Potential handles provide us with hypothetical control—if I could do A,
I could control B because they rely on mental agency. When we learn that A
causes B relative to V, we reason that if we did A, we would control B. For
example, given the model of the tides that was specified above, an interven-
tionist would come to regard the moon as a handle to the tides on Earth. It
is true that we cannot overtly manipulate the moon and that we do not have
practical control over the tides on Earth. However, an interventionist will
reason that if we did bring about A, alter the position of the moon relative
to Earth, then we could control B, the tides on Earth. Interventionism thus
agrees with Collingwood’s practical notion of causes as handles and with
Collingwood’s idea of control. The significant difference is that intervention-
ism explicitly extends the idea of control to potential handles by utilising
mental agency.
Although I will introduce my specific argument regarding the problem
of scope in a later chapter (Chapter 8), we can note here that once we in-
troduce and apply the notion of mental agency into an agency approach,
we can potentially locate a solution to the problem of scope. Indeed, by
highlighting the similarities with Collingwood’s practical idea of causation
and arguing that Woodward’s account relies on agency—and thus that in-
terventionism should be considered an agency approach to causation—I am
suggesting that the agency approach can successfully overcome the problem
of scope by extending the causal relation to include events that do not or
cannot rely on overt actions but which do rely on mental actions.
This chapter has shown that the agency approach is not untoward (as a
manipulation approach) simply because it is anthropocentric or because it
makes an essential use of agency. Indeed, all of the manipulation accounts










In this chapter, I want to bring together the work that has been done thus
far and outline a viable agency approach to causation. The position that
I defend is called Causal Interactionism. My argument is that any viable
approach to causation must make a reference to agency because causation
involves an interaction between human agents and the world.1
We have learned that manipulationists like Woodward and Price agree
with Collingwood that causes are handles and that causation is best under-
stood from a particular point of view. The point of view in question is often
taken to be that of a purposeful agent—an agent with some particular end
or goal. Still, the connection between causation and agency is ambiguous.
Does agency create causation? Does agency track causation? Or, is causation
somehow comprised of agency?
This chapter is an attempt to clarify a position regarding the relationship
between causation and agency. My position is that causation is constituted
by agency; I say that causation should be understood as an interaction be-
tween human agents and the physical world. Causal Interactionism is the
idea that the causal relation is something that emerges from the interaction
1By ‘world,’ I mean something like the physical environment, or what Collingwood
called ‘nature.’ I take it that Collingwood was correct when he says ‘that which is caused
is an event in nature, but the word cause still expresses an idea relative to human conduct’
(1940, p. 296). I interpret Collingwood as saying that causation involves an interaction
between the world—something in nature—and human agency. For stylistic purposes, I
will sometimes refer to the world as the physical world or the physical environment.
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of human agents with the physical world.
I seek to address the following questions: given that there is a relationship
between causation and agency, how we should understand the relationship?
What does the relationship between causation and agency amount to? What
are its consequences?
My hope is that by bringing clarity to these issues, I can show that the
agency approach can avoid an extreme position. Recall that one of the biggest
problems with the agency approach (see chapter 3) is that it appears to result
in an extreme and untoward metaphysics; if causation relies on agency, then
we cannot make sense of causal claims (in this world or any other) where
agency does not exist.
The common supposition is that the agency approach is extreme or un-
toward because it flies in the face of any respectable science (one wants to
say, ‘of course there’s causation without agency!’). My thesis is that Causal
Interactionism can avoid an extreme metaphysics. I will show that, by tak-
ing science, viz., physics, seriously, we come to see that there is no such
thing as agent-independent causation. The resulting position is a form of
non-realism, where ‘realism’ can be taken as the claim that the objects and
theories of scientific enquiry exist in such a way that they are mind- and
agent-independent2 (Part 2 of my project was used to defend the idea that
causation is not mind- and agent-independent). I will argue that the re-
sulting position avoids untoward consequences by motivating the idea that
causation is comprised—not created—by human agency. It may be the case
that those with strong intuitions for causal realism disagree with or reject
such a position. While I hope that those with such intuitions will be open
to my arguments and possibly troubled by what I have to say, they will not
be able to reject Causal Interactionism because it amounts to an extreme or
2Non-realism can be broadly construed as the denial of specific existence claims, for
example, the denial that witches exist or as the denial of specific independence claims,
for example, the denial that colours exist independently of observers. The non-realism
that I advocate primarily concerns independence. To explain, consider again the analogy
with colours. Most philosophers, I imagine, would not deny the existence of colours.
Non-realism about colours usually takes the form of rejecting the independence of colour
properties. That is to say, most of us would deny that colours exist in the world in such
a way that they are independent of something like a visual system. The non-realism I
support about causation is meant to work in the same way. I do not deny that the objects
or physical mechanisms which make up certain causal relationships, say the moon, gravity,
and the tides on earth, exist. Rather, what I deny is that causal relationships exist in such
a way that they can be described as agent-independent.
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untoward metaphysics.
This chapter will be structured around three questions:
1. How do agents interact with the world via causal models?
2. What is my theory of Causal Interactionism?
3. What are the metaphysical implications of Causal Interactionism?
This chapter will be laid out as follows. In §2, I will defend the idea that
causal modelling involves agency and that human agents can interact with
the world via causal models.
In §3, I will introduce my theory of Causal Interactionism. I will note
important similarities between Causal Interactionism and traditional agency
theories like Price (1993, 2007) and Collingwood (1940) as well as other
manipulation approaches such as Woodward (2003, 2007). I will also note
where Causal Interactionism differs from both traditional agency theories and
Woodward’s manipulationist approach. By defending the idea that causation
involves an interaction between human agents and the physical world, and
by extending the notion of agency to include mental actions, my argument is
that Causal Interactionism is the most plausible interpretation of the agency
approach to causation.
I will end in §4 by offering some motivational support for the agency ap-
proach by considering the metaphysical implications of Causal Interaction-
ism. By contrasting Causal Interactionism with Price, who explicitly denies
any benefits of a discussion or analysis regarding the metaphysical implica-
tions of the agency approach (and thus does not provide any such discussion),
I will argue for a metaphysical picture that is not only consistent with the
claims made by Causal Interactionism, but it is one that can help mitigate
worries regarding the agency approach to causation. In the following chapter,
I will further investigate the prospects for Causal Interactionism.
7.2 How do Human Agents Interact with the
World via Causal Models?
In chapter 6§4, I suggested a link between causal modelling and mental
agency. In this section, I want to explore that relationship in more detail
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and explain how causal modelling involves mental agency. I will also show
how causal modelling allows us to interact with the world.
In a sense, my arguments rely on the idea that there are multiple ways
for agents to interact with the world. We can interact with the world by
acting overtly, by doing φ in ω* where φ is an intentional bodily movement
and ω* is the actual world. We can explain the subsequent interaction as a
man named Jon doing φ(ω*) and resulting in ψ(ω*)—Jon’s throwing the ball
caused the window to break. However, we can also interact with the world
via causal models ω where ω represents something like what Pearl called the
world in the model. We manipulate causal models by doing φ(ω), carrying
out an experimental manipulation within the model. The manipulation of
the model allows us to reason about the effects of φ(ω*). We can explain the
subsequent interaction as a women named Mary doing φ(ω) and resulting
in ψ(ω). Or, (note the hypothetical reasoning) if Mary could do φ(ω*), it
would result in ψ(ω*). For example, Mary’s manipulation of the distance
between the earth and the moon (within the model) led to a difference to
the tides on earth; if Mary could alter the distance between the earth and
the moon, she could affect the tides.
Recall from chapter 2 that Pearl argues that we can gain knowledge about
causation by causal modelling (I listed three basic ideas to Pearl’s approach
in chapter 2§5). But how can we apply the notion of agency and interaction
to causal models? The answer partially depends on what kind of model
is being used. There are many kinds of models. For simplicity, we can
distinguish between two kinds of models: physical models and non-physical
models. Physical models are called material models; non-physical models
are called abstract models. Unlike physical models, which are constructed as
physical objects, abstract models are built using mathematical equations.3
It is easy to understand how scientists can interact with the world via
material models. Material models such as Watson and Crick’s structural
3Abstract models are sometimes thought of as stories (Hartmann, 1999), fictions (Frigg
2010; Fine, 1993; Godfrey-Smith, 2009, 2006), or abstract objects (Giere, 1988) that con-
tain a deliberate simplification of some complicated phenomena, with the goal of making it
more tractable. Abstract models allow us to strip away, in our imagination, the properties
of concrete objects that we find irrelevant. Abstract models may also contain deliberate
distortions. Isolated systems, frictionless planes, and perfectly rational agents are some
well-known examples. While the debate over how to classify abstract models is ongoing, a
proponent of Causal Interactionism need not be wedded to the idea that abstract models
are mathematical objects or stories or even fictions. All that matters for Causal Interac-
tionism is that there is a sensible link between abstract models, agency, and interaction.
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model of DNA or a scale model of an aeroplane can be overtly manipulated
because they are physical objects. However, it is less clear how human agents
can interact with the world via non-physical objects such as abstract models.
As an illustration of how human agents can interact with the world through
abstract models, consider Volterra’s predator and prey model.
To understand why certain types of fish populations had been reduced in
the Adriatic Sea during the light fishing of World War I, Volterra created a
mathematical model representing a simple environment of two populations
of fish, one predator population and one prey population. The predator
and prey model was composed of two differential equations. These equations
included variables for the size of the prey population V, the size of the preda-
tor population P, and the intrinsic growth rate r and death rate m for both
predator and prey populations (Weisberg, 2007).
By experimenting with the model, Volterra was able to (hypothetically)
manipulate the fish in the Adriatic Sea. He was able to do this by changing
the values of r and m. The changes inside the model were meant to rep-
resent variations in the target environment, i.e., the actual fish populations
in the Adriatic Sea. Volterra was able to represent real world conditions,
e.g., heavy fishing, by making changes to r and m inside the model; when
Volterra increased the value of r, he was (hypothetically) manipulating the
growth rate of the fish population by changing the level of fishing in the
Adriatic Sea. Significantly, by manipulating the level of fishing in the model
environment, Volterra was able to discover the effects of these changes. It
just so happened that when Volterra increased the amount of fishing, he
discovered corresponding changes to both V and P. Through the manipu-
lations that were made inside the model, Volterra was subsequently able to
gain insight into how light fishing may have affected the fish population in
the Adriatic Sea.
Although Volterra’s manipulations were hypothetical, his strategy cap-
tures what Woodward considers to be the intuitive core of the manipulation
approach. Woodward says that ‘A causes B if and only if B would change
if an appropriate manipulation were to be carried out.’ (Woodward, 2013 p.
13, original emphasis).
Thus, causal modelling allows us to reason about the world (e.g., the moon
and the earth’s tides or fish populations in the Adriatic Sea) via hypothetical
manipulations. Performing interventions inside causal models allow us to
say, ‘if X were to be changed by an intervention to such and such a value,
the value of Y would change’. From this, we reason that, had we overtly
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changed X, the change would effect Y . Woodward’s argument is that this
type of counterfactual reasoning is both necessary and sufficient for capturing
causal relationships. The implicit suggestion is that human agents do not
have to (overtly) perform manipulations to gain a knowledge of causation—it
is sufficient for us to reason about hypothetical manipulations.
So, we can understand how scientists utilise the concept of agency and
how they interact with the world by manipulating abstract models (I state
why this amounts to an interaction with the world below). By thinking about
mental agency, we can say that human agents interact with the world via
causal modelling by manipulating something within the model and reasoning
about the effects of the manipulation in the actual world.
7.3 My Theory of Causal Interactionism
Causal Interactionism develops the claim that the causal relation can be
analysed in terms of a particular interaction between human agents and the
world.
In essence, Causal Interactionism says that causation is something that
exists iff agents interact with the physical world (admittedly, this will initially
sound vague, but I will clarify this particular point as we move ahead). In any
case where we say that A causes B, A will involve manipulation and human
agency and B will involve a reaction of some kind—something that happens
in the physical environment (i.e., something the world communicates to us
in response to A). We can think of the interaction like this: If X is a human
agent and Y is the world, when X and Y interact, X is doing something to
influence Y, and Y is doing something that influences X (when Y influences
X, it is typically in terms of information and understanding).
Allow me to demonstrate this concept using two examples. When we
say that throwing the rock caused the window to break, A, throwing the rock,
involves human agency. B, the window breaking, is something that happens
in the world as a result of A. In regards to the interaction, we could say that
the agent did A and the world does B.
Now consider the example of the extinction of the dinosaurs. We say
that the dinosaurs went extinct (B) because a large asteroid slammed into
the earth near the Mexican Peninsula (A). We think that had we prevented
the meteorite from hitting the earth, we could have prevented the extinction.
When we reason about preventing A (bringing about ¬A, say by going back
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in time and blowing up the asteroid when it was a million miles away from
Earth), the world reacts by doing (¬B), that is, the world reacts by having
dinosaurs extant or still in existence. In regards to the interaction, we could
say that, had I brought about ¬A, the world would bring about ¬B4.
To better understand Causal Interactionism, consider below how the the-
ory relates to, and ultimately differs from, other manipulation approaches.
7.3.1 How does Causal Interactionism Relate to Other
Manipulation Approaches?
Causal Interactionism is similar to what Collingwood says about the practical
idea of causation. In the practical sense, a cause is something that exists
in nature but is relative to human agency. I agree with Collingwood that a
cause is something that exists in nature and that a cause is relative to human
agency. What I would add, following Causal Interactionism, is that because
the cause A is something in nature, and because it is relative to agency,
the first part of the “interaction” between agents and the world involves our
manipulation of the world. The second part of the “interaction” involves the
world’s “reaction” to our manipulation, which is B. B is something that
happens in the world as a result of A. Sometimes A is an activity, such
as ‘throwing a rock’ caused B; sometimes it is a thing or situation—had
we manipulated A, we could have produced or prevented B. Significantly,
the interaction between the world and human agents can help to explain
the relationship between causation and agency. What Causal Interactionism
shows, in line with Collingwood’s philosophy, is that causation is comprised
of agency. Causation involves agency, but it also involves the world.
Causal Interactionism is analogous to Menzies’ and Price’s (1993) idea
that causation is a secondary quality. One could say that causation, like
colour, emerges from a particular interaction. Like colour, which emerges
from the interaction between the human visual system and light, causation
is something that emerges from the interaction between human agents and
the physical world.
Causal Interactionism is also analogous to Price’s idea that causation
is perspectival. As I argued in chapter 4, causation (the causal relation)
is relative to a frame of reference. The frame in question for Price is the
‘agent’s perspective,’ where the agent’s perspective takes into account the
4Of course, it could be the case that the dinosaurs went extinct for another reason.
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directionality of causation by taking into account something about our epis-
temic makeup, viz., how we deliberate (I will discuss the relationship between
Causal Interactionism and frame-working below).
Causal Interactionism, too, can make sense of the directionality of cau-
sation. Bearing in mind the standard concept of agency, we can capture the
asymmetry of causation by focusing on the ‘Why’ question. Intentional ac-
tions, and thus agency, assumes directionality. The concept of agency entails
that agents act for reasons, and that reasons stand in place of a means-end
utility function. The utility function can be captured by the words because
or so that I could..., where these words specifically reference future oriented
goals. What Causal Interactionism would add, is that the goal in question
can be practical (as in, tangible, e.g., bringing something about) or theoret-
ical (as in, understanding what would happen if I were to φ).
Causal Interactionism corresponds to interventionism in that it says the
causal relation can be captured by reasoning about the effects of manipula-
tions within a causal model. Like Woodward (2003), Causal Interactionism
says that we can capture causation by focusing on causal models. When
we carry out an experimental manipulation within a causal model, we en-
able hypothetical reasoning. This type of reasoning allows us to understand
‘what would be different,’ as Woodward says, or, as Causal Interactionism
says, what would happen if we were to bring something about.
Causal Interactionism is similar to all of the manipulation approaches
that we have considered, i.e., those of Collingwood, Price, and Woodward,
in that causation can be labelled as relatively objective. Indeed, one of the
benefits of Causal Interactionism is that it can make the relative objectivity of
causation quite clear. Consider again the analogy with colour. When we say
that colour is objective, for example, given that we take into consideration
the (normal functioning) human visual system, it is abundantly clear how
colour is relatively objective. Colour is relative in the sense that the concept
applies to a particular frame of reference, viz., the human visual system. It is
objective in the sense that we can make factual (true or false) claims about
colour given the appropriate frame. In chapter 4, the apple on page 72 was,
in fact, red. To say that it was green or blue would be false.
Causal Interactionism can similarly demonstrate how relative objectivity
applies to causation. Because the causal relation results from an interaction
between human agents and the physical world, what causes what will be an
objective fact about the world given that we take into consideration certain
facts about human agency (viz., our interaction with the world). It was
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unclear in the last chapter what to make of facts about human agency and
thus the appropriate frame of reference. For example, the frame of reference
for Collingwood was what agents could produce or prevent. This sometimes
specified individual agents, based on their expertise, and other times human
agents in general. The frame of reference for Price was human agents in
general. Also, the frame of reference for Woodward was causal models.
Given the picture of relative objectivity presented in chapter 4, so-called
facts about causation could vary depending on which theory one looked at
and ultimately with the frame of reference that was being used. For Colling-
wood, the curvature of the road, the design of the car, and the speed of
the vehicle all come out as possible causes of the car accident. However,
the objective facts about the cause of the accident will change depending
on who you ask. For (qualified) surveyors, the cause is the curvature of the
road; for the driver, the cause is speeding, etc. One potential advantage to
Woodward’s theory, as we saw, is that interventionism can take into account
a wider frame of reference. For example, by modelling the car accident, an
investigator could manipulate multiple variables, e.g., the road, the car, and
the driver, and determine objective facts about causation without relying
on individual point of views. Given a model of the crash, we might discover
that, given the curvature of the road, any car moving faster than 70 mph will
not make the turn and will crash into the hill. Thus, if we discover that the
car was travelling at 75 mph when it attempted to make the curve, we could
say that the car crashed due to the curvature of the road and the speed of the
vehicle. One individual may think differently, as Collingwood suggests, but
the italicised statement is the objective fact of the matter.
Because Causal Interactionism extends the concept of agency to include
hypothetical action, Causal Interactionism can make use of the widest possi-
ble frame of reference (or ‘point of view, as it were), which is sometimes causal
models (that include as many variables as we find interesting or relevant)5.
However, according to Causal Interactionism, we can say that causation is
relative because what causes what is relative to interaction (i.e., how human
agents interact with the world). According to Causal Interactionism, how hu-
man agents interact with the world varies (as we will see in more detail in the
5I say that Causal Interactionism can make use of the widest possible frame of reference,
but I do not mean to imply that Causal Interactionism states that frames will not vary or
that frames will always be as wide as possible. The frame of reference will vary for Causal
Interactionism, the point worth noting is just that Causal Interactionism can make use of
causal models, which potentially represents a wide frame of reference.
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next chapter), and thus the frame of reference grounding (relative) objectiv-
ity will also vary. In cases where we can utilise causal modelling, the causal
model will represent the objective facts about the causal relation. However,
in cases where we are not utilising causal models (like Collingwood’s idea of
individuals reasoning about the cause of the car crash), we can still make
objective claims about the causal relation, although the objectivity of the
causal claims may be somewhat limited.6
The benefit of Causal Interactionism is that it can explain how frames
of reference vary by noting variations in interactions. While Causal Inter-
actionism can accommodate hypothetical agency and causal modelling, this
accommodation does not indicate, nor should it, that Causal Interaction-
ism represents a normative agency approach to causation, where the causal
relation is said to be objective or discoverable merely from the perspective
of causal models. Rather, as we will see in the next chapter, the benefit
of Causal Interactionism is that it can explain what is happening or what
the differences are when we look at causation from competing or contrasting
reference frames. Causal Interactionism can accommodate causal modelling,
which potentially represents a uniquely broad frame of reference; but, in
other cases where causal claims do not rely on causal modelling in a techni-
cal sense, Causal Interactionism can also accommodate and explain what is
happening. In the example of the car crash, it is not incorrect to think that
different agents will obtain contrasting ideas about about the causal relation
based on what they understand and ultimately how they model the crash (in
other words, how they interact with the world). Even so, Causal Interaction-
ism has the tools to model the crash using a broader frame of reference, as
an investigator might do according to Woodward (2003).
7.3.2 How Does Causal Interactionism Differ From Other
Manipulation Approaches?
Perhaps the most significant difference between Causal Interactionism and
other manipulation approaches to causation is that Causal Interactionism
6If you recall the idea of objectivity in the modern sense according to Daston and
Galison (objectivity as ‘trained judgment’), something could be more or less objective
because it was a matter of degree. This idea fits nicely with Causal Interactionism. The
driver may make an objective claim about a causal relationship given his interaction with
the world, but it may be less objective than the claim made by an investigator utilising a
causal model.
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clearly shows how agency is related to causation. However, there are more
subtle variations between the theories, which I will now discuss.
Causal Interactionism is different from Collingwood’s practical sense of
causation in two ways. The first, which is a matter of clarification, is
that Causal Interactionism can explain cases like the automobile accident.
Collingwood fails to explain the distinction between cases like the accident,
which relies on hypothetical agency and hypothetical control, and how this
differs from cases where we rely on the notion of overt agency and practical
control. Collingwood’s theory allows for hypothetical agency in that the sur-
veyor, the driver, and the manufacturer are all seen as reasoning about the
effects of certain manipulations. Causal Interactionism differs from Colling-
wood in that Causal Interactionism makes clear what is going on in these
cases, e.g., we learn that they involve hypothetical agency and the notion of
hypothetical control.
The second way that Causal Interactionism is different from Colling-
wood’s approach is that Causal Interactionism can extend hypothetical rea-
soning to impossible human actions. For example, if we included the incline
of the hill into a causal model, we could determine that the hill was a con-
tributing cause to the car’s failure to advance, despite the possibility that we
are unable to overtly manipulate the incline of the hill. Thus, Causal Inter-
actionism can extend Collingwood’s practical idea of causation to situations
where objects or events are outside of the practical control of human agents.
We say that the gravitational effect of the moon on the earth’s oceans cause
the tides because we know, given certain information regarding Newton’s law
of gravitation, that if we manipulated the moon in the right way, we could
effect the tides. It is true, of course, that we cannot overtly manipulate the
moon in such a way that would effect the tides. But, we know via causal
modelling (including certain variables like the mass of the moon and the
movements of tides on Earth into a model) and hypothetical agency (rea-
soning about the effects of manipulations within the model) that if we could
manipulate the moon in the right way, the tides would change. Other cases
might include ‘the lightning caused the field to catch fire’ and ‘the movements
of the continental plates caused the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake’.
Causal Interactionism differs from Woodward’s theory of intervention-
ism in that Causal Interactionism explicitly involves human agency (in the
overt sense and that extended sense which includes hypothetical agency).
As we have seen, Woodward has continually denied that interventionism in-
volves agency. In an important way, Causal Interactionism can clarify what
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Woodward means by this. Essentially, what Woodward denies is that inter-
ventionism involves (or relies on) overt agency. However, as I have made
clear (in chapter 6 and here), interventionism does depend on the concept
of agency, viz., hypothetical agency. So, Causal Interactionism differs from
interventionism in that Causal Interactionism recognises interventionism as
an agency approach to causation.
Regarding Price’s agency theory, Causal Interactionism differs primarily
in terms of clarification. Unlike Price, Causal Interactionism removes ambi-
guity regarding the notion of agency. According to Causal Interactionism,
‘agency’ means both overt and hypothetical agency. Causal Interactionism
also clarifies the relationship between causation and agency. Causal Interac-
tionism says that causation results from an interaction; Causal Interactionism
shows that causation is comprised of agency; and Causal Interactionism il-
lustrates how to conceptualise cases of causation that do not involve overt,
or even possibly overt, human actions. As I will show in the next chapter,
Causal Interactionism also has a clear solution to the problem of scope and
a clear explanation for the so-called experience of agency, which Price and
other agency theorists (e.g., von Wright and Gasking) rely on to defend the
idea that causation is linked with human agency. As this represents a signif-
icant prospect for Causal Interactionism, it will be discussed in more detail
in the following chapter.
However, Causal Interactionism is quite different from what Menzies and
Price say about the causal relation. The causal relation for Menzies and Price
is explicitly defined as a means-end relationship. For instance, Menzies and
Price claim that A causes B means that human agents can bring about B by
bringing about A. This definition has led opponents of the agency approach
to worry that a causal relationship is somehow created by overtly doing A—
a causal relationship is created by an occurrence of overt human agency.
For example, Woodward seems to interpret Menzies and Prices as claiming
that agency creates the causal relation when he says that their definition
of cause makes agency a magical quality—‘according to which our ability
to manipulate X somehow makes it the case that a means-end connection
comes into existence between X and Y ’ (Woodward, 2003, p. 120). In other
words, Woodward takes Menzies and Price to mean that a causal relationship
“exists” only in conjunction with overt action (Woodward could argue that a
similar problem arises for Causal Interactionism. Indeed, I say that causation
only “exists” if human agents interact with the world. But there is nothing
untoward or magical about this. Indeed, Causal Interactionism is very clear
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that while causation is constituted by agency—human agency makes up part
of the interaction that gets us to causation—but agency is not the whole
story. Causation also involves the world).
As I discussed in chapter 4, Price (2017) has pointed out that Wood-
ward’s theory of interventionism seems to imply that agency tracks a kind
of mind-independent causation. The idea is that causation (whatever it is)
really exists, it exists in such a way that it is mind-, agent-independent, and
that, as agents, we learn to track real causal relationships (perhaps through
some form of behaviourism). The problem with suggesting that causation
is mind-independent is that it leaves manipulationists, who support a form
of relativism and a kind of subjectivity regarding causation, open to the
worry that they make causation unduly relativistic and subjective (recall the
worries raised by Strevens).
So, contrary to Menzies and Price, we shouldn’t imply that we have to
do A in the overt sense and that our action somehow brings about B. Nor
should we suggest, perhaps in some sense like Woodward, that human manip-
ulation tracks mind-independent causal relationships. Rather, according to
Causal Interactionism, we should say that we manipulate A, either overtly or
hypothetically, and that B is something that happens in the physical world.
In other words, we should say, much like Collingwood, that causation is com-
prised (i.e., constitutive) of agency. Given these various interpretations and
suggestions, the landscape looks like Table 7.1:
Table 7.1: Relationship Between Agency and Causation




7.4 The Metaphysics of Causal Interaction-
ism
One further difference between Price’s agency theory and Causal Interaction-
ism has to do with metaphysics. One of the biggest challenges with under-
standing Price’s theory relates to his claim that causation is anthropocentric
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alongside his claim that the agency theory should be seen as metaphysically
quiet. In other words, following Price’s approach, it is difficult to under-
stand why agency is so important to causation. Price, of course, argues that
causation is pragmatically anthropocentric. But, to my point, the idea that
causation is pragmatically anthropocentric, i.e., that causation is practically
useful to us as agents, perhaps in terms of effective strategies, is not some-
thing most philosophers would deny. Nor, more importantly, has it been
something so compelling that it leads large crowds to support the agency
approach.
What the agency approach to causation needs, I think, is a stronger claim,
that is, a claim based on compelling evidence to motivate and support the
idea that causation is comprised of agency. Consider the following possibility.
I say that causation is the result of an interaction between human agents
and the physical world. Causal Interactionism implies that causation is con-
tingent on human interaction. I said earlier that the first part of the interac-
tion involves human agency. So, Causal Interactionism states that causation
exists iff there is agency. Thus, Causal Interactionism offers compelling mo-
tivation for the claim that agency is necessary for understanding causation.
Price, who recognises the contingent nature of causation (Price, 1993, 2007,
2017), argues that the metaphysical meat—represented by such words as
exists—should be kept off the bone.
Keeping with my own predilections...I think [we should] explicitly
disavow that the project of the agency theory should be seen as
metaphysics in the first place. Rather it should be seen as what
I have sometimes called philosophical anthropology: the task of
explaining why creatures in our situation come to speak and think
in certain ways—in this case, in ways that involve causal concepts.
I think this is one of a range of philosophically interesting cases in
which the useful questions turn out to be questions about human
thought and language, not questions about other aspects of the
world (such as the nature of causation). (Price 2017, p. 76)
I agree with Price that the agency approach to causation is well placed to
answer all sorts of anthropological questions (e.g., why human agents come
to think and speak in causal terms, why human agents need the notion of
cause). But, I disagree with Price that the agency approach has nothing
interesting to say about metaphysics or the nature of causation. In fact, the
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agency approach that I prefer, Causal Interactionism, benefits from saying
something about the nature of causation—namely, following Russell (1913)
and arguments made against Ney in chapter 5, that the nature of causation
is not physical. The nature of causation is not physical because causation is
agent-dependent.
The metaphysical claim that causation is not physical puts us in the
appropriate context to investigate the essential features of causation that
are anthropocentric. In other words, once we understand that fundamental
physical theories cannot capture the nature of causation on their own (as
I have argued), it becomes easier to appreciate the fact that causation has
something to do with us as agents—a fact that provides the agency approach
with much-needed motivation.
As an example, imagine two possible worlds: (i) an autonomous world in
which agents are unable to intervene and (ii) a world exactly like our own
but with no human agents.
What could we say about causation in world (i)? It might be argued that
the causal relation is agent-independent because we cannot apply the notion
of manipulation or intervention. What happens in this world is simply a mat-
ter of mechanics, or a way the system functions independently of any human
agent. There are two things to note about this world. One, when we apply
our notion of causation to this world—a notion that involves manipulation
and intervention—then we can say that there is causation in this world. For
example, we could say that, if we could intervene in world (i), then we could
alter the system. This would, of course, amount to changing the metaphysics
of the system, i.e., it would no longer be an autonomous world. So, in one
sense, we can say that there is causation in world (i) but that it is no longer
autonomous; when we project an agent or agent-based reasoning onto world
(i), we enable causal reasoning but alter the metaphysics of the system. Sec-
ond, keeping in line with the definition of Causal Interactionism, we could
say that if we stick to the metaphysics of the original system, that is, if we
keep world (i) autonomous, then there is a sense in which there is no cau-
sation in this world. In this world, we could say that ‘everything influences
everything’ (e.g., what happens in one place effects everything else to some
degree) or that the system is self sufficient and just keeps on running. But,
we could not say that there is causation in this world because, technically
speaking, there are no human agents, and thus there is no frameworking and
no way for us to speak about manipulation, difference making, or “the” cause
of a particular event. In other words, we could not speak about causation as
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we usually do.
The same applies to world (ii), that is, the world with no agents. One
may contest and say, ‘so what happens in world (ii) when a tree falls in the
woods and kills a squirrel? Are we really going to claim that the tree was not
somehow causally responsible for the squirrel’s death? In reply, I would say,
‘yes, of course we could say that the tree caused the squirrel’s death.’ But,
when we reason about the cause of the squirrel’s death, we are projecting
agent-based reasoning into world (ii), and again we are left claiming that
there is causation in this world by changing its metaphysics, i.e., we apply
our concept of cause onto the world with no agents, thereby making it a world
with at least one agent, e.g., the agent doing the reasoning. However, if we
stick to the original metaphysics, we could not claim that the tree caused
the squirrel’s death or that anything causes anything else. Again, this is
because, without agent-based reasoning, we do not allow for frameworking,
manipulation, intervention, or difference making, and it does not make sense
to apply our notion of cause into this particular world. In the world with
no agents, things may and probably do happen, just as they do in world (i).
But, to the point of Russell’s localisation argument (1913), in a world with
bare physical facts—a world where the only ingredient so to speak is physical
facts—there is no way to apply the standard notion of cause. To do so, we
would need a second ingredient, human agency.
So, what Causal Interactionism reveals in these two examples is that if
we are being technically consistent, that is, if we are sticking to world (i) and
world (ii)’s metaphysics, there is a sense in which we can say there is no
causation in worlds without agents.
My argument is that the agency approach needs a stronger metaphysical
claim. But, what if my claim that there is no causation without agency is
too strong? It is indeed a strong claim, but all that matters for the agency
approach is whether or not it is consistent. I claim that it is. Consider
an analogy with colour. Imagine a world exactly like our own, except that
every creature in this world is blind or there is no creature with a visual
system. In this world, there is one ingredient for colour, viz., physical light.
But, without a visual system, there is no sensible way that we can speak
about colour. As with causation, we could apply our standard concept of
colour to this world and say, ‘of course, if the world is exactly like our own,
there is green grass and red leaves’. But, as I have already explained, this
simply amounts to changing the metaphysics of the original world. In the
original world (according to its metaphysics), there is no colour. There is the
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potential for colour, i.e., there is physical light, but there cannot be colour
itself without a second ingredient, a visual system to process physical light
into distinct colours.
The argument regarding colour is meant to be equivalent to my argument
regarding causation. Technically speaking, in a world with no agents, there
is no causation because it lacks the requisite ingredients—physical facts and
agency. Worlds without agents have the potential for causation, there are
physical facts, but there cannot be causation itself without a second ingredi-
ent, agency or agent-based reasoning.
Intuitively, we do want to say that worlds just like our own but with
no agents or with no sighted creatures have causes and colours. I agree
with the intuition. Yet, if we look closely enough at what’s really going
on in these cases, for example, we investigate some of the assumptions we
are relying on when we say that worlds like our own yet with no sighted
creatures have colours, we do come to see that we are simply projecting our
own experience onto these worlds and then assuming, via the projection, that
there are colours.
Perhaps it is more difficult to accept the argument regarding causation.
Allow me to make one final point. Perhaps you disagree with my claim that it
would be nonsensical to say that the tree was not the cause of the squirrel’s
death. Fair enough. But ask yourself why you think the tree has to be
the cause. Likely, you’re assuming that the tree is the thing we could have
manipulated to prevent the animal from dying—it was the tree that made
a difference. Yet, we know that in the world with no agents the concept of
manipulation does not apply. So we cannot say that the tree is the cause
because it is the thing that would allow us to prevent the squirrel’s death.
Perhaps the cause is some general event which ultimately led to the tree fall.
It may be that there was a storm and lightning hit the tree and that’s why it
fell over, killing the squirrel. For the same reason, this doesn’t work either,
but also because the storm-event cannot be the cause because our notion of
‘event’ similarly doesn’t apply to this world. You may see where this is going.
The last thing we might say is that everything within light-distance to the
fallen tree is the cause. Perhaps this does come out as the proximate “cause”
of the squirrel’s death (and likewise some kind of “cause” to movements in
world [i]). My argument has been that if it is, it is nothing like what we
would ordinarily call ‘a cause’. And thus, there is a real sense in which there






In this final chapter, I want to highlight the leading prospects for Causal
Interactionism. These include the following:
1. Overcoming the problem of scope.
2. Clarifying “the experience of agency.”
3. Explaining causal variation and ascription.
Agency theorists are well aware of the problem of scope. Indeed, there
have been numerous attempts to overcome it. In §2, I will highlight the
various efforts to overcome the problem of scope and some of the challenges
associated with them. I will focus on what I consider to be the main issue
for the agency theorist. The issue is how to extend causation beyond our
capacity for manipulation while remaining consistent. In essence, the agency
theorist must do two things. First, they must show how to extend causation
to events or objects that lack a clear connection with human agency. Second,
they must explain how the extended cases involve agency. In other words, a
satisfactory solution to the problem of scope must extend causation to cases
that seemingly lack human agency while also showing that these cases do
involve agency. I will argue that agency theorists have been unsuccessful.
Following the work of the previous chapter, I will offer a unique solution
154
to the problem of scope, which I claim is sufficient for solving both issues.
Following Causal Interactionism, I will show how to extend causation to
events or objects that lack a clear connection with human agency, and I will
show how these cases involve agency.
In §3, I will pick up a related problem regarding the issue of scope as
it relates to our experience as agents—or what Gasking and Price call ‘the
experience of agency’. There are two issues at stake regarding the matter
of scope as it relates to the experience of agency. First, perhaps the most
critical, is that all human agents lack the experience of manipulating the
properties of certain objects or events that we know to be causal, e.g., the
mass and movement of large bodies, the weather, and the continental plates.
Second, different agents will lack comparable experience. The lack of com-
parable experience entails that different agents, depending on their unique
experience, will have conflicting ideas about the causal relation. The easi-
est way to understand this problem is by relating it to a problem we have
already seen. I have already noted that one of the biggest problems with
Collingwood’s practical account of causation is that causation depends on
what an agent can produce or prevent. Agents with different capacities for
producing and preventing will disagree about the cause of an event (recall
the automobile accident). We can say the same thing about the experience
of agency. Agents with different experiences will disagree about the cause of
an event. Following Causal Interactionism, I will offer an interpretation of
the ‘experience of agency’, I will argue that this interpretation is the most
plausible, and I will explain how it avoids the issue of scope.
Lastly, in §4, I will pick up the issue regarding difference-making theories
and what we call a cause. As I mentioned in the previous chapter (and
above), agency approaches lead to the idea that causes will vary alongside
certain parameters, e.g., what an agent can produce and prevent, an agent’s
history of manipulation, the agent’s situation, or variable selection within a
causal model. We can say that the cause of an event varies when, given the
same event (E), two agents disagree: one agent determines the cause of (E)
to be P, and another agent determines the cause to be Q. That this is so was
made clear in chapter 4, where I discussed the relativity of causation and
argued that causal relation is relative to a certain frame of reference.
However, in light of what was said about Causal Interactionism in the
previous chapter, this needs further elaboration. One may point out, regard-
ing Causal Interactionism, that a cause is taken to be the thing that, if we
could have produced or prevented it, we could have produced or prevented
155
the effect. This leads to a particular concern. The concern is that there are
too many causes, for there are indeed many things I could produce or prevent
to control some effect and that what we ascribe as a cause is simply arbitrary.
I will situate this concern in terms of difference-making theories because a
similar concern arises for these theories, and there has already been signifi-
cant work on how to explain and resolve the issue. The issue is that we need
a way to distinguish between non-causes, non-significant difference makers,
and significant difference makers. I will argue that the matter has not been
sufficiently explained. For example, Menzies claims that we can resolve the
issue by thinking about context. I believe that Menzies is correct. It helps
to think about causation in terms of context, but thinking about context
does not explain why we make such distinctions (e.g., between non-causes,
insignificant causes, and causes) in the first place. Following Causal Interac-
tionism, I will argue that we can capture the distinction by thinking about
interaction and human agency. In the end, I will show how to overcome the
concern and explain why this is a particular benefit of Causal Interactionism.
8.2 Overcoming the (Analytic) Problem of
Scope
There are two ways that agency theories can lead to the problem of scope.
First, following agency theories such as Collingwood (1940), Gasking (1955),
von Wright (1971), and Price (1993), the problem of scope arises due to the
particular analysis of causation. A cause is something an agent can produce
or prevent (Collingwood), a recipe that involves bodily movement (Gasking),
something an agent manipulates (von Wright), or something an agent can
overtly bring about (Price). An event that one cannot produce, manipulate,
or bring about cannot be considered causal. Second, following Gasking and
Price, the problem of scope arises due to the particular claim that causation
is connected to the experience of agency. What “the experience of agency”
entails is unclear. However, Woodward (2003, 2013) seems to think that
the experience in question relates to an individual agent’s history of manip-
ulation. An agent’s history of manipulation includes the events or objects
that an agent has the experience of overtly bringing about or manipulating.
When an agent has the historical experience of bringing about or manipulat-
ing an object or event, then these experiences make up the events or objects
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that what we are allowed to call causes. In other words, the causal relation
will depend on our history of manipulation. Any event or object that is
not including in the agent’s historical experience of manipulation cannot be
considered causal.
Here are the two ways that agency theories can lead to the problem of
scope:
Analytic problem of scope : the problem of scope arises
because some theory states that a cause is something that an
agent can manipulate M . However, there are many cases where
we say that H is a cause, but M is not applicable to H.
Experiential problem of scope : the problem of scope
arises because some theory states that causation is connected to
our experience as agents. But there will be many cases where the
relevant experience does not extend particularly wide—in relation
to the problem of scope, wide enough to capture the multitude of
known causal relationships.
In this section, I will focus on the problem of scope according to the ana-
lytic problem. In the following section, I will focus on the problem according
to the experiential problem.
Price tries to overcome the problem of scope, which he calls the issue
of ‘unmanipulable causes,’ by ‘weakening’ the agency theory to allow for a
particular kind of reasoning. Price argues that we can reason by analogy from
the ‘intrinsic features’ of two events and overcome the problem of scope. The
idea seems to be that we can extend the agency theory—A causes B iff I can
bring about B by bringing about A—by analogy. We can reason, by analogy,
between events that we can manipulate and events that are unmanipulable.
The analogical reasoning approach is initially found in Gasking (1955)
and von Wright (1971). Gasking argues that A causes B if manipulating
A allows us to produce or prevent B. Though causation is a ‘recipe’ for
producing and preventing, Gasking acknowledges that we sometimes want to
make a ‘theoretical claim’ about causes that we cannot manipulate. He says
that
One can sometimes properly say of some particular happening, A,
that it caused some other event, B, even when no-one could have
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produced A, by manipulation, as a means of producing B. For
example, one may say that the rise in mean sea-level at a certain
geological epoch was due to the melting of the Polar ice-cap. But
when one can properly say this sort of thing it is always the case
that people can produce events of the first sort as a means to
producing events of the second sort. For example, one can melt
ice in order to raise the water level in a certain area (Gasking,
1955, p. 485).
Following Gasking, we could say the melting of the polar ice caps caused the
mean sea level to rise because we have the similar experience of raising the
water level in a bucket by pouring more water into it.
Likewise, von Wright claims that we can understand the eruption of Vesu-
vius and the destruction of Pompeii in terms of claims about causes that
human beings can manipulate. He uses the example of impacts of falling
stones on human heads. Von Wright notes
The eruption of Vesuvius was the cause of the destruction of Pom-
peii. Man can through his action destroy cities, but he cannot,
we think, make volcanoes erupt. Does this not prove that the
cause-factor is not distinguished from the effect-factor by being
in a certain sense capable of manipulation? The answer is neg-
ative. The eruption of a volcano and the destruction of a city
are two very complex events. Within each of them a number of
events or phases and causal connections between them may be
distinguished. For example, that when a stone from high above
hits a man on his head, it kills him. Or that the roof of a house
will collapse under a given load. Or that a man cannot stand
heat above a certain temperature. All these are causal connec-
tions with which we are familiar from experience and which are
such that the cause-factor typically satisfies the requirement of
manipulability (1971, p. 70).
Note the similarity between Gasking and von Wright’s approach with
Price. Price says that
[I] would argue that when an agent can bring about one event as a
means to bringing about another, this is true in virtue of certain
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basic intrinsic features of the situation involved, these features
being essentially non-causal though not necessarily physical in
character. Accordingly, when we are presented with another sit-
uation involving a pair of events which resembles the given situa-
tion with respect to its intrinsic features, we infer that the pair of
events are causally related even though they may not be manipu-
lable. In its weakened form, the agency account states that a pair
of events are causally related just in case the situation involving
them possesses intrinsic features that either support a means-end
relation between the events as is, or are identical with (or closely
similar to) those of another situation involving an analogous pair
of means-end related events (1993, 204).1
Price’s quote needs some clarification. Price says, following both Gasking
and von Wright, that we can reason about unmanipulable causes by analogy
with causes that can be overtly manipulated. In essence, the problem of
scope and the suggested solution looks like this:
1Hereafter, I will focus on Price’s solution to the problem of scope. I do this for two rea-
sons. First, Gasking, von Wright and Price all attempt to overcome the problem of scope
using the same strategy, viz., analogical reasoning between two events. Second, Price’s
account of analogical reasoning is the most developed, and the most widely discussed in
the literature on causation.
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The Problem
1. The agency theory says that A causes B iff a human agent can overtly
manipulate A.
2. There are many cases where we say that A causes B, and we cannot
overtly manipulate A.
The solution
3. In cases where we say that A causes B and we cannot overtly manipulate
A, we can reason about manipulating A via analogy with Z, where Z
(the cause) can be overtly manipulated and Z (which shares intrinsic
features with A) brings about Y, which resembles B.
Furthermore, Gasking, von Wright, and Price must reason by analogy
from events that can be overtly manipulated to events that cannot so they
can retain the essential feature of the agency theory—that causation in-
volves human agency (which they take to mean ‘overt agency’). To keep the
agency theory consistent, they must show how events or objects that cannot
be overtly manipulated—event A—involves agency. To do this, they must
find a similar event that involves human agency—event Z. When they rea-
son by analogy from Z to A, they can consistently maintain that causation
requires human agency.
Note the similarity between (3) and what Price says, following the quote
above
Clearly, the agency account, so weakened, allows us to make
causal claims about unmanipulable events such as the claim that
the 1989 San Francisco earthquake was caused by friction between
continental plates. We can make such causal claims because we
believe that there is another situation that models the circum-
stances surrounding the earthquake in the essential respects and
does support a means-end relation between an appropriate pair
of events. The paradigm example of such a situation would be
that created by seismologists in their artificial simulations of the
movement of continental plates (p. 205).
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Following 3, the friction between continental plates represents A, an unma-
nipulable cause. The artificial simulations of the movement of continental
plates represents Z.
So, Price thinks we can understand cases like the movement of the conti-
nental plates caused the 1989 San Francisco earthquake because we have the
analogous experience of overtly manipulating a model that shares ‘intrinsic
features’ with the actual event, viz., the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake.
Woodward argues that Price’s solution to the problem of scope fails.
Woodward thinks the idea of ‘intrinsic features’ is inherently vague. He
believes that if we are forced to rely on artificial simulations or small-scale
models to understand causes that cannot be overtly manipulated by human
agents, we may ‘fail to capture their causally relevant features because, for
example, the models fail to ‘scale up” (Woodward, 2003, p. 125).
I agree with Woodward that the notion of ‘intrinsic features’ is vague.
If by ‘intrinsic’ Price means ‘essential’, then we are left trying to find a
strict analogy with the ‘fundamental elements’ that two events, that is, a M
event (an event we can overtly manipulate) and a non-M event (an event
we cannot overtly manipulate), both share. In many cases, this seems overly
demanding. Take the simple case of a grass field catching fire after a lightning
strike. Surely, we have the comparable experience of making things catch
fire, even grass. Farmers can burn down fields by throwing a lit match into
it, which is roughly 600-800◦ (Celsius). Similarly, forest fires occur nearly
every year in California because someone throws a cigarette butt (the tip can
reach 900◦) into dry grass. But, the essential features of lightning are rather
different from those of a match or a cigarette. Lightning is the movement
of electrical charges and technically does not have a temperature. Lightning
causes fires because it heats the air through which it passes. A fire can
occur after a lightning strike because the air through which it travels can
reach temperatures of 28,000◦. Against Price, it is not clear that we can
say ‘lightning caused the field to catch fire’ because we have the comparable
experience of burning grass using a small flame (from a match or a cigarette).
This is because the M event I caused the field to catch fire by throwing a lit
match into it seemingly does not share the fundamental elements of the non-
M event the field caught fire because of lightning. For example, a match or
a cigarette has a direct heat source, i.e., a temperature, whereas lightning
technically does not. Indeed, the significant question arises: how can we tell
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what a good analogy is?2
Price could argue that we have a better analogy—scientists who can recre-
ate the effects of a lightning strike in a laboratory. If scientists artificially
created a lightning bolt that hit a small patch of dry grass (or any com-
bustible material), and the grass caught fire, then we can reason by analogy
between this event and the real-world lightning event. Let us grant that this
is feasible. Even if the relevant M -event exists, a problem remains. The
strict analogy defence entails that we can only speak about lightning causing
fires after scientists were able to create the analogous event in their labora-
tory. Before the analogous event, Price’s theory entails that it would have
been irrational to say that lightning caused the field to catch fire. This seems
untoward. It is likely that we knew, via some other form of reasoning, that
lightning caused fires before the strict analogy that Price is after. Indeed,
the story of Prometheus, c.8th-century BCE, suggests that this is true. In
the Prometheus myth, Prometheus steals fire from Zeus by sneaking into
Zeus’ domain and taking a spark from Zeus’ lightning bolt. It is likely that
after witnessing many fields, forests, homes, and other objects catch fire af-
ter a lightning strike, we reasoned by induction that lightning strikes lead
to fires. In the particular case that the field caught fire after the lightning
strike, we could use abduction (IBE) to explain the fire. Moreover, anyone
today who is unaware of what scientists do in their laboratories would be
deemed irrational in saying that ‘lightning caused the fire’. They cannot
reason by analogy from the appropriate M -event, because the event is un-
known. Neither would anyone who is unaware of what seismologists do in
their laboratory be able to reason that movements in the continental plates
caused the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake.
There is a related problem for Price’s solution to the problem of scope.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, there are cases where we say that
A caused B based on the manipulation of abstract (non-physical) models.
Because the agency theorist must reason between a M -event and a non-M
event, there will be many cases where Price’s analogical approach breaks
down. For example, we would not be able to speak about the causes of the
decline of fish in the Adriatic Sea, the Earth’s tides, or stars exploding as
supernovae because scientists do not model these events in such a way that
2There are many other cases where similar problems for Price’s solution to the problem
of scope can be made evident. For example, how would we apply Price’s strict analogy
approach to: ‘shark bites can be lethal’?
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they can be overtly manipulated. Rather, as I showed, these cases rely on the
hypothetical manipulations of abstract models. If by ‘artificial simulations’
Price means an abstract model, then his analogy between what scientists do
in their laboratory and the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake would similarly
break down (because M is not applicable to abstract models).
In such situations, there are three available options for the agency theo-
rist. The first choice (1) is to bite the bullet and admit that we cannot speak
sensibly about the causes of the earth’s tides or exploding stars. The second
option is to show how we can (2) draw the correct analogy between some M
event and the real world non-M event. The last option is to (3) show how
abstract modelling involves real agency.
I assume that Price would reject (1). Price explicitly defends option (2).
However, an obvious problem with option (2) is that it appears to amount to
the rather strange claim that we know about the causes of certain events not
based on the sophisticated abstract modelling used in science but rather on
some analogy based on the manipulation of a clumsy physical model. Price
does indicate that his theory can rely on option (3). Evidence for this claim
could be Price’s use of ‘simulations’ in the example he uses of the 1989 San
Fransisco earthquake. Price says that the best example of a means-end rela-
tionship concerning the earthquake is a situation ‘created by seismologists in
their artificial simulations of the movement of continental plates.’ I suggested
above, following Woodward, that by ‘simulations’, Price was referring to a
physical model. However, it may be the case that Price intends ‘simulations’
to mean a computer simulation or an abstract model. If this is the case, Price
would need an argument to explain how the experimental manipulations of
abstract models involve real agency.
Price’s only argument for this position is that Woodward’s theory of
interventionism—which utilises the concept of experimental manipulations
of abstract models—requires agency. Because interventionism avoids the
problem of scope, if Price’s argument stands, he thinks that the agency the-
ory can make use of the same tools. Reasoning by analogy with abstract
models would help Price because it would allow him to use abstract models,
which are common in science, as the relevant non-M event. Rather strangely,
Price’s position, as we saw in chapter 4, is that Woodward’s theory makes
causation mind-dependent, and therefore this leads to agent-subjectivity. On
one issue, Price is correct: Woodward’s theory is mind-dependent. But, Price
has not shown how mind-dependance (what I called frameworking) leads to
real agency. Sure, Woodward’s theory entails that we model events based
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on limited factors or variables that we find interesting and relevant (I am
following Price here in emphasising the ‘we’). But, frameworking and rela-
tivity, which apply to Woodward’s theory, do not entail real agency. As we
saw in the debate between Woodward and Price on objectivity, Woodward
accepts that interventionism is relative (to a certain extent), but he denies
that interventionism involves (overt) agency. So, Price himself is unable to
utilise those features of interventionism that might help his agency theory
overcome the problem of scope simply by arguing that interventionism is
subjective. To utilise the same tools as Woodward’s theory, Price would
need a specific argument to show precisely how interventionism, specifically
abstract modelling, involved the notion of agency. Price offers no such argu-
ment. Price’s theory is overly committed, i.e., exclusively committed, to the
concept of overt agency, and, in turn, he is unable to capture the features
of interventionism that would otherwise benefit his theory. As I will argue
in a moment, Causal Interactionism does provide an argument to show how
abstract modelling involves real agency. So, a unique benefit to Causal In-
teractionism is that it can rely on option (3), whereas Price’s version of the
agency theory cannot.
Option (3) will not work for Price. The agency theorist is left with a
dilemma: Either he accepts that we have to reason from aM event to a non-
M event in order to remain consistent with his analysis of cause (‘A causes B
iff bringing about...’), or he must alter his definition of a cause. Option one
is insufficient as a solution to the problem of scope. It leaves too many cases
unanswered. Option two means the agency theorist admits a small defeat
and heads back to the drawing board.
8.2.1 A Solution to the Problem of Scope
In the previous chapter, I said that Causal Interactionism has the tools to
overcome the problem of scope. This was somewhat misleading. Actually,
Causal Interactionism avoids the issue of scope altogether. Causal Interac-
tionism does not need to find a solution to the problem of scope because,
as constructed, the problem does not occur. The problem does not occur
because I have shown that abstract modelling involves real agency (viz., hy-
pothetical agency). This allows Causal Interactionism to extend the causal
relation to casual claims captured by abstract models.
Concerning the issue of scope, the problem with traditional agency theo-
ries is that they are forced to reason between a M -event and a non-M event.
164
This is problematic for two reasons. First, we can never be sure, as Woodward
points out, that the analogy is strong enough. There may be cases, many
cases in fact, where the analogy breaks down because we failed to consider
one of the essential features in question. Moreover, as shown in the lightning
example, there may be cases where we have a good analogy but whether or
not the analogy is successful in the sense that it captures the essential fea-
tures of the two events is unclear. Second, an appropriate analogy could be
unavailable, and we would be forced into irrational considerations (such as
‘I don’t know why the field caught fire’ when we have substantial evidence,
albeit not a strict analogy, for the claim the lightning was the cause).
As an example, consider what Causal Interactionism would say about
certain so-called unmanipulable causes, e.g., the lightning and the fire. As I
mentioned above, as long as we have an approximate understanding of the
effects of lightning, we could reason that had we prevented the lightning, the
grass would not have caught fire. We can also reason that, had we produced
lightning, we could have caused a fire. There are two things to point out.
First, contrary to the strict analogy approach, all that is necessary to over-
come the problem of scope is an approximate understanding of a cause’s (e.g.,
the lightning’s) effects. Second, given this understanding, we can reason that
‘had I prevented the lightning, I could have prevented the fire’. What this
shows is that we can eliminate the need for a strict analogy and, quite sig-
nificantly, how the alleged non-M event—the lightning strike—involves real
agency, viz., hypothetical agency.
The same is true for the case of the 1989 San Fransisco earthquake. Given
an approximate understanding of the effects of plate tectonics, I can use hy-
pothetical agency to reason about the effects of certain (hypothetical) ma-
nipulations. For example, I could deliberate about what would happen if
I were to manipulate the convergent boundaries (the place where the crust
is destroyed as one plate dives under another) in such a way that the force
or energy between the two plates accumulated but was not released. If the
accumulated energy was equivalent to 99,000,000 tonnes of TNT, when the
energy was released, I would produce a magnitude 9.0 earthquake. I can also
reason about the earthquake as a cause. Given an approximate understand-
ing of the effects of earthquakes, I can use hypothetical agency to reason
about the destruction of cities like Pompeii or San Fransisco.
In essence, Causal Interactionism avoids the problem of scope because
Causal Interactionism shows us how abstract modelling involves real agency.
By reasoning about hypothetical manipulations, Causal Interactionism can
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extend causation to events or objects that cannot be manipulated overtly
but that can be hypothetically manipulated within a causal model. This is
a significant advantage over conventional agency theories, which have tra-
ditionally relied on the problematic notion of analogical reasoning. It goes
without saying that there are, of course, good physical models and that it is
okay to rely on them—the point is that exclusively relying on them does not
allow us to overcome the problem of scope. Coming back to the lightning
example, Causal Interactionism can use hypothetical reasoning to say that
the cause of the fire was the lightning and avoid the need for a strict analogy
as well as the subsequent concern about whether or not the analogy is good
one.
There are many other cases where perhaps we could manipulate certain
objects or events overtly, but our understanding of specific causal relation-
ships are based on hypothetical agency and abstract modelling. I used the
example in an earlier chapter of the decline of certain fish populations in the
Adriatic Sea following the light fishing period of World War I. We were able
to understand the relationship between fishing levels and the populations of
fish in the Adriatic Sea by hypothetically experimenting with abstract mod-
els (recall Volterra’s mathematical equations). Causal Interactionism can
take the science at face value. Because Causal Interactionism shows us how
hypothetical experiments with abstract models involves real agency, there is
simply no need to think any further about how the hypothetical experiments
relate to real-world, overt manipulations. For example, a traditional agency
theorist like Price might say that we could carry out overt manipulations—
for example, by running costly and time consuming fishing experiments in
the Adriatic Sea—but there is simply no reason to view the real-world ex-
periments as preferable to the hypothetical ones. Moreover, it is a common
practice throughout science to draw conclusions via abstract modelling, and
it would be absurd to say that the agency theorist can make sense of (some
of) the claims in science (which rely on hypothetical manipulations) because
we could perform some closely related overt action.
8.3 The Experiential Problem of Scope
In the above section, I explained the problem of scope in relation to a analytic
analysis. The problem of scope, according to the analytic analysis, is that
there are events or objects that we know to be causal, but these events or
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objects fail to qualify as causes based on the specific analysis that a cause
is something that an agent can manipulate or bring about. I also explained
how Causal Interactionism avoids this problem.
However, following the ideas of Gasking and Price, there is a second
analysis of the agency theory, one which is often conflated with the analytic
analysis, that seems to lead to the problem of scope. Agency theorists suggest
that causation is connected to the experience of agency. I will explain the
experience of agency in more detail below. However, prima facia, relating
causation to our experience seems to limit what we are allowed to call causes.
As I stated in the introduction, if we think of the ‘experience’ as something
like our historical experience of manipulation, then anything that falls outside
of the agent’s historical experience, that is, anything an agent does not have
the experience of manipulating, cannot be considered to be causal.
Given the interpretation of ‘experience’ as an agent’s historical experi-
ence of manipulation, the idea that causation is connected to our experience
certainly does unduly limit what we are allowed to call causes. As I will
explain below, I think this interpretation is indicative of Gasking’s approach.
Whether or not Price endorses this interpretation is not clear. Some of
Price’s remarks on the experience of agency seem to lead to the idea that
he is thinking in terms of the agent’s historical experience of manipulation,
like Gasking. Other remarks by Price appear to indicate a rather different
interpretation of ‘experience’. I will parse many comments from Price, note a
distinction between two alternative interpretations of ‘experience’, and argue
that a single definition of ‘experience’ is not explicitly supported by Price. I
will then conclude this section by offering my understanding of the experi-
ence of agency, and I will argue that this interpretation avoids any issues of
scope.
8.3.1 Gasking and Price
Gasking (1955) argues that the cause-effect relationship should be explained
in terms of a ‘producing-by-means-of relation’ (1955, p. 485). Gasking says,
we say “A causes B” ‘in cases where one could produce an event or state of
the A sort as a means to producing one of the B sort’ (ibid). For example,
we say that iron glows by making it hot. For Gasking, the notion of cau-
sation is connected with our manipulative techniques for producing results.
He famously said that ‘a statement about the cause of something is very
closely connected with a recipe for producing it or for preventing it’ (ibid,
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my emphasis).
Following Gasking, there is a second and separate analysis of the agency
approach that leads to the problem of scope. The second analysis is based
on what Gasking says about an agent’s experience. Note the following quote:
We learn by experience that whenever in certain conditions we
manipulate objects in a certain way a certain change, A, occurs.
Performing this manipulation is then called: “producing A” (ibid,
486. My emphasis).
Gasking seems to imply that we only say that A causes B when we have
the overt experience of producing B by producing A. So, there appears to
be a second concern regarding the problem of scope. If causation is directly
related to an agent’s ‘experience’, then we can only speak about causes when
we have the requisite experience (of production, for example). It is true that
Gasking says that ‘one says A causes B in cases where one could produce an
event or state-of the A sort’ (my emphasis), but what Gasking says about
experience seems to contradict this. We speak of A causing B not when
one could produce A but in cases where one has the historical experience
of producing A. Gasking confirms this position when he speaks of recipes
or techniques for production. He says the notion of causation ‘is essentially
connected with our manipulative techniques for producing results’ (ibid, p.
483). Of course, we learn such techniques through experience. Originally,
we did not find recipes just lying around; we learned recipes by performing
manipulations.
So, following Gasking and his remarks on experience, the problem of scope
arises because there are many cases where we say that A causes B and we
lack the requisite experience of producing B by doing A. Examples abound,
and it seems that we are right back where we started. Human agents lack the
experience of producing earthquakes, Big Bangs, expanding universes (and
indeed, in some cases, much more), and yet we know that these events either
have causes or act as causes themselves.
Because Gasking says that we speak of producing events of the A sort, he
might reply that while we lack the direct experience of producing earthquakes
and Big Bangs, we do have the experience of producing events of this sort.
I will not reply to this because I have already spoken about the problems
associated with analogical reasoning—viz., reasoning between a non-M and
a M event. Even if this kind of logic gets us to cases where we lack the
168
connection to direct experience, a new problem emerges. The problem is
that human agents do not share the same experiences, and it is not clear
that Gasking would allow us to generalise the direct experience of one agent
to another (it is not clear that he would allow us to “share recipes”).
Like Gasking, Price also relates causation to our experience as agents. He
says, quite significantly,
[T]he central point is that the concept of causation is to be ex-
plained by relation to our experience as agents in the same way
that the concept of colour as a secondary quality is to be explained
by relation to our experience as observers (1993, p. 193).
Price notes that our experience as agents is fallible. Overt manipulations
(of the ‘bringing about’ sort) do not lead to an infallible guide to the existence
of causal relationships. Rather, Price’s point seems to be that our experience
as agents provides a level of credence for certain causal relationships (what
he calls ‘agent probabilities’). Nonetheless, Price is committed to the idea
that the ‘central point’ of the agency theory is that causation is directly tied
to our experience as agents.
That being the case, what does Price mean by ‘experience’? Consider
the following quote. Price says that, as agents, we have a very special class
of succession:
[T]hose in which the earlier event is an action of our own, per-
formed in circumstances in which we both desire the later event,
and believe that it is more probable given the act in question than
it would be otherwise. To put it more simply, we all have direct
personal experience of doing one thing and thence achieving an-
other. We might say that the notion of causation thus arises
not, as Hume has it, from our experience of mere succession; but
rather from our experience of success : success in the ordinary
business of achieving our ends by acting in one way rather than
another (1993, p. 194)
In one way, Price seems to be saying something rather different from
Gasking. When he says that we have the experience of doing one thing
and achieving another, Price appears to indicate that ‘experience’ means our
experience of being agents, that is, our experience of being agents in general.
Call ‘being an agent’ the general experience of agency. Given the general
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experience of agency, the so-called experience of agency would mean the
experience of having done one thing and achieving another. However, Price
seems to contradict this interpretation when he talks about our experience
of success. The experience of success seems to indicate that what Price
means by experience is something more similar to Gasking. I explained
that, for Gasking, we say that A causes B, when we have learned, through
experience, a recipe for production (‘producing by means of...’). If we focus on
what Price says about success, it may be that Price is essentially reiterating
Gasking’s point. Utilising Price’s language, we could say that we have good
evidence of causal relationships when we have the experience of successfully
bringing about B by overtly doing A. In other words, agent probabilities,
which indicate causal relationships, strictly apply to the agent’s experience
of successfully bringing about (some effect). The experience of successfully
bringing about A and achieving B indicates that ‘experience’ means what
it did for Gasking—the historical experience of manipulation or (in Price’s
language) bringing about.
Indeed, if ‘experience’ meant the general experience of being an agent,
it is hard to see how Price would cash out ‘agent probabilities’ in terms of
agents generally having done one thing and achieved another. If you recall
from chapter 3, according to Price, a free action can ‘break’ the spurious
correlation between two events by creating an independent causal history
via the free act. The probability that A causes B would be higher when
the agent’s free action was working through a causal pathway, rather than
a correlation. So, at least in terms of agent probabilities, ‘the experience
of agency’ seems to mean the historical experience of bringing about. For
example, we could not distinguish between spurious and (actual) causal re-
lationships by having the general experience of agency, that is, by merely
doing one thing and achieving another. We speak about causal relationships
when the agent has already had the experience of doing one thing and bring-
ing about another. For example, I know that the rooster is a spurious cause
of the rising sun because I actually manipulated the rooster, not because I
have the general experience of doing one thing and achieving another, e.g.,
having the experience of rubbing two sticks together and producing fire. I
could break the evidential bearing of roosters on rising suns by creating an
independent causal history and thus break the usual evidential bearing of
roosters on rising suns, but this would require a new and distinct act, a new
experience, viz., one that deprives roosters of their usual evidential bearing
to rising suns.
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By relating experience to our success, the suggestion seems to be that ‘ex-
perience’ means our historical experience of bringing about a certain event
(B) by doing something overt (A). If this interpretation of experience is cor-
rect, then the worry arises that agent probabilities (and thus causal relation-
ships) apply only to those events or situations where an individual agent has
the experience of performing a manipulation. While I think it is still unclear
how we should interpret Price’s use of ‘experience’, it is important to note
that some of his critics have made up their minds. Woodward, for example,
interprets Price’s use of experience in terms of the historical experience of
manipulation. Woodward says:
If the only way we understand causation is by means of our prior
grasp of the experience (or notion) of agency, then we face the
obvious problem about the extension of causal notions to circum-
stances in which the relevant experience of agency is unavailable
(2003, p. 123).
When Woodward speaks of ‘the relevant experience,’ he takes experience
to mean the agent’s historical experience of manipulation or bringing about.
So, given this interpretation, agent probabilities would apply only to those
events or situations where a particular agent has the overt experience of
bringing about B by doing A. Any event or situation where an agent lacked
the relevant experience of bringing about would not be considered causal.
However, Price might be able to avoid some of these complications if by
experience he means the general experience of agency. If by ‘experience’ Price
means the general experience of being an agent, then we could extrapolate
our experience as agents, that is, doing one thing and achieving another,
to any case where we could bring about B by doing A. Indeed, this would
avoid the problem of relating causal relationships to an individual’s history
of bringing about. However, it would not altogether prevent the problem
of scope. If I lacked the experience of manipulating an event that is known
to be causal, e.g., the movement of tectonic plates, the analogical reasoning
approach that Price defends would still require that I have the experience
of manipulating a similar event. There are two problems with this. First,
I may lack the experience of manipulating a similar event, and I would not
be able to capture a claim such as ‘the 1989 San Fransisco was caused by
the movement of tectonic plates’. Second, even if I had the experience of
manipulating a similar event, I would be left trying to make sense of the
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unmanipulable cause by analogical reasoning, and I have already shown that
the analogical reasoning approach is insufficient for solving the problem of
scope.
If we grant that by ‘experience’ Price means the general experience of
being an agent, it may make the problem of scope less demanding, that is,
there may be fewer cases of unmanipulable causes. However, the significant
point to bear in mind is that, even if we give Price the ‘general experience’
analysis of experience, we are still left trying to make sense of all of the causal
claims where manipulation is humanly impossible. On the general experience
analysis, I may lack the experience of manipulating a particle accelerator.
Nonetheless, because I have the experience of being an agent, and because it
is (humanly) possible to manipulate a particle accelerator, e.g., by working at
CERN, I can talk sensibly about the creation of the Higgs-Boson. Yet, even
on the general experience analysis, I cannot make sense of causal claims that
involve impossible human actions, and, again, Price’s solution of analogical
reasoning is insufficient to overcome it.
So, whether or not we interpret Price’s views in terms of the experience of
being an agent or in terms of the historical experience of bringing about, he
cannot avoid the problem of scope (and he does not overcome the problem
by relying on analogical reasoning).
8.3.2 What Does Causal Interactionism Say about the
Experience of Agency?
I have argued that the agency approach can overcome the problem of un-
manipulable causes by making a distinction between overt and hypothetical
agency. Hypothetical agency, which includes mental actions like reasoning
about the effects of bringing something about, allows us to extend the concept
of agency to events where overt agency is impossible. This, in turn, makes it
possible to capture causal claims that do not or cannot involve overt agency.
Moreover, I have shown that hypothetical agency allows us to relinquish
the limiting requirement of analogical reasoning between two events (a non-
M and a M event). But, what would Causal Interactionism say about the
experience of agency? The question is important because the answer reveals
that the ‘experience of agency’ is an important component of hypothetical
agency, that is, reasoning about the effects of bringing something about. I
think the most plausible interpretation of the experience of agency is the
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general experience of agency. What Causal Interactionism should, and can,
make clear is that the ‘experience of agency’ should not be limited to our first-
hand experience as agents (that is, our historical experience of manipulation).
In the following example, we can see how the experience of agency works in
terms of hypothetical cases (i.e., hypothetical agency).
Recall Pearl’s example of the moon. The moon is an object that is impos-
sible for me to overtly manipulate. I cannot overtly manipulate the moon,
yet because I have a general understanding of the moon, say that its mass
is X and it affects the tides, and because I have the experience of being an
agent, that is, the experience of having done one thing and achieved another,
I can hypothetically manipulate it. The same goes for many of the scientific
claims about causes in space: the expansion of the universe, Kepler’s super-
nova in 1604, or the orbit of Uranus around the sun. Surely, the experience of
agency arises due to the (overt) manipulation of ordinary objects. However,
we can extrapolate this experience to hypothetical cases. Consequently, in
the hypothetical cases, when we reason that if I could do A, I would produce
or prevent B, the experience of agency plays a critical role.
I have used this section on the experience of agency to do three things.
First, I made a distinction between two possible ways that the agency theory
can lead to the problem of scope. The issue of scope is usually taken to
mean the problem in the analytic sense, the sense that was considered in §3.
However, ‘the experience of agency’ also leads to the problem of scope, and
it is often unclear which sense of the problem is being used when one raises
the problem (e.g., the quote from Woodward in this section rests on the
experiential sense). Second, the so-called experience of agency is a central
part of Price’s agency theory and, because I have been so heavily focused
on Price’s work, brushing aside the ‘experience of agency’ would amount to
dismissing a significant component his theory. Third, and most importantly,
Causal Interactionism can accommodate the ‘experience of agency’ and show
how it avoids the problem of scope.
8.4 Causal Variation and Ascription
In this last section, I want to highlight a problem for manipulation theo-
ries by focusing on the idea of difference making. Difference-making theories
claim that A is a cause of B because A (counterfactually or probabilistically)
makes a difference to B. Woodward (2003) explicitly endorses a counterfac-
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tual difference-making theory. What I want to highlight is a problem for
difference-making theories. The problem is that there are many variables
(using Woodward’s terminology), which, by manipulating them, would make
a difference to some effect. But, many of the variables that would make a
difference to an effect are considered to be insignificant and ultimately non-
causal. Thus, there must be a distinction between insignificant difference
makers and significant ones. I will highlight this problem and argue that the
agency approach that I prefer, viz., Causal Interactionism, can successfully
accommodate the distinction and explain why it is important.
Regarding the distinction between difference makers, that is, the need to
distinguish between insignificant and significant difference makers, we can
situate the problem by asking a question. In cases where there are various
difference makers, why are we willing to accept one claim about causation as
true and not another when both variations fit the difference-making criteria?
To highlight the problem, consider the following example.
Imagine that you have just returned from a week-long philosophy confer-
ence entitled ‘Causation and Difference Making’. As you enter your flat, you
notice that your favourite plant has died. Before you left for the conference,
you had asked Sally, your neighbour, to water the plant while you were away.
On seeing the dead plant, you infer that Sally forgot to water it or that she
got the dates for the conference wrong. Therefore, the cause of the plant’s
death is Sally’s omission—Sally’s not watering it. In other words, what made
a difference to the plant (either probabilistically or counterfactually) was the
fact that Sally did not water it. However, upon reflection, you suddenly
realise a problem: had anyone watered the plant, it would not have died.
So, for example, had the Queen watered the plant, it would not have died.
Should you conclude that the cause of the plant’s death was the Queen’s not
watering it? The Queen’s omission indeed made a difference to the plant,
and it is technically correct to conclude, via the difference-making analysis,
that the Queen’s not watering the plant caused it to die.
Consider another example. Imagine that a hurricane has just levelled
Jim’s house and every house on his block. Jim’s neighbour, Lorenz, who has
been out of town, arrives and asks Jim what happened to his home. Jim
tells him that a hurricane destroyed every house on the block—his house was
destroyed because of the hurricane. While this explanation seems initially
plausible, Lorenz, who is a physicist, tells Jim that he is somewhat mistaken.
Large events like hurricanes, Lorenz explains, can result from small causes
like the movement of a butterfly. The precise strength and direction of the
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storm was determined by sensitive initial conditions, which are influenced by
minor perturbations such as the flapping of the wings of a distant butterfly.
So, given a standard difference-making analysis, we can say that the cause
of the damage was the flapping of a butterfly’s wings.
What these examples are meant to reveal is that we need a way to dis-
tinguish between difference makers. Some difference makers, like hurricanes
and Sally’s omission, seem more significant than a butterfly and the Queen.
The important question is, how do we distinguish between significant and
insignificant difference makers?
One thought is that we can assign certain states, e.g., calm (non-hurricane)
weather, as defaults. We hold Sally responsible for the dead plant because
we think that, by default, people in distant places or strangers like the Queen
bear no responsibility to you or to your possessions. Being clear about de-
faults is useful when thinking about the distinction between difference mak-
ers, particularly in the context of causal modelling. Interventionists (Pearl,
2000; Woodward, 2003) model ‘small worlds’ where causal relationships per-
tain to a limited number of variables. It may be the case that we do not
include things like the Queen and the butterfly into a causal model because
of some prior expectation—by default we think that these factors are irrele-
vant. However, note that this does not explain the problem—it simply takes
for granted the fact that we hold some things to be more significant than
others. We still need to answer the following question: If we think that the
Queen’s omission made a difference to the plant, why not include it into a
causal model?
Before I answer the question, I want to consider a well-known solution
related to this problem. Peter Menzies, in his article, ‘Difference Making in
Context’ (2004), points out that it is often taken to be a matter of pragmatics
which ‘draws a distinction between causes and background conditions’ (p.
144). ‘Conditions’ are best thought of as all of the conditions of the physical
environment prior to a particular event. Given a strong realist assumption
about causation (e.g., the kind that Russell (1913) rejected), the event in
question is taken as an effect, and the prior conditions are all the causal
influences that make up or brought about the effect. So, the distinction
between causes and conditions is threefold: it includes irrelevant factors (non-
causes), non-significant difference-making factors (factors that technically
have a causal influence on the effect that we reject as causal), and difference-
making factors (what we call causes). What Menzies and myself want to show
is that non-significant difference-making factors are also irrelevant—they are
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simply non-causes. Consider an example used by Menzies:
A person develops lung cancer as a result of years of smoking. It
is true that if he had not smoked he would not have developed
cancer. It is also true that he would not have developed lung
cancer if he had not possessed lungs, or even if he had not been
born. But it is absurd to think his possession of lungs or even his
birth caused his lung cancer (Menzies, 2004, p. 143).
We might say that we do not think of the Queen’s omission or being
born as causes because the human mind selectively and pragmatically ranks
the cause to be some other factor. ‘The principle of invidious selection’, as
David Lewis calls it, ranks most of the causes of an event as mere background
conditions, disqualifying them from being difference makers. For Lewis and
others, who hold the metaphysical assumption that causation is a real and
absolute property in the world, the Queen being born and a profusion of other
events are causes. According to Lewis’s theory, ‘any event but for which the
effect would not have occurred is one of its causes’ (Menzies, ibid). Menzies
wants to show that this is false. He intends to show that the Queen, being
born, and a profusion of other events are not causes.
How does Menzies do this? Menzies calls the distinction between causes
and conditions (conditions will include non-significant difference makers) the
problem of profligate causes (2004, p, 143). Profligate causes are useless
causes or what Menzies means by non-causes. Menzies argues that we can
make the distinction by focusing on context. For Menzies, C makes a differ-
ence to E relative to Fm where F is a system or model and m represents the
normal laws and conditions within a system.
Menzies notes two parameters that provide context for causal claims.
First, the context of enquiry, and second, the context of initial conditions or
what he calls the context of ‘normal conditions’. The first parameter states
that causation is relative to enquiry, that is, the kinds of questions we ask,
and the second condition says that what we include into a causal model or a
system is based on the normal laws and conditions that make up that model
or system.
To illustrate these parameters, consider again the problem of the Indian
famine that I discussed in chapter 5:
The cause of a great famine in India may be identified by an
Indian peasant as the drought, but the World Food Authority
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may identify the Indian government’s failure to build up reserves
as the cause and the drought as a mere condition (Menzies takes
this from Hart and Honore´ 1985: pp. 35–6).
This example reveals that the same situation elicits different causal judg-
ments. The idea is similar to what Collingwood brings to light in the practical
sense of cause. I will highlight the connection with Collingwood below. For
now, note that the example demonstrates that different agents determine
that the same events have different causes, depending on the type of enquiry
being undertaken (e.g., the peasants are asking, ‘why did our crops die’? and
the World Food Authority is asking, ‘why did the peasants starve’?).
Here is another example from Menzies:
If a building is destroyed by fire, it may be true that the fire would
not have taken hold but for the oxygen in the air, the presence
of combustible material, and the dryness of the building. But
these are not significant difference makers. On the other hand,
if a fire breaks out in a laboratory or in a factory, where special
precautions are taken to exclude oxygen during the experiment or
manufacturing process, it would not be absurd to cite the presence
of oxygen as a significant difference maker and a cause of the fire.
In both situations it may be true that the fire would not have
occurred if oxygen had not been present (Menzies modifies this
example from Hart and Honore´, 1985: pp. 35–6).
This case reveals that what we include into a causal system is relative to
the normal laws and conditions of a particular system. Menzies calls this the
‘relativity to the context of occurrence’. The ‘context of occurrence’, usually
implicitly, gives us the ‘normal conditions’ that arise within a particular
system—a system being an indeterminate group of objects bound by ceteris
paribus laws:
A particular system may consist of a great many objects or very
few, of very large objects or very small ones. Astronomers and
cosmologists investigate vast systems—solar systems, galaxies, or
the cosmos itself. The systems investigated by biologists and
economists—economies, markets, species, populations, and so
on—are smaller, but still large by human standards. On the other
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hand, the systems investigated by particle physicists are small by
any standard. It is not always easy to determine which objects
belong to a particular system. This is not just because of our epis-
temic limitations, but because the spatiotemporal boundaries of
the system are indeterminate (Menzies, 2004, p.146).
I find much of what Menzies has to say about contextual parameters
illuminating. However, there is much more to be said about how, and indeed
why, we come to distinguish between difference makers. Why is the context
of inquiry helpful for making the distinction? Why is the context of initial
(ordinary) conditions likewise useful for distinguishing between causes and
non-causes? Are there more contexts that we use to distinguish between
difference makers? Below, I argue that we can answer these questions by
thinking about human agency and causal reasoning.
Before I offer an explanation for the above difficulties, it will be useful
to consider the notion of causal reasoning. Causal reasoning is steeped in
abstraction. What Menzies calls a system (what Pearl and Woodward call
‘small worlds’) is highly abstract. We begin to abstract away much of the
world because we have particular interests and goals. You may want to avoid
being injured or getting ill, and your interest leads you to ask a specific set
of questions; this, in turn, leads to the fact that much of the world becomes
irrelevant. If you want to avoid getting lung cancer or the flu, for example,
you will not be interested in how many universities are in California, the
number of bolts that are needed to build a 1957 Chevy, or whether I prefer
coffee over tea.
Causal reasoning also involves value judgments. Collingwood references
this idea when he talks about the hypothetical case of scientists claiming to
have discovered the cause of cancer, but the alleged “cause” does not enable
us to prevent cancer. Collingwood rejects the idea of a cause where the notion
of a handle is not applicable (where the “cause” cannot be used to produce or
prevent). What this reveals is that when we generalise a causal relationship,
‘C causes E’, we are interested in producing a fruitful generalisation. That is
to say, we are interested in generalisations that serve particular ends. When
causal generalisations are fruitful, having control over C (the cause) will allow
us (practical or hypothetical) control over E (the effect). We think that if
we can produce or prevent C, we can produce or prevent E.
Causal reasoning also relates to what Pearl (2000) calls the essence of
causation—prediction and control. To illustrate this, consider the examples
178
shown above. In all of the examples, I claim that the distinction between
difference makers can be captured by considering human agency and the
notion of control.
Absurdities Explained
1. The Queen: The Queen’s omission is not a cause because there
is no obvious sense in which we have control over the Queen or
where she has control over the plant (she does not know who you
are or where you live or even that you own a plant, for example).
Sally’s omission is considered causal because there is an obvious
sense in which we have some control over what she does, for
example, we interacted with her and asked her to water the plant
(in Menzies’ analysis, we would say that the ‘normal condition’
is that Sally waters the plant).
2. Lung Cancer: Having lungs and being born are not causes in
the sense that there is no obvious or ethical way for us to control
lung cancer by removing people’s lungs or killing babies. On the
other hand, smoking is considered a cause of lung cancer because
we can control whether or not we choose to smoke.
3. The Presence of Oxygen: Oxygen is not a cause of the fire in
the first instance because there is no obvious way for us to control
the level of oxygen. However, the reason why oxygen is a cause of
the fire in the laboratory is that in this context, unlike the earlier
context, we do have control over the level of oxygen.
4. The Indian Famine: The peasants consider the cause of the
great Indian famine to be the drought because the peasants think
that if there were more rain, then the famine would not have
occurred. Alternatively, the World Food Authority thinks that
a lack of food storage is the cause of the famine because that is
what they can control. For example, if they had intervened by
storing more food, then the famine would not have occurred.
I said that all of these cases could be captured by thinking about the
notion of agency and control. However, you would be correct to point out
that in the event of the Indian Famine, the peasants cannot (overtly) control
the level of rain and thus the occurrence of a drought. The Indian Famine
example reveals a problem for the idea that the distinction between differ-
ence makers can be captured by agency, viz., that it is impossible to overtly
manipulate and control things like the weather. However, the problem only
arises for standard agency theories of causation, e.g., Price’s (1993) account.
The peasants cannot overtly control the level of rain. The problem does not
arise for Causal Interactionism. The peasants can reason3—and it is likely
that this is what they are doing—that if they could control the level of rain,
they could have prevented the famine (Hindus believe that the deity Indra
controls the level of rainfall. In Vedic mantras, Indra is called upon to release
rain in times of draught and to stop downpours in times of excessive rain. In
the Vedic text, Manusmriti 3.76, we see the belief that worship could affect
rainfall, ‘An oblation duly thrown into the fire, reaches the sun; from the sun
comes rain, from rain food’). This is significant. What this shows is that
Causal Interactionism can resolve all of the absurdities, whereas traditional
agency theories cannot. Indeed, a benefit of Causal Interactionism is that it
can achieve the distinction between significant and non-significant difference
makers in cases where the reasoning involves hypothetical agency—reasoning
about the effects of φ where φ represents an impossible human action.
So, given that we are thinking in terms of Causal Interactionism, we can
explain the distinction between difference makers and overcome the alleged
absurdities noted above. The fact that we can show that the distinction
between difference makers can be captured by thinking about control and
human agency is a benefit of the agency approach. The fact that we can
capture the distinction in cases where overt action does not apply (e.g., the
Indian Famine and the peasants) is a further benefit of Causal Interactionism.
The last benefit of Causal Interactionism is quite significant, and it’s
worthwhile to briefly elaborate on what has been said. How we interact
with the world as agents is based on context—contexts like enquiry and
normal conditions. In the example of the building fire and the Indian famine,
different agents determined different causal relationships depending on how
they interact with the world. That is, the kinds of questions we ask and the
‘normal conditions’ that we take for granted are all included in the unique
way that we interact with the world as practical agents. When we interact
with the world as agents, we always have some particular end in mind, and
3The reason the peasants apply this type of reasoning to [rainfall] is because rain is
naturally variable. In previous years, we can assume, the level of rain was much higher.
The famine occurred, according to the peasants, because the amount of rain varied to such
a degree that their crops died. Below, I will further explain why the peasants view the
lack of rain as the cause, and why other situations, e.g., the plant and the Queen, do not
necessarily involve further elaborations of hypothetical reasoning.
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this end will help determine the things we abstract away, based in part on
what the agent takes to be the normal conditions. The end we are interested
in achieving will also help to determine what kinds of questions we ask. In
simple terms, context is merely a natural part of the interactions that we
have with the world as agents. So, for Causal Interactionism, the context
that Menzies’ speaks of is directly built in, and the cause of an event can
vary because different agents interact with the world in various ways. Allow
me to further explain.
It is true that if the peasants had reasoned if the World Food Authority
had stored more food, then the famine would not have occurred, then the cause
of the famine for the peasants would be the lack of food stores. However,
the lack of food stores is not a cause for the peasants because their “normal
conditions” do not include a certain level of food stores. This is revealed, in
part, by what kind of question the peasants ask about the famine, e.g., why
did our crops die?, which is simply a measure of how they interact with the
world. But, this also shows a further type of context: the context of prior
expectations. If the peasants had some prior exception about the amount
of food they would receive from the World Food Authority, they may have
reasoned about the food stores. In this case, the lack of food would be a cause
for the peasants as well as for the World Food Authority. If the peasants
had a prior expectation regarding the level of food stores, they might have
asked a different question, e.g., why wasn’t there more food stores? Thus,
their interaction with the world would be different. But, the peasants had no
prior expectation of food stores. They did have prior expectations regarding
the amount of rainfall that would occur in a particular season. Thus, and
rather simply, a cause is determined or ascribed to a particular event by the
kind of interaction we have with the world as agents. The interactions we
have with the world as agents include or assume the kinds of questions we
ask, what we take to be “normal”, and some level of prior expectation.
Imagine that the cause of a house fire was taken to be the running stove—
the fire was caused because the stove was left running. In this case, the
homeowner may reason that, if she had turned off the stove, she could have
prevented the fire. However, it would also be true if the homeowner had
reasoned if the home was never built, then the fire would not have occurred.
This last counterfactual is true. But, the house being built is not a taken as
a cause because, among other things, the homeowner is asking, why did this
house burn down? Moreover, when reasoning about the cause of the house
fire, she is considering some prior expectations about her behaviour (that she
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turns off the stove) and the normal conditions of the home when she is away
(that the stove is turned off).
So, the particular cause we ascribe to an event is based on how we interact
with the world. In many cases, like above, the kinds of questions we ask, what
we consider to be normal, and our prior exceptions will determine which
events, objects, or variables we deem to be significant and ultimately causal.
If a young boy dies because a stray bullet hit him, there are likely hundreds if
not thousands of counterfactuals that could be used to explain his death. Had
he not been born, had he not woken up, had he not been at that particular
street corner, had the shooter not..., etc. But, what we ascribe as causal will
be determined by the interactional engagements we have with the world as
agents. If the boy’s mother sent her child to the corner to get milk because
the mother had forgotten to buy it the day before, she might hold herself
responsible. Alternatively, when I make a causal model of the event, I do
not include the mother’s request for milk because I have no prior expectation
that a mother would avoid doing such a thing. I would not include the boy
being born or the fact that he got out of bed that day for the same reason.
Significantly, the interactions we have with the world as agents can also
clarify how we ascribe the notion of control to particular objects or events.
Similar to what Collingwood points out, the mother applies the idea of con-
trol to her decision to send her son to get milk. For the mother, her prior
expectations and her normal conditions lead her to feel a sense of control
of her son’s movements around the city. The fact that she applies the idea
of control to her decision regarding her son leads her to believe that she is
causally responsible for her son’s death. When we make a causal model of the
event, we may lack the same prior expectations and assume different normal
conditions. For example, we do not hold the prior expectation that a mother
refrains from asking her son to get milk. We may hold the expectation that
people will not shoot guns in the city, and this may lead us to think that the
shooter is responsible for the boy’s death. In other words, we apply the no-
tion of control to the shooter.4 Thus, we reason that had I manipulated the
shooter, or if we could manipulate further shootings, I believe that I could
4This is somewhat different from Collingwood. When I apply the idea of control to the
shooter, I may not have a practical way of controlling shooters—maybe If I were a police
officer or an FBI agent, I would—but this is not needed. I apply the notion of control to
shootings based on my prior expectations and what I take to be normal conditions, not,
as Collingwood says, because I can control shootings. This reveals an instance of applying
the notion of control in the hypothetical sense.
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have prevented the boy’s death or that I could prevent future deaths from
occurring.
8.4.1 Moral Judgment
I said that how we interact with the world as agents includes things like the
questions we ask, the ends we are interested in achieving, normal conditions,
and prior expectations. All of these contexts or interactions go into causal
ascription. These are perhaps some of the most significant factors or contexts
that make up our interactions, but there are others. One that is also worth
mentioning, and perhaps one that is tied up to some extent with the others,
is moral reasoning or moral judgment. Moral reasoning is practical reasoning
about what, morally, one ought to do (or in the past tense, what one ought to
have done). Moral judgment is the act of ascribing moral value to a particular
action—to judge an action as moral or immoral is to say that the action is
right or wrong (worthy of praise or blame). What I want to do here is draw
attention to the fact that in some cases, causal ascription will relate to moral
intuitions; I want to highlight the context of moral judgment.
To be clear, I argue that we can determine significant difference makers
based on judgments regarding moral responsibility. That is, in cases where
the significant difference makers have not yet been determined, we may de-
termine them by considering moral judgments. There may be cases where
our intuitions regarding significant difference makers lead us to determine
moral responsibility. In such cases, what is happening is likely that we have
used one of the other contexts, e.g., the context or normal conditions, to
determine significant difference makers. If a burglar enters my home and
breaks my television, using the context or normal conditions, I may reason
that the burglar is causally responsible for my damaged television because,
under normal conditions, people do not break into my home and try to steal
my possessions. In this case, I might then judge the burglars actions as
wrong because I have already determined him to be causally responsible for
damaging my television. I am interested in reversed cases—that is, cases
where moral judgments allow us to determine significant difference makers.
A possible example of the context of moral judgment is the case presented
above. It may be the case that the mother feels morally responsible for her
son’s death and then ascribes the notion of control to her decision regarding
her son. In this case, her moral reasoning leads to her conclusion that she
is causally responsible for her child’s death—i.e., she takes her decision re-
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garding her son to be a significant difference maker. This being the case, the
mother is saying, ‘what I did is wrong; therefore, I’m causally responsible’.
In other words, if the mother did not feel a sense of morally responsibility
for her son’s death, she would not consider her action to be a significant
difference maker.
However, if I were to model the event of the child’s death, I may reason
differently. I could argue with the mother, ‘you did nothing wrong; therefore,
you are not causally responsible.’ My argument would reveal that I do not
share the same context of moral judgment as the mother. I may judge that
the shooter acted wrongly and therefore that his actions are worthy of blame.
In this case, I am reasoning that the shooter was wrong and that the shooter
is causally responsible for the child’s death—the shooter’s actions represent
a significant difference maker. I do not deem the mother’s decision regarding
her son to be wrong, and thus, I do not consider the mother’s action to be a
significant difference maker.
The context of moral judgment may also be relevant to the case of the
plant and the Queen.5 When I ask Sally to water my plant for me while I am
away, assuming she agrees and that we have the dates right, I consider Sally
to be morally responsible for my plant’s well-being while I am away. I do
not consider strangers like the Queen to bear any morally responsibility for
my plant’s well being. This sense of moral responsibility leads me to judge
Sally’s omission as wrong, and this, in turn, leads to my judgment that Sally
is causally responsible for my plant’s death. Sally is a significant difference
maker, not the Queen, because Sally acted wrongly.
Something resembling the context of moral responsibility is also present
in Collingwood’s historical sense of cause. Collingwood, recall, tells the story
of the Fall—of Adam and Eve in the garden. When God asks Adam why he
ate the forbidden fruit, Adam replies that he did so because Eve told him
to; he sinned because Eve persuaded him to do so. What we see from this,
implicitly, is that Adam does not feel morally responsible for his sin. Adam
puts the blame on Eve because he thinks that her request for him to eat the
fruit makes her morally responsible. According to Adam, it was Eve’s actions,
not his own, which led to the Fall. Because Eve acted wrongly, and not
Adam, Eve’s actions represent a significant difference maker. However, God
reasons differently. God holds Adam and Eve morally responsible for their
5Assuming we have not already determined relevant difference makers using another
context, e.g., the context or normal conditions which was used above.
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own actions, and he subsequently banishes both of them from the garden. For
God, Adam and Eve both acted wrongly, and both of their actions represent
significant difference makers.
The brief foray into moral reasoning and moral judgment is meant to
highlight the fact that our moral judgments will often help to determine
significant difference makers. In other words, actions that we judge wrong
and blame worthy will often go into our considerations of causal ascription,
as I have tried to indicate with these examples. A simple way of expressing
this is to say that how we interact with the world as agents will sometimes
include a particular kind of moral reasoning or moral judgment, and these




The primary work of my thesis can be broken into two parts.
First, I have tried to show that there is, in fact, a significant and essential
relationship between causation and agency. I take it that Collingwood is
correct, along with Woodward and Price who agree with him, that causation
is agent-relative. Causation is agent-relative because causes are handles—
that is, they are things in nature that give us control (over other things in
nature). In essence, the causal relation is agent-dependent because causes
(as handles) are essentially connected to (overt or hypothetical) production
or prevention.
There are numerous implications for the causal relation. As I argued in
chapter 4, against Strevens, the causal relation is not mind-independent and
absolute. As Strevens himself notes, frameworking, which involves localising
a causal relationship, is fundamental to scientific practice—indeed, even to
physics. It follows that the causal relation is relative. Though it is unclear
just based on relativism that there is a constitutive relationship between
agency and causation, I argued that causation is relative to practices like
frameworking, and thus human agency, because, as Collingwood and Pearl
note, handles (and thus causes) would disappear if we take the causal relation
as absolute and frame-independent.
Following the work of chapter 5, we can also claim that the causal re-
lation is not, fundamentally, physical. In other words, the causal relation
doesn’t supervene directly on the physical—agents get in the way, even in
physics. Of course, in some cases, a causal relationship will clearly reference
physical facts. Indeed, a causal relationship may be reducible to physical
facts. Agency theorists can happily accept the claim that sometimes facts
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about a causal relationship will be physical. However, in other cases, there
may be no straightforward physical connection at all. We can assume that
the stock market crash in 1929 had something to due with physical facts, but
it is impossible to say what all of these facts are or even why they are signif-
icant. More importantly, we saw that practices like frameworking represent
an equally significant role when thinking about the nature of causation—so
much so that we can say that the causal relation essentially relies on prac-
tices like frameworking. For example, we can only say that C causes E when
C and E have both been localised (or made relative) to some kind of frame-
working. Now, we can see much more clearly what this means: frameworking
results from a particular interaction between agents and the world, and thus
human agency is also an essential element of the causal relation. By critically
analysing Ney’s theory of foundationalism, we are able to make a significant
and substantial metaphysical claim: the nature of causation is not (entirely)
physical.
In essence, chapters 4 and 5 were used to motivate the idea that causation
is agent-dependent or agent-relative by supporting the idea that the causal
relation is not mind-independent, absolute, or fundamentally physical.
Secondly, I defended an agency approach to causation against two crit-
ical concerns: the problem of scope and the problem of subjectivity. As I
explained in chapter 6, because the problem of scope can be taken as the re-
sult of an untoward anthropocentrism, I also had to explain how the agency
approach avoided an anthropocentrism of this kind. To do so, I argued that
the agency approach, which includes Woodward’s theory of interventionism,
is anthropocentric in what I called the common sense—it is anthropocentric
because human agents are given a privileged status regarding causation. Sig-
nificantly, I was able to show that the agency approach avoided an untoward
anthropocentrism, that is, metaphysical anthropocentrism, by rejecting the
claim that an agency approach stipulates that the causal relation is somehow
created by human agents.
By highlighting the debate betweenWoodward and Price, I further demon-
strated that the agency approach is capable of capturing a sense of objectiv-
ity. I argued that the agency approach is objective in a relative sense while
explaining how Woodward, Price, and Collingwood all reject the notion that
causation is objective in the absolute sense. By revealing the ways in which
all three philosophers rejected the idea that causation is absolutely subjec-
tive, I concluded that the agency approach was, indeed, objective. Given
that the causal relation is relative to certain interactional parameters, we
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can say that the claim ‘A causes B’ is an objective fact. It is not a mind-
or agent-independent fact, as Price argues, but it is a fact about the world
nonetheless, as Woodward rightly suggests. This is significant for two rea-
sons: I was able to resolve the debate between Woodward and Price while
overcoming the problem of subjectivity.
By demonstrating that a cause is something an agent can manipulate—
either overtly or hypothetically—the agency approach that I prefer, Causal
Interactionism, is able to capture well-known scientific claims about causa-
tion, which, as I said in the introduction to this thesis, appear to have nothing
to do with human agency. It appears that claims such as ‘a large asteroid
caused the extinction of the dinosaurs’ has nothing to do with agency be-
cause such claims do not rely on overt agency. Nonetheless, we do think that
if we had prevented the asteroid from hitting the earth near the Mexican
peninsula, we could have prevented the extinction. Significantly, by demon-
strating how such hypothetical reasoning involves real agency, I developed
a method to extend causation to events that do not or cannot involve overt
human agency and thus solved the problem of scope.
Lastly, I pointed out that Causal Interactionism allows us to make a
strong (and clear) metaphysical statement about the causal relation. Be-
cause the casual relation is neither physical nor anthropocentric, the nature
of the causal relation becomes interactional (Chapter 7). Indeed, the inter-
actional nature of causation fits well with Price’s ‘minimal’ and Woodward’s
‘moderate’ realism. Two statements follow: the causal relation is (1) some-
thing that is a part of the natural world (as Woodward likes to point out),
but it is (2) not something that exists independently of human agents (as
Price continually maintains). In many ways, Causal Interactionism repre-
sents a coalescence and unites the ideas of both Woodward and Price. But,
the two key ideas have been dormant in Collingwood all along. Indeed, the
bulk of this work boils down to two foundational claims that Collingwood
stated over 75 years ago—that a cause is something which exists in nature
but is agent-relative. In many ways, and as we have seen, Price’s work
has been focused on the later of Collingwood’s two claims, while Woodward
has tended to focus on the first (though they both accept each one). Once
statement (2) has been sufficiently motivated, all that was needed was (i) a
way to show that both (1) and (2) could be consistently maintained in light
of apparent counterexamples, like the dinosaurs’ extinction (see §2 & §3 of
this Chapter), and (ii) that an agent-relative approach to causation could
somehow maintain a sense of objectivity.
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In light of the work of Causal Interactionism, Collingwood’s words become
appreciably well founded. Causation, Collingwood says,
rests on...the relation between man and nature (1940, p. 310).
189
Bibliography
[Anscombe, 1957] Anscombe, G.E.M. (1957). Intention, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
[Ayer, 1971] Ayer, A.J. (1971). Language, Truth, and Logic. Penguin Books.
[Baghramian, 2010] Baghramian, M. (2010). ‘A Brief History of Relativism’,
in M. Krauz, Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology (ed). Columbia
University Press. 31–52.
[Barandiaran, et al, 2009] Barandiaran, X.E., E. Di Paolo, and M. Rohde,
(2009). ‘Defining Agency: Individuality, Normativity, Asymmetry, and
Spatio-Temporality in Action’, Adaptive Behavior, 17(5): 367–386.
[Barnouw, 1997] Barnouw, D. (1997). ‘The Shapes of Objectivity’, in A.
Megill (ed), Rethinking Objectivity. Duke University Press, 127–50.
[Beebee, 2007] Beebee, H. (2007). ‘Hume on Causation: The Projectivist
View’, in Corry and Price (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitu-
tion of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 224–249.
[Beebee, 2006] Beebee, H. (2006) Hume on Causation, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
[Bennett, 2017] Bennett, K. (2017). Making Things Up, New York: Oxford
University Press.
[Bernstein, 1983] Bernstein, R.J. (1983). Beyond Objectivism and Rela-
tivism. University of Philadelphia Press.
[Bernstein, 2016] Bernstein, S. (2016). ‘Grounding is not Causation’, Philo-
sophical Perspectives, 30(1): 21–38
190
[Bernstein, 2017] Bernstein, S. (2017) ‘Causal Idealism’, in T. Goldschmidt
and K. Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford
University Press.
[Carr, 1961] Carr, E.H. (1961). What is History? (Penguin Books).
[Cartwright, 1979] Cartwright, N. (1979). ‘Causal Laws and Effective Strate-
gies’, Nouˆs 13 (4): 419–37.
[Collingwood, 1940] Collingwood, R. G. (1940). An Essay in Metaphysics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Collingwood, 1946] Collingwood, R.G. (1946). The Idea of History. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
[Collingwood, 1960] Collingwood, R. G. (1960). The Idea of Nature. New
York: Oxford University Press.
[Daston and Galison, 2007] Daston, L. & Galison, P. (2007). Objectivity.
MIT Press: Cambridge.
[Davidson, 1963] Davidson, D. (1963), ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’,
reprinted in Davidson (1980) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 3–20.
[Davidson, 1971] Davidson, D. (1971). ‘Agency’ in Binkley, R.W., Bronaugh,
R.N., Marras, A., (eds) Agent, Action and Reason: University of
Toronto Press. 3–26.
[Dixon, 2016] Dixon, S. (2016) ‘What Is the Well-Foundedness of Ground-
ing?’ Mind, 125(498): 439–468.
[Dowe, 2000] Dowe, P. (2000). Physical Causation. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
[Elga, 2007] Elga, A. (2007). ‘Isolation and Folk Physics’, in Corry & Price
(eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s
Republic Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 106–119.
[Fabian, 1997] Fabian, J. (1997). ‘Ethnographic Objectivity Revisited’, in A.
Megill (ed), Rethinking Objectivity. Duke University Press, 81–108.
191
[Field, 2003] Field, H. (2003). ‘Causation in a Physical World’, in M.J. Loux
& D. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
[Fine, 1986] Fine, A. (1986). The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the
Quantum Theory, University of Chicago Press.
[Fine, 1993] Fine, A. (1993). ‘Fictionalism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy
XVIII.
[Frankfurt, 1978] Frankfurt, H. (1978). ‘The Problem of Action’, American
Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 2 157–162.
[Frigg, 2010] Frigg, R. (2010). ‘Models and Fiction’, Synthese 172: 251–268.
[Frisch, 2014] Frisch, M. (2014). Causal Reasoning in Physics. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
[Galison, 2014] Galison, P. (2014). ‘The Journalist, the Scientist, and Ob-
jectivity’ in Padovani, F., Richardson, R., & Tsou, J (eds) Objectiv-
ity in Science: New Perspectives from Science and Technology Studies.
Springer: New York.
[Gasking, 1955] Gasking (1955). ‘Causation and Recipes’ Mind Vol. 64, No.
256 pp. 479–487.
[Gaukroger, 2012] Gaukroger, S. (2012). Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
[Geertz, 1984] Geertz, C. (1984). ‘Anti Anti-Relativism’ American Anthro-
pologist, New Series, Vol. 86, No. 2. 263–278.
[Gillies, 2005] Gillies, D. (2005) ‘An Action-Related Theory of Causality’,
British Journal of Philosophy of Science 56: 823–842.
[Giere, 1988] Giere, R. (1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[Glazier, 2016] Glazier, Martin, 2016, ‘Laws and the Completeness of the
Fundamental’, in Reality Making, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 11–
37
192
[Glynn, 2013] Glynn, L. (2013). ‘Causal Foundationalism, Physical Causa-
tion, and Difference Making’, Synthese 6: 1017–1037.
[Godfrey-Smith, 2006] Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). ‘The Strategy of Model-
based Science’, Biology and Philosophy, 21: 725–740.
[Godfrey-Smith, 2009] Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009) ‘Models and Fictions in Sci-
ence’, Philosophical Studies 1: 101–116.
[Goldman, 1970] Goldman, A. (1970). A Theory of Human Action, Engle-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
[Goodman, 1978] Goodman, N. (1978).Ways of Worldmaking. Hackett Pub-
lishing Company.
[Gopnik and Schulz, 2007] A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (2007). (Eds), Causal
Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. New York: Oxford
University Press.
[Hart and Honroe´, 1985] Hart, L.A. and Honroe´, T. (1985). Causation in the
Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Hartmann, 2009] Hartmann, S. (2009). ‘Models and Stories in Hadron
Physics’, in Mary M. & Margaret, M. (eds) Models as Mediators: Per-
spectives on Natural and Social Science. Cambridge University Press,
326–346.
[Hausman, 1988] Hausman, D. (1998). Causal Asymmetries. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
[Hitchcock, 2007] Hitchcock, C. (2007). ‘What Russell Got Right’, in Corry
& Price (eds.), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Rus-
sell’s Republic Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45–65.
[Hieronymi, 2009] Hieronymi, P. (2009). ‘Two Kinds of Agency’ in Mental
Actions, L. O. Brien and M. Soteriou, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 138–162.
[Honore´, 2010] Honore´, A. (2010). ‘Causation in the Law’, The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition).
193
[Jago, 2016] Jago, M. (2016) (ed.), Reality Making, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[Jaynes, 2003] Jaynes, E.T. (2003). Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.
Cambridge University Press.
[Kant, 1998] Kant, I. (1998). The Critique of Pure Reason, G. Paul & W.
Allen (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[Keller, 1997] Keller, E.F. (1997). ‘The Paradox of Scientific Subjectivity,’ in
A. Megill (ed), Rethinking Objectivity. Duke University Press, 313–332.
[Krauz, 2010] Krauz, M. (2010). Relativism: A Contemporary Anthology.
Columbia University Press.
[Lewis, 1973] Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
[Lewis, 2004] Lewis, D. (2004). ‘Void and Object’, in Collins et al. (2004),
277–90.
[Lower, 2001] Loewer, B. (2001). ‘Review of Mind in a Physical World ’,
Journal of Philosophy, 98, 315–24.
[Mackie, 1974] Mackie, J.L. (1974). The Cement of the Universe. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
[Megill, 1997] Megill, A. (ed) (1997). Rethinking Objectivity, Duke University
Press, second edition.
[Mele, 1997] Mele, A.R. (1997). ‘Agency and Mental Action’, Philosophical
Perspectives, 11: 231–249.
[Mele, 2009] Mele, A.R. (2009). ‘Mental Action: A Case Study’, in Mental
Actions, L. O. Brien and M. Soteriou, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 17–37.
[Menzies and Price, 1993] Menzies, P. and Price, H. (1993). ‘Causation as a
Secondary Quality’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44:
187–203.
[Menzies, 2004] Menzies, P. (2004). ‘Difference-Making in Context’, in J.
Collins, N. Hall, & L. Paul (eds)Causation and Counterfactuals. 139–80.
194
[Menzies, 2007] Menzies, P. (2007). ‘Causation in Context’, in Causation,
Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited,
Price & Corry (eds.), pp. 191–223.
[Mill, 1875] Mill, J.S. (1875). A System of Logic. London: Parker and Son.
[Moser, 1999] Moser, P.K. (1999). Philosophy After Objectivity. New York:
Oxford University Press.
[Ney, 2008] Ney, A. (2008). ‘Physicalism as an Attitude’. Philosophical Stud-
ies. 138: 1–15.
[Ney, 2009] Ney, A. (2009). ‘Physical Causation and Difference-Making’,
British Journal of Philosophy of Science 60: 737–764.
[Noonan, 1999] Noonan, H.W (1999). Hume on Knowledge, London and New
York: Routledge
[Norton, 2006] Norton, J. (2006). ‘Do the Causal Principles of Modern
Physics Contradict Causal Anti-Fundamentalism?’
[Norton, 2007] Norton, J.D. (2007). ‘Causality as a Folk Science’, in Price, H
& Corry, R. (Eds.) Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality:
Oxford University Press. 11–44.
[Palmer, 1999] Palmer, S.E. (1999). Vision Science: Photons to Phe-
nomenology. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
[Peacocke, 2009] Peacocke, C. (2009). Mental Action and Self Awareness
(II): Epistemology, in Mental Actions, L. O. Brien and M. Soteriou,
(eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 192–214.
[Pearl, 2000] Pearl, J. (2000). Causality. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
[Pickering, 1995] Pickering, A. (1995). The Mangle of Practice: Time,
Agency & Science. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
[Pickering, 1997] Pickering, A. (1997). ‘Objectivity and the Mangle of Prac-
tice,’ in A. Megill (ed), Rethinking Objectivity. Duke University Press,
109–126.
195
[Potochnik, 2011] Potochnik, A. (2011). ‘Explanation and Understanding:
An Alternative to Strevens’ Depth. European Journal of Philosophy of
Science, 1: 29–38.
[Proust, 2009] Proust, J. (2009). ‘Is There a Sense of Agency for Thought?’,
in Mental Actions, L. O. Brien and M. Soteriou, (eds.), Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 253–280.
[Price, 1991] Price, H. (1991). ‘Agency and Probabilistic Causality’, British
Journal of Philosophy of Science, 42: 15–76.
[Price, 1992] Price, H. (1992). ‘Agency and Causal Asymmetry’ Mind, 101:
501–20.
[Price, 1992b] Price, H. (1992). ‘The Direction of Causation: Ramsey’s Ul-
timate Contingency’. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the
Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 2 : Symposia and Invited
Papers, pp. 253–267.
[Price, 1996] Price, H. (1996). Time’s Arrow and Archimedes’ Point. New
York: Oxford University Press.
[Price, 2001] Price, H. (2001). ‘Causation in the Practical Sciences: The
Case for Pragmatism’ in Suppes, Costantini, Galavotti (eds), Stochastic
Causality Stanford University Press. 103–121.
[Price, 2004] Price, H. (2004). ‘Models and Modals’, in Douglas Gillies (ed.),
Laws and Models in Science, Kings College Publications, 49–69.
[Price, 2007] Price, H. (2007). ‘Causal Perspectivalism’, in Corry and Price
(eds), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s
Republic Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 250–91.
[Price, 2011] Price, H. (2011). Naturalism Without Mirrors. Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[Price, 2013] Price, H. (2013). Expressivism, Pragmatism, and Representa-
tionalism, Cambridge University Press.
[Price, 2017] Price, H. (2017). ‘Causation, intervention and agency: Wood-
ward on Menzies and Price’, In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and H. Price
(eds), Making a Difference. Oxford University Press, 73–98.
196
[Price, 2017b] Misak, C & Price, H. (eds) (2017). The Practical Turn: Prag-
matism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century. Oxford University
Press.
[Putnam, 1982] Putnam, H. (1982). ‘Why There isn’t a Ready Made World’,
Synthese 51:2, 141–167.
[Putnam, 1990] Putnam, H. (1990). Realism with a Human Face. Harvard
University Press.
[Ramsey, 1929] Ramsey, F (1929). ‘General Propositions and Causality’, in
D.H. Mellor (ed.) (1978). Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic,
Mathematics, and Economics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 133–
51.
[Raven, 2016] Raven, M. (2016). ‘Fundamentality Without Foundations’,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(3): 607–626
[Rorty, 1979] Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Prince-
ton University Press.
[Russell, 1913] Russell, B. (1913). ‘On the Notion of Cause’, Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, 13: 1–26.
[Russell, 1948] Russell, B. (1948). Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.
Routledge: London & New York.
[Russo, 2011] Russo, F. (2011). Review of: Depth. An account of scientific
explanation, Michael Strevens. Theoria, 71: 261–263.
[Salmon, 1984] Salmon, W. (1984). Scientific Explanation and the Causal
Structure of the World. Princeton University Press.
[Salmon, 1998] Salmon, W. (1998). Causality and Explanation. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
[Schaffer, 2009] Schaffer, Jonathan. (2009). “On What Grounds What”, in
Chalmers, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontol-
ogy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 347–383
[Schlosser, 2015] Schlosser, M, (2015). ‘Agency’, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
197
[Sloman, 2009] Sloman, S. (2009). Causal Models: How to Think About the
World and It’s Alternatives, Oxford University Press.
[Strevens, 2007] Strevens, M. (2007). ‘Review of Woodward, Making Things
Happen’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74: 233–49.
[Strevens, 2008] Strevens, M. (2008). ‘Comments on Woodward, Making
Things Happen’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77: 171–
92.
[Weisberg, 2007] Weisberg, M. (2007). ‘Who is a Modeler?’, British Journal
for Philosophy of Science 58: 207–233.
[Woodward, 2003] Woodward, J. (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory
of Causal Explanation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Woodward, 2007] Woodward, J. (2007). ‘Causation With a Human Face’ in
R. Corry and H. Price (eds), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of
Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
66–105.
[Woodward, 2007b] Woodward, J. (2007). ‘Interventionist Theories of Cau-
sation in psychological Perspective’, in A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (eds),
Causal Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, and Computation. New York:
Oxford University Press.
[Woodward, 2008] Woodward, J. (2008). ‘Response to Strevens’. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 77: 193–212.
[Woodward, 2009] Woodward, J. (2009). ‘Agency and Interventionist The-
ories’, in The Oxford Handbook of Causation Beebee, Hitchcock, and
Menzies, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[Woodward, 2012] Woodward, J. (2012). ‘A Functional Account of Causa-
tion’, Philosophy of Science, 81 (5): 691–713.
[Woodward, 2013] Woodward, J. (2013). ‘Causation and Manipulability’,
The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Ed-
ward N. Zalta (ed.).
[Williamson, 2010] Williamson, J. (2010). In Defence of Objective Bayesian-
ism. New York: Oxford University Press.
198
[Williamson, 2007] Williamson, J. (2007). ‘Causality’ in D.M. Gabbay and
F. Guenthner (eds), Handbook of Philosophical Logic.
[von Wright, 1975] von Wright, G. (1975) ‘Causality and Determinism’. New
York: Columbia University Press.
[von Wright, 1971] von Wright, G.H. (1971). Explanation and Understand-
ing : Routledge Library Editions.
199
